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The general findings of the merger literature have raised the question of why mergers 
continue to be so prevalent when there is no conclusive evidence of value gains. In 
particular, the zero or even negative stock price reaction of the acquirer firm 
surrounding the announcement has been puzzling.  
In order to provide insight into this apparent contradiction, this study examines the 
sources and the realization of synergistic gains from mergers and acquisitions more 
directly. Prior studies on the sources of synergy have not been very effective since the 
nature of the data may have obscured the true economic impact of mergers. Using the 
rich information gained from the U.S. hotel industry data from 1991 to 2009, this 
study investigates the sources of merger-related gains while controlling for the market 
condition. Along the way, the much-neglected area of value erosion from M&A is also 
addressed.  
The findings indicate that at the hotel property level, both the target and the 
acquirer show significant cost savings; target hotel properties achieve price gains 
when they are merged into similar brand families of the acquirer; acquirer hotel 
properties gain occupancy improvements from the demand spillover from the target 
hotel properties. The study also finds that local market conflicts have a negative 
impact on the revenue of both target and acquirer properties. No evidence was found 
for price-increasing collusion among the properties of the target and the acquirer.      
The investigation of the offer premium and the operating performance shows that 
the offer premium is positively associated with synergistic gains for the acquirer 
 properties while it is non-significant for the target properties. These results suggest an 
interesting possibility that the premium may actually be a price to gain control over 
the target’s resources, which is critical to generating value on the acquirer side.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
After decades of research, the question of value creation from mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A) continues to be debated. Abnormal stock returns around the 
announcement of acquisitions consistently indicate that target shareholders experience 
significantly positive abnormal returns while the acquiring firm’s shareholders, on 
average, have negative or zero abnormal returns.  
While this result may be interpreted as evidence that M&As create some real 
economic value, with most of the gains accruing to the target shareholders, criticism 
has also been raised since the result is not observationally distinguishable from the 
mere transfer of wealth from the acquirer shareholders to the target shareholders 
without creating any value, or from mispricing in the financial market. Further, a 
negative drift found in the long-run stock price of the acquiring firms following the 
merger has raised the troublesome possibility that the gains from mergers are 
overestimated or non-existent (Agrawal, Jaffe, and Mandelker, 1992; Loughran and 
Vijh, 1997). 
The value creation from mergers has also been investigated by using the post-
acquisition operating performance of the merged firm from accounting data. The 
abnormal announcement stock return is based on the strong assumption that the stock 
price impounds the full information regarding the ex ante anticipated synergy of the 
merger. In contrast, the operating performance reflects the ex post realized synergy. 
Again, the findings have generally been mixed – some researchers reported 
improvement in operating performance (Healy, Palepu, and Ruback, 1992; Andrade, 
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Mitchell, and Stafford, 2001) while others found no evidence of performance 
improvement (Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1989; Ghosh, 2001).  
The lack of consensus regarding the creation of value through M&A has led 
academics to vigorous discussion of market efficiency (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; 
Baker, Ruback, and Wurgler, 2007) and econometric issues (Barber and Lyon, 1997; 
Kothari and Warner, 1997). Scholars have also investigated possibly non-value 
creating motivations underlying mergers, i.e. managers’ overconfidence (Malmendier 
and Tate, 2003) or hubris (Roll, 1986). Agency theories suggest that managers of 
bidding firms may overpay to pursue their personal objectives. To lend support to this 
claim, acquiring firm managers have been found to be richly rewarded through 
takeover activities (Grinstein and Hribar, 2004; Harford and Li, 2007). 
On the other hand, another stream of research has focused on the factors that 
affect the announcement abnormal return or operating performance. Along this line, 
researchers have examined various deal or firm characteristics, such as the payment 
method (stock vs. cash deal) (Travlos, 1987; Chang, 1998; Fuller, Netter, and 
Stegemoller, 2002), deal form (tender vs. non-tender offer), relatedness between the 
target and the acquirer (horizontal, vertical, or conglomerate merger), and firm 
characteristics (firm size (Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins, 1983) and public private 
status (Chang, 1998; Fuller et al., 2002)). Noting that all value creation actually takes 
place after the acquisition, researchers in organization theory have emphasized the 
importance of the integration phase of the M&A (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991). The 
final outcome of the M&A depends on the premerger decision-making as well as the 
successful post-merger implementation, which involves the procedural, physical, 
managerial, and socio-cultural aspects of the organization (Shrivastava, 1986; Pablo, 
1994).   
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1.2 Motivation and Research Questions 
The economic rationale for mergers and acquisitions is value creation through 
synergistic gains by combining two organizations. While synergy has been defined 
differently by researchers, the standard textbook definition states that when two firms 
combine into one, with the acquirer assuming assets and liabilities of the target firm 
(Brealy, Myers, and Marcus, 2007), synergy is created when the value of the 
combined firms exceeds the sum of the value of the two firms as separate entities, i.e. 
V0C > V0A + V0T where V0C denotes the value of the combined firms, V0A is the value 
of the acquiring firm, and V0T is the value of the target (Brealey, Myers, and Allen, 
2005). While the value of synergy is defined as V0C – (V0A + V0T) from the above 
relationship, this is only true when the acquirer pays exactly V0T to the target firm. 
Typically, the acquisition price (P0T) often exceeds the value of firm T (V0T) and the 
difference is defined as the price premium (PP0T) paid to the target shareholders (PP0T 
= P0T – V0T). In a recent review of the literature, Eckbo (2009) reported that the offer 
premium reaches about 45 - 50%. In consideration of the offer premium, a positive 
synergy means that V0C – (V0T + V0A) – PP0T > 0 (Canina and Kim, 2010).  
A survey of CFOs shows that the primary motivation for M&As is to achieve 
synergies (Mukherjee, Kiymaz, and Baker, 2004). While enthusiasm for M&A 
activities has continued in the market with recurring merger waves, empirical studies 
have not provided conclusive evidence of value creation reflected in stock returns or 
operating performance measures. Thus, a legitimate area of research would be an 
investigation of the sources of synergy and its realization. Nevertheless, surprisingly 
little research has looked into the underlying sources of the gains from mergers 
(Kaplan, 2000; Andrade et al., 2001).  
This dearth of studies is not because there are no theoretical grounds for 
determining the sources of synergy that can be induced by mergers and acquisitions. 
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Drawn from theories of economics and finance, the economic rationale for possible 
synergistic gain by combining two organizations is clearly established. Collusive 
synergy refers to the market power in the output market and buying power in the input 
market as the industry moves closer to a monopolistic structure. Operating synergy is 
expected from economies of scale and scope through the higher utilization of facilities 
and personnel, spreading of overhead, or advantages of common learning curves. 
Managerial synergy is realized from more competent management achieved by putting 
better capabilities and knowhow in place. Financial synergy is the gain expected from 
the reduction of cost of capital by diversifying risks through combining unrelated 
businesses or tax savings by taking advantage of losses of the target through merger 
(Bradly, Desai, and Kim, 1988; Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford, 2001; Devos, 
Kadapakkam, and Krishnamurthy, 2009).  
While the economic rationale for possible synergistic gains is solid, the 
problem is rather the lack of relevant information sets to verify the sources of synergy 
and realized impact (Calomiris and Karceski, 2000). For instance, market power 
affects price while buying power influences cost of goods sold. In order to pinpoint 
specific sources and the impact of synergy, highly detailed information is required. 
This includes not only price and cost information of the merged firm but also 
information on the product market and the demand conditions. Existing empirical 
studies, which typically examine the stock returns or operating income measures from 
a large sample of a dataset, only capture the net impact of the synergistic gain (or loss). 
Thus, with this traditional approach it is impossible for researchers to identify the 
underlying sources of gain (Piloff and Santomero, 1998; Kaplan, 2000; Andrade et al, 
2001).  
This study attempts to fill this research gap, using the proprietary dataset of the 
lodging industry. First, I directly investigate the possible sources of synergy gain and 
5 
their realized outcome. The dataset provides detailed hotel property level price, 
quantity demanded, quantity supplied, and revenue covering the entire U.S. market, 
including information regarding the geographic locations of the properties. For a 
smaller subset of the hotel properties, revenue, cost, and expense data are available as 
well. Such information allows us to evaluate the specific sources of gain with the 
corresponding impact, which in turn will contribute to our understanding about which 
type of synergy contributes to the creation of value in mergers and acquisitions and 
which makes a weaker contribution.  
Second, scholars have long been puzzled by findings of zero or even negative 
abnormal stock price reactions for the acquiring firms surrounding the announcement 
of the merger. Andrade et al. (2001: p.118) have noted, “We would like to believe that 
mergers would happen for the right reasons, and that their effects would be, on 
average, as expected by the parties during negotiations. However, the fact that mergers 
do not seem to benefit acquirers provides reason to worry about this analysis.” A valid 
question should then be whether the anticipated sources related to the synergistic gains 
work differently for the acquirer versus the target. Nevertheless, there has been little 
research in this area. The biggest obstacle is that once the deal is completed, it is 
difficult or even impossible to disentangle the performance of the target and the 
acquirer and investigate them separately. After the deal is completed, the target and 
the acquirer are unified.  Production units may merge and sales units are consolidated.  
In this respect, the property-level lodging industry dataset provides a rare 
opportunity to trace detailed information about the target and the acquirer separately 
before as well as after the merger. Lodging firms have great economic motivation for 
expansion, both geographically and across different product types. Consequently, 
M&As have been active in the lodging industry. Since the individual units of hotel 
properties are maintained even after the deal is completed while the performance will 
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be influenced by the changes created by the merger, this unique feature enables us to 
analyze the performance of the target and the acquirer separately in the post-
acquisition phase. By doing so in conjunction with identifying the related sources of 
gain, this study provides additional insights into the inequality observed in the stock 
price reactions of the target and the acquirer.  
Third, while synergies are the focus of mergers and acquisitions, there are also 
possible costs associated with them which have been largely unaccounted for in the 
existing literature. Andrade et al. (2001) reiterated that in order to better understand 
the outcome of mergers, information is needed about the sources of value creation as 
well as possible destruction. It should be noted that in this study cost does not mean 
the one-time integration costs or overall agency-driven mergers, but negative side 
effects associated with the merger that may occur simultaneously with the synergistic 
impact in the merged organization. Ross, Westerfield, and Jaffe (2008) describe such 
value erosion in their corporate finance textbook as follows: “Another difficulty in 
determining incremental cash flow comes from the side effects of the proposed project 
on other part of the firm. A side effect is classified as either erosion or synergy. 
Erosion occurs when a new product reduces the sales and hence, the cash flows of 
existing projects.” For example, in mergers driven by geographic roll-up or product or 
market extension (Bower, 2001), while the objectives of the transaction should be 
economies of scale and scope, cost-saving, or higher efficiency, the perturbation in the 
product family and the geographic locations may cause cannibalization, brand dilution, 
or territorial conflicts.  
Although there are equally solid theoretical grounds for possible value erosion 
associated with mergers in the operational side, this aspect has not been considered in 
the empirical studies of mergers and acquisitions. The lodging industry data provide 
each property’s product type and detailed geographic information. Using this rich data, 
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this study incorporates the possible sources of negative impact of as well as the 
positive synergy from mergers and acquisitions. In this way, this study contributes to a 
more precise evaluation of the impact of mergers and acquisitions on performance.  
 
1.3 Organization of the Dissertation 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, a 
summary of pertinent literature is presented. I summarize the empirical findings of the 
existing literature on the performance of M&A and the factors that affect performance. 
Then, I move on to a review of studies on the sources of synergy. I also introduce two 
additional theoretical concepts, the resource-based theory of the firm and the theory of 
local competition, which are relevant to the analyses performed in this dissertation. 
Lodging industry specific M&A literature is summarized as well.  
Chapter 3 is devoted to lodging industry characteristics. Overall M&A 
activities of the lodging industry are summarized. Then, I present the characteristics of 
the lodging product and the rationales for expansion in the lodging industry, followed 
by the sources of gains in lodging mergers.  
Chapter 4 describes the research framework employed in this study. The 
testing strategy is developed and subsequently hypotheses are formulated. In order to 
facilitate the discussion in the chapters following, this chapter also outlines the 
variables and the event study structure that are going to be used in the analysis.  
Chapter 5 presents the data sources and the sample. Once the final sample is 
determined, the variables are obtained or constructed. The description of the sample 
and the variables are presented in this chapter.  
Chapters 6 and 7 are devoted to the main analyses of this dissertation. One of 
the main issues regarding the post-acquisition performance is whether there is an 
improvement after the merger. This aspect is presented in Chapter 6. Once the 
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performance change is identified, the remaining issue is that whether such change is 
actually due to the mergers and what the sources of gains are. This is verified through 
the multivariate regression analysis. The methodology and the results regarding the 
regression analysis are described in Chapter 7.  
Chapter 8 and 9 discuss the conclusion in this study, along with their 
limitations. Finally, the contributions of this study to the existing body of literature are 
noted, followed by the future research agenda.  
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
M&A has been an actively pursued area of study in finance, strategic 
management, and economics. In this chapter, I first summarize empirical studies on 
the performance of M&A. Given that acquiring firms generally do not benefit from 
making acquisitions, much scholarly attention has been devoted to a better 
understanding of the specific moderators, i.e. deal characteristics, managerial effects, 
firm characteristics, and environmental factors, which are related to the outcome of 
mergers and acquisitions. After I discuss the empirical findings related to the 
announcement abnormal returns and operating performance, I move on to the 
literature on such moderators. This part is based on joint work with Canina and Ma. 
Our work was published in Canina, Kim, and Ma (2010).  
Then, I review the literature on the synergy of mergers and acquisitions. While 
I review the types of synergistic gains in more detail, I also discuss studies related to 
the area of possible side effects from acquisitions as well, which has not been 
addressed much in the M&A literature. Subsequently, existing empirical studies 
regarding the sources of synergy are summarized.  
Next, I review the existing lodging industry M&A literature. Local competition 
is important in the lodging industry, especially at the property level. Thus, the nature 
of local competition is highly relevant to the discussion of the creation and erosion of 
synergy. I introduce the literature on local competition along with empirical findings 
in a subsection.  At the end of this chapter, I review the literature regarding the 
resource-based theory of the firm and the offer premium.  
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2.1 Performance of M&A 
Two common approaches for measuring the performance of mergers and 
acquisitions have been to use the stock market’s reaction upon the announcement of 
the merger and to estimate the actual operating performance of the merged firm.  
 
Announcement Abnormal Return Abnormal stock returns surrounding the 
announcement date have been most widely used as a performance measure of mergers 
and acquisitions (Agrawal and Jaffe, 2000). The presumption is that the financial 
market is efficient and that stock price changes should instantly take into account all 
information available about the merger at the time of the announcement, including the 
synergy that the merger can create. Thus, a positive abnormal return, if detected, is 
interpreted as an indication of the expected value creation from the merger.  
Using the event study framework, researchers have computed the 
announcement- induced abnormal return during the event period, typically for the 
three days immediately surrounding the announcement (one day before and after the 
announcement) or for a longer window (beginning several days prior to the 
announcement and ending near the merger announcement) (Andrade et al., 2001). 
Empirically, one of the most persistent findings throughout the literature is that 
target firms typically experience large, significant abnormal returns at deal 
announcements, while shareholders of acquiring firms on average do not gain from 
mergers. Acquirers’ abnormal returns around announcements are either insignificant 
or even negative (Betten et al. (2007) provide a comprehensive review of the existing 
empirical findings). Several explanations have emerged for the observed disparity 
between the target and the acquirer results. Many researchers have pointed out that 
considering a substantial premium paid to the target shareholders, the positive 
abnormal returns to the target are not very surprising (Jarrell and Poulsen, 1989; 
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Agrawal and Jaffe, 2000). Another explanation is the size difference between the 
target and the acquirer. The acquiring firms are generally larger than target companies 
and thus the same dollar gains translate into different percentage returns (Jensen, 
1984). If the investment in the target firm is small relative to the total value of the 
acquiring firm, the increase in value from the merger may not cause much change in 
the acquirer's share price (Jarrell and Poulsen, 1989). 
Driven by the positive abnormal return of the target, the combined returns of 
the target and the acquirer are usually found to be positive and significant (Jensen and 
Ruback, 1983; Bradley, Desai, and Kim, 1988; Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter, 1988; 
Mulherin and Boone, 2000; Andrade et al., 2001). The positive combined abnormal 
returns of the target and the acquirer have been interpreted as evidence that mergers do 
create value but the gains accrue entirely to target shareholders (Andrade et al., 2001).  
However, there have been more fundamental questions about the interpretation 
of announcement abnormal returns. The assumption of the announcement return 
approach is that the information relevant to a merger’s success might not be 
incorporated into stock prices efficiently at the time of the announcement. If this is the 
case, there should be no long-term drift in the stock return after the announcement. 
Nevertheless, some researchers found negative long-run abnormal returns following 
mergers (Agrawal and Jaffe (2000) provide a review). While merger event studies 
usually accept the stock market’s efficiency as an axiom, not as a hypothesis to be 
tested (Scherer, 1988), long-run underperformance of the merged firm’s stock 
suggests that changes in stock prices at the time of the announcement overestimate the 
future efficiency gains from mergers (Jensen and Ruback, 1983).   
For explanations of these puzzling results, three broad lines of explanation 
have emerged (Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn, 2007). First, under behavioral 
arguments, the market slowly corrects its overvaluation of the merged firms’ shares 
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(Baker, Ruback, and Wurgler, 2007; Shleifer and Vishny, 2003). For example, Rau 
and Vermaelen (1998) found that “glamour” acquirers tend to underperform in the 
post-acquisition period, which may be due to both managers’ and the market’s 
optimism based on past performance of the “glamour” firm. Second, a neoclassical 
argument is that the merger is a response to a negative industry shock and that the 
merged firm performs better than it would have without the merger–which may still be 
worse than the pre-merger performance (Harford, 2005). Third, apparent 
underperformance is an artifact of the econometric methodology itself. Barber and 
Lyon (1997) and Kothari and Warner (1997) showed that common estimation 
procedures can produce biased long-run average buy and hold return estimates due to 
the new listings, rebalancing of benchmark portfolios, and skewness of multiyear 
abnormal returns. Proposed corrections include carefully constructing benchmark 
portfolios to eliminate known biases and conducting inferences via a bootstrapping 
procedure. Mitchell and Stafford (2000), however, pointed out that the bootstrapping 
procedure is seriously flawed because it assumes independence of multiyear abnormal 
returns for event firms in spite of the presence of cross-correlations of event firm 
abnormal returns. They argued that after accounting for the positive cross-correlations 
of event-firm abnormal returns, there was no long-run abnormal performance.  
 
Operating Performance  Instead of looking at the financial market’s 
expectation of synergy creation, operating performance studies examine whether the 
expected synergy of mergers is ever actually realized. If mergers truly create value for 
shareholders, the gains should eventually show up in the post-acquisition cash flows of 
the merged firms (Andrade et al., 2001). Proponents of this methodology argue that 
accounting data measure actual performance conditions, not investor expectations, and 
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are therefore likely to be somewhat more reliable than the approach which uses equity 
returns (Piloff and Santomero, 1998).  
In this approach, operating performance is compared before and after the 
merger using operating cash flow, EBITDA (earnings before interest, tax, 
depreciation, and amortization), or gross profitability measures, which summarize the 
effect of the merger on the operating performance independent of the impact of the 
funding sources for the acquisition.  
Along this line, Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992) used post-merger pretax 
operating cash flow returns on assets1 to measure changes in operating performance 
for the 50 largest U.S. mergers between 1979 and mid-1984. To control for industry 
trends, industry-adjusted measures were used in the analysis by subtracting the 
industry median performance measure from the event firm’s performance measure. 
Abnormal industry-adjusted cash flow returns were measured as the intercept of a 
cross-sectional regression of the post-merger industry-adjusted cash flow returns on 
the market value of assets (median of Year 1 to Year 5) on the corresponding 
premerger returns (median of Year -5 to Year -1). Although the raw cash flow returns 
were lower in the post-acquisition period, the abnormal industry-adjusted performance 
showed significant improvement after the acquisition. Further, they also found that a 
positive announcement return of the combined target and acquirer was consistent with 
an improvement in the operating performance. 
Andrade et al. (2001) replicated Healy et al. (1992), using the operating margin 
with a broader sample of roughly 2,000 mergers from 1973 to 1998. They also found 
an improvement in the operating performance of the merged firms after the merger.   
                                                 
1 In Healy et al., operating cash flow is defined as sales minus cost of goods sold and selling and 
administrative expenses, plus depreciation and goodwill expenses. This measure is deflated by the 
market value of assets (market value of equity plus book value of net debt). 
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Such findings contrast with an earlier study by Ravenscraft and Scherer 
(1989), who examined the post-acquisition profitability of the line of business of the 
target firms using three measures, i.e. the industry-adjusted operating income (before 
interest charges, extraordinary charges or credits, and income taxes) over end-of-
period book value of assets; operating income over sales; and cash flow (operating 
income plus depreciation) over sales. They found that the profitability measure 
declined after the merger, except in the pooling-of-interests mergers of roughly 
equally sized target and acquirer.  
Re-examining Healy et al. (1992), Ghosh (2001) used the matching firm 
approach of Barber and Lyon (1996) using firms of similar size and prior performance 
as a control benchmark, instead of the industry median. Using the peer-adjusted cash 
flows return on market value of assets as of years -1 as a pre-acquisition performance 
measure and the median of the corresponding measures in years 1 to 3 as the post-
acquisition performance, he found no evidence of operating performance improvement 
following acquisitions.  
Negative post-acquisition operating performance was also found in Bouwman, 
Fuller, and Nain (2009). They used EBITDA normalized by average total book value 
of assets as a measure of operating performance combined with the matching firm 
approach of Barber and Lyon (1996). They found negative post-acquisition adjusted 
operating income for the overall sample, insignificant results for tender offers and 
significantly negative results for mergers.  
The approach of using accounting data has its own drawbacks. Although 
accounting data are designated to measure actual performance, they may be inaccurate 
as a measure of synergistic gains, i.e. measured changes between the pre-merger and 
post-merger period may not be solely due to the merger (Kaplan, 2000; Andrade et al, 
2001).  Mergers entail integration costs which may disguise operating gains achieved 
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shortly after merger completion. As a solution, operating performance studies have 
focused on post-acquisition performance after two to five years after the completion. 
This is also reasonable given that many performance gains may take time to be 
achieved and thus reflected in financial report.  
However, extending the post-merger period as a solution creates its own 
problem. In general, the performance of the merged firm is matched by some peer 
control group. Nonetheless, when the number of dimensions to be matched goes up 
and the matching criteria become fine (e.g., size and prior performance matched 
within 5% rather than 30%, and 4-digit rather than 2-digit SIC matches), finding 
matches becomes difficult or even infeasible (Li and Prabhala, 2007). Given that it is 
difficult to find a perfect match between the event firm and the control, beyond a 
certain point after the merger, analysis of the merged firm relative to some peer 
control group is likely to be affected by the idiosyncratic circumstances of each market 
or firm-specific factors as well as the merger itself. Thus, there is a limit to the extent 
that the merger can be held accountable for the firms’ relative performance (Piloff and 
Santomero, 1998).  While it is clear that failure to account for such extraneous 
conditions may lead to improper conclusions regarding merger-related changes, it is 
difficult for researchers to obtain such detailed information. 
 
2.2 Moderators of M&A Success  
While the discussion has continued regarding the validity and the methodology 
related to stock price and accounting measures of merger performance, another strand 
of research has examined the moderators that affect the performance of the M&A. 
Researchers have found distinct patterns in the performance of M&A in subsets of the 
deals as defined by deal characteristics and firm characteristics such as the method of 
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payment (stock vs. cash), deal type (tender offers vs. mergers), firm size, and deal 
attitude.  
 
Method of Payment. While various factors affect the method of payment,2 a 
widely-examined rationale is that of signaling. Acquirers that use stock to finance 
acquisitions signal to the market that their shares are overvalued (Myers and Majluf, 
1984). As a result, the market will reevaluate the acquirer shares downward at the 
announcement of a merger, leading to a negative abnormal return. This intuition is 
strongly confirmed in a large body of empirical studies based on announcement period 
abnormal returns of acquiring firms (Andrade et al., 2001; Betton et al., 2007; 
Bouwman et al., 2009; Carow, Heron, and Saxton, 2004; Huang and Walkling, 1987). 
By contrast, a significantly positive announcement return has been found for cash-
financed acquisitions of large public targets (Fuller et al., 2002) and for cash-financed 
acquisitions by small public bidders for public targets (Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn, 
2008). The method of payment appears to affect long-run returns as well. For 
example, Rau and Vermaelen (1998) found, as did Loughran and Vijh (1997), that 
acquirers making stock acquisitions underperform compared to those using cash. 
In terms of operating performance measures, for the most part no significant 
relationship has been found between payment type and post-acquisition operating 
performance. In particular, in a study focused specifically on the operating 
performance and the method of payment in takeover, Heron and Lie (2002) asserted 
that there is no evidence that the method of payment convey information about the 
acquirer’s future operating performance. In Ghosh (2001), while operating cash flow 
performance of the stock financed deals were found to be lower when the industry 
                                                 
2 For example, tender offers tend to use cash; cash-rich acquirers tend to use cash; acquirer managers 
with a large ownership stake prefer cash to avoid dilution. See Martin (1996). 
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median was used as a control, the result was insignificant when the matching firm 
method was applied. Bouwman et al. (2009) reported significantly lower post-
acquisition abnormal operating income for the stock-financed deals than for the cash-
financed deals. However, in the regression analysis when the stock market condition 
was controlled, the payment method was insignificant.  
 
Tender Offer vs. Merger. Agency theory proposes that mergers and 
acquisitions are a means to protect shareholders (of target companies) from poor 
management (Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Jensen, 1986). This implies the existence of a 
market for corporate control in which ineffectively managed firms are takeover targets 
and managers of those acquired firms are subject to turnover. Thus, a tender offer, in 
which the acquirer approaches the target shareholders directly and attempts to replace 
the incumbent managers of the target, is expected to perform better than a merger. 
Consistent with this notion, some studies showed superior performance for tender 
offers relative to mergers at the announcement date (Betton et al., 2007; Bouwman et 
al., 2009; Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Jensen, 1986), but these results are not consistent 
across studies. Bhagat, Dong, Hirshleifer, and Noah (2005) report a non-significant 
announcement abnormal return for acquirers involved in tender offers. Similarly, 
Huang and Walkling (1987) find no significant difference in the announcement 
abnormal returns between tender offers and mergers after controlling for payment 
method and degree of resistance. The long-term results seem to support the value-
creation of tender offers over mergers. The long-run abnormal stock return for tender 
offers is positive, while for mergers it is negative (Rau and Vermaelen, 1998). Using 
data for mergers only (not tender offers), where post-acquisition underperformance is 
more prevalent, Agrawal, Jaffe, and Mandelker (1992) find that shareholders of 
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acquirers experience a statistically significant loss over the five years following the 
merger.  
Loughran and Vijh (1997) extended these studies by analyzing the impact of 
both the payment method, cash vs. stock, as well as the type of deal, tender offer vs. 
merger. They document that the long-term buy and hold excess returns are 
significantly positive for cash- financed tender offers and significantly negative for 
stock-financed mergers.  
Bouwman et al. (2009) also examined the impact of the deal type in 
combination with the payment method. However, their results are different from those 
of other studies: they reported that regardless of the deal type (merger or tender offer), 
stock-financed deals resulted in significantly negative results while cash-financed 
deals showed non-significant results for all the performance measures (announcement 
return, long-run buy and hold return, and operating performance).  
 
Private vs. Public Status. It is well documented that private target firms are 
acquired at a substantial discount relative to equivalent public firms. This may be 
explained by the relative illiquidity or information asymmetry between the private 
company owners and the acquiring firms (Chang, 1998; Fuller et al., 2002).  
Regarding information asymmetry, Capron and Shen (2007) argued that less 
information about private targets produce more value-creating opportunities for 
exploiting such information. They found that acquirers tend to choose private targets 
in familiar industries and favor public targets to enter new sectors with a high level of 
intangible assets. Moreover, acquirers of private targets perform better than acquirers 
of public targets upon the merger announcement. The authors further claimed that 
acquirer returns from their target choice (private/public) are not universal but depend 
on the acquirer’s type of search and on the merging firms’ attributes. Superior 
19 
announcement abnormal returns for acquirers of private targets have also been 
reported by others (e.g. Betton et al., 2008; Chang, 1998; Fuller et al., 2002).  
The information asymmetry hypothesis reconfirmed such findings in Cooney, 
Moeller, and Stegemoller (2009). They used a sample of private target firms that 
withdrew an initial public offering so that they could use the valuation history of the 
target, which was not available for other private targets. In addition to the positive 
announcement return for the acquirer, which is consistent with general findings for 
private targets, Cooney et al. (2009) found a positive relationship between the 
acquirer’s announcement return and the target’s value revision measured by the 
difference between the value of the target at the time of its planned IPO and the 
acquisition price. Because of information asymmetry, a larger revision of firm value 
reflected in the acquisition price signals a greater value of the private firm, leading to 
greater gains for the acquirers. With regard to private acquirers, Bargeron, 
Schlingemann, Stulz, and Zutter (2008) found that private equity acquirers pay lower 
premiums to publicly traded targets. The finding is consistent with the fact that 
acquirers that are operating public firms pay more because they expect to realize 
synergy gains from the acquisitions, while for private equity acquirers the expected 
synergy is much lower.  
The literature also includes findings that acquirer returns are affected by the 
interaction between the public status of the target, the size of the target, and the form 
of payment. For example, stock-financed acquisitions of large public firms lead to 
lower (more negative) acquirer abnormal returns while acquirers of stock-financed 
acquisitions of large private firms earn higher abnormal returns. 
 
Acquisition Experience. Although organizational learning theory predicts that 
an acquirer’s acquisition experience will influence performance in subsequent 
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acquisitions, the empirical results are mixed. While Fowler and Schmidt (1989) 
reported that long-term stock returns improve significantly for acquirers that have 
previous acquisition experience, Lubatkin (1983) and Ravenscraft and Scherer (1989) 
found no such effect. Bruton, Oviatt, and White (1994) documented a positive 
relationship between the acquirer’s previous experience and acquisition performance 
measured by return on sales for financially distressed targets, but they find no such 
effect with non-distressed targets.  
Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999) hypothesized that acquirers start out by 
making generalization errors that diminish M&A performance, and continue to do so 
until they develop a sufficient amount of experience. Consistent with this proposition, 
the authors found an overall U-shaped relationship between an organization’s 
acquisition experience and its acquisition performance as measured by the 
announcement abnormal returns and accounting returns (ROA). Zollo and Singh 
(2004) expanded this study by proposing that experience alone does not improve long-
run acquisition performance, while knowledge codification strongly does so. 
 
Managerial Self-interest. Since Jensen and Meckling’s study (1976), agency 
problems between corporate managers and their shareholders have been well-
documented. In the M&A context, this means that acquirer shareholders earn lower 
abnormal returns when agency problems with acquirers are more severe.  
Jensen (1986) argued that managers endowed with free cash flows will invest 
in projects having a negative net present value. Consistent with this hypothesis, there 
is a negative relationship between acquirers’ abnormal returns and the level of their 
free cash flows (Harford, 1999; Lang, Stulz, and Walkling, 1991).  
Grinstein and Hribar (2004) found that acquirer abnormal returns are lower 
when the acquiring CEOs have a higher degree of managerial power. Harford and Li 
21 
(2007) argue that corporate governance plays an important role in monitoring the 
agency problem. Using buy-and-hold abnormal returns of acquirers’ stock, they 
present evidence that even in mergers where bidding shareholders are worse off, 
bidding CEOs are better off three quarters of the time, supporting the conjecture that 
managers’ self-interest may influence M&A activity. They also report that the 
monitoring role of the board is important. In the presence of a stronger board, CEO 
salaries are reduced as a result of negative acquisition-related performance. 
 
Relatedness. The realization of synergy is affected by the actual combination 
of resources through the merger (Barney, 1988; Chatterjee, 1986; King et al., 2004; 
Singh and Montgomery, 1987). Many studies support the idea that horizontal mergers 
are more valuable than conglomerate mergers because it is easier to realize expected 
synergies in horizontal mergers (Chatterjee, 1986; Finkelstein and Haleblian, 2002; 
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1990; Singh and Montgomery, 1987). For horizontal 
mergers, researchers note that resource complementarity, in which the resources are 
different but mutually supportive (Wang and Zajac, 2007), between the target and the 
acquirer is an important antecedent of acquisition performance (Kim and Finkelstein, 
2009). The degree of relatedness improves the operating performance of the acquirer 
(Healy et al., 1992). In addition, the sources of gains in horizontal mergers appear to 
come from improved production efficiency and buying power (Fee and Thomas, 
2004).  
The similarity between the target’s and the acquirer’s organizational culture 
and management style affects the transfer of functional skills between the businesses 
(Salter and Weinhold, 1978; Singh and Montgomery, 1987). Thus, the impact of 
similarity on M&A performance has been the subject of research. Empirically, greater 
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differences in management style between the target and the acquirer are associated 
with negative acquisition performance (Chatterjee, 1992; Datta, 1991).  
International deals may also be viewed in terms of (lack of) similarity. 
International mergers involve nation-specific differences in addition to firm-specific 
differences (Olie, 1994). Consequently, international acquisitions are associated with 
inferior performance relative to domestic ones (Eckbo and Thorburn, 2000; Moeller 
and Schlingemann, 2005).  While relatedness and similarity have been analyzed at the 
industry and country level, there has been little research focusing on intra-industry 
settings.  
 
2.3 Synergy  
While the identification of synergies is not straightforward, researchers have 
analyzed synergies in terms of operating, collusive, financial, and managerial aspects, 
which may overlap and are all related to revenue enhancement, cost reduction, or both 
(Capron, 1999).  
As seen earlier, studies of M&A performance using announcement stock 
returns and post-acquisition operating performance have not provided conclusive 
evidence of value creation from the merger. The most troubling findings have been 
zero or even negative abnormal returns to the acquirer shareholders, which has raised 
questions as to whether M&A is a good investment, and if not, why it is not blocked 
more frequently by the acquirer shareholders (Matvos and  Ostrovsky, 2008). While 
debates and discussion continue regarding the assumption of the efficient market, the 
econometric issue, and the refinement of the factors that affect the merger outcome, 
some scholars have noted an inherent complexity involved in the stock price measures 
around the M&A announcement, which makes it even more challenging to analyze 
M&A performance.  
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Early on, Jensen (1984) pointed out that acquirers often engage in a prolonged 
acquisition program. Thus, while the benefits for target companies from a particular 
merger around the time of the announcement can be more easily estimated, the 
bidders’ benefits may be spread out over several acquisitions. Hietala, Kaplan, and 
Robinson (2002) noted that the announcement of a takeover reveals information not 
only about the potential synergies in the combination, but also about the stand-alone 
value of the bidder and the target, and the bidder overpayment. Consequently, it is 
often impossible to isolate these effects and understand the meaning of the market’s 
reactions to a takeover announcement. Thus, tests based on stock-market prices are at 
best indirect and probably weak because only the net effect is observed through stock 
prices. Evidence of insignificant stock price reaction can be interpreted as either the 
absence of both the market power and efficiency effect or their offsetting presence 
(Kim and Singal, 1993).  
Given that value is expected to be created from synergistic gains by combining 
the target and the acquirer, a valid area of research should be an investigation of the 
sources of synergy and their actual realization. Nevertheless, the research in this area 
has been sparse. The main problem is that it requires a great deal of detailed data, 
which are not available to researchers in general. For example, a direct test of market 
power requires an examination of product price changes while controlling for a 
multitude of factors affecting product prices, such as changes in costs, market demand, 
and general economic conditions.  
Along these lines, in 1996 the NBER commissioned a group of academic 
researchers headed by Steven Kaplan to conduct in-depth case studies of a small 
number of mergers. The studies were published in Mergers and Productivity (Kaplan, 
2000). The purpose of the clinical research was to fill in the gaps left by the prior 
large-sample stock returns and accounting performance studies. While the Kaplan 
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group’s studies revealed richness in the economic data surrounding mergers that could 
not be captured by the large-sample studies, these studies did not generate substantial 
insights into exactly how mergers create value (Andrade et al., 2001). In the following 
sections, I briefly review the types of synergy and summarize the existing empirical 
literature. Along the way, I also address the literature regarding the areas of potential 
value erosion as well.  
 
Types of Synergy. Collusive synergies are benefits that are derived from 
increased market power in the input and the output markets. Mergers, especially 
horizontal mergers between competing firms within an industry, reduce the number of 
firms by one, which can lead to an accumulation of market power by the merged firm. 
The theory of oligopoly predicts that a consolidation of firms in an industry leads to 
higher prices with less quantity produced, which increases the joint profit of the 
merged entity at the expense of consumers surplus. If rival firms in the same industry 
cooperate, the price of rival firms will increase as well (Kim and Singal, 1993).  
In the input market, M&A increases buying power by increasing the 
purchasing volume of the combined entity. Buying power refers to the situation where 
a firm or group of firms obtain more favorable terms from suppliers than those 
available to other buyers, or than would otherwise be expected under normal 
competitive conditions (Dobson, Waterson, and Chu, 1998). The increased buying 
power of the merged firm may also intensify competition among suppliers or 
destabilize collusion among suppliers, which will also contribute to lower costs 
(Snyder, 1996).  In addition, it seems plausible that larger firms may be able to 
negotiate lower prices with their suppliers based on volume discounts at the supplier's 
costs in return for the promise of a continued, long-term business relationship (Given, 
1996). 
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Operating synergies result from enhanced efficiency achieved from economies 
of scale, economies of scope, or cross-selling opportunities. Economies of scale refer 
to the reduction of the unit production cost by increasing the volume of production. If 
the production technology displays economies of scale over some region, then there is 
a benefit in merging. Typically, in the manufacturing sector, economies of scale are 
explained by the existence of substantial fixed costs related to capital assets such as 
plant and equipment. However, they also include non-capital fixed costs such as 
administrative overhead, including marketing, R&D, distribution, sales or 
administrative activities. When the merged firm consolidates the production and 
functional areas of the organization, economies of scale are achieved through the 
spreading of fixed costs over a higher total production volume of the merged entity 
(Brealey et al., 2005).  
On the other hand, economies of scope refer to cost savings that arise from the 
joint production of multiple products as opposed to producing each product separately. 
More specifically, cost savings can arise if there is a common and recurrent use of 
proprietary know-how or specialized and indivisible physical assets (Teece, 1980). 
Costs can then be cut by removing the redundant components across the different 
product lines (Helfat and Eisenhardt, 2004). 
Many firms acquire other firms in order to acquire well-established brands to 
hedge against the high costs and risks of new product development (Mahajan, Rao, 
and Srivastava, 1994). Brand extension is often intended to achieve higher revenue 
from existing customers. Formally, this practice is called cross-selling and refers to the 
practice of encouraging existing customers to buy additional products and services 
within the firm rather than from competitors (Butera, 2000; Kamakura, Wedel, de 
Rosa, and Mazzon, 2003).  
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Merged brands may generate a positive spill-over effect on one another 
(Mahajan et al., 1994) especially when customers have diverse needs for the different 
products or services offered by such brands.  If there is a good relationship established 
between the firm and the customer the brand proliferation may create greater market 
share (Kapferer, 2008; Morgan and Rego, 2009). The ability to sell additional services 
to existing customers as result of strong customer loyalty is known to lead to a pricing 
advantage over competitors (Reichheld and Sasser, 1990).  
While the cross-selling motivation is frequently found in mergers and 
acquisitions, in reality, the anecdotal evidence shows that the gains are not easy to 
achieve (Ngobo, 2004). Customers’ preferences or budgets may not align with all the 
heterogeneous services provided by that single provider (Day, 2000).  The literature 
also suggests that brand extension may weaken brand loyalty by diluting the brand 
image through interference from additional brands (Locken and John, 1993). In 
particular, when a product is extended into a highly heterogeneous segment, the 
increasing multi-market contact with competitors may intensify price competition 
across many markets (Morgan and Rego, 2009). Researchers have pointed out that it is 
important for a multi-brand firm to ensure that consumers in a higher quality segment 
do not purchase from another brand intended for consumers in a lower quality segment 
(Aribarg and Arora, 2008). In order to avoid this so-called cannibalization effect 
across different product categories within a firm, it is crucial for the firm to control 
quality levels offered by a certain brand to maintain the brand’s equity (Randall, 
Ulrich, and Reibstein, 1998).  
Numerous studies have reported that extension into a similar product category 
generates more favorable consumer evaluations and confidence in the overall family 
brand image (Aaker and Keller, 1990; Boush and Loken, 1991; Park et al., 1991; 
Romeo, 1991; DelVecchio and Smith, 2005). Specifically, strong customer confidence 
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can lead to relative risk reduction, which in turn contributes to a price premium for the 
product category (DelVecchi and Smith, 2005).   
Managerial synergies result from applying superior or complementary 
managerial competencies (e.g. planning and monitoring capabilities), replacing 
incompetent managers, or using the skills of general management across different 
areas of the business (Trautwein, 1990). The theory of corporate control argues that 
takeover is a mechanism to replace inefficient managers of the target companies 
(Jensen, 1983). If the managers of the acquiring firms are more capable than those of 
the target firms, the takeover can improve the overall efficiency of the target firm. 
This theory predicts that poorly performing firms are more likely to become targets 
whose performance will improve after the takeover.  
Finally, financial synergies come from risk diversification and coinsurance by 
investing in unrelated businesses. However, the actual cost-saving effects from lower 
financial costs have been doubtful. This is because the financial market does not 
reward risk reduction from diversification since investors can achieve diversification 
on their own by forming “homemade” portfolios (Amihud and Lev, 1981).   
 
Empirical Findings. Although empirical research on the sources of synergy has 
been sparse, the price impact of collusive synergy in horizontal mergers has received a 
relatively higher degree of attention in the context of antitrust regulations and 
consumer welfare. Since it is difficult to observe price directly, early studies tested 
market power by exploring rival firms’ stock price reactions to horizontal mergers 
(Eckbo, 1983; Stillman, 1983).  
Eckbo (1985) argued that in an efficient capital market, a merger-induced 
change in expected future product and factor prices translates into merger-induced 
abnormal stock returns for firms competing within an industry. A horizontal merger is 
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expected to increase the probability of successful collusion among rival firms by 
eliminating one of the competitors in the industry. Thus it will cause an increase in the 
industry's monopoly rents and consequently the market values of the merging firm and 
its rivals. While researchers have found a positive reaction by the competitors' stock 
upon the announcement of a horizontal merger, a positive abnormal return was also 
observed when the government challenged the initial merger, which contradicts the 
collusion theory (Eckbo, 1983).  
Several criticisms have been made concerning the stock price approach for 
testing the collusion hypothesis. The stock price of rivals may carry information other 
than potential collusion. For example, a merger announcement may raise the 
probability of firms in the same industry becoming targets in the future, which may 
raise the stock price of the rivals (Song and Walkling, 2000). The rivals studied were 
large, multiproduct firms with only a small fraction of their revenues from the affected 
market (Haleblian et al., 2009).  Thus, their reaction may not capture the collusion 
effect precisely. More importantly, in light of the sources of synergy, a test based on 
the stock market reactions of rivals does not provide any information. Any changes in 
the price of merging firms reflect the joint effect of cost savings from buying power, 
which may decrease price, and the exercise of increased market power, which may 
increase price. Since the stock market data only provides the net effect, an 
insignificant stock price reaction may indicate either the absence of both market power 
and buying power or their offsetting presence (Kim and Singal, 1993).  
In a study of airline mergers, Kim and Singal (1993) directly examined the 
airfare of the merger-affected routes and their rival routes. Lending support to the 
market power hypothesis and the possibility of tacit collusion, they found that prices 
on routes served by merged firms and their rivals increased relative to those of other 
firms unaffected by the merger. Pointing out that the cost saving will lead to lower 
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price, the observed price increase was interpreted as evidence that market power 
dominates the cost saving from the buying power.  
The aforementioned study by Healy et al. (1992) also touched upon the sources 
of synergy with their analysis of post-acquisition operating performance. For the 
sources of such improvement, various measures of asset productivity, labor efficiency, 
and possible sacrifice of long-term viability of the firm for short-term performance 
improvements were examined.  
The variables examined include an increase in asset turnover (sales over 
market value of assets at the beginning of the year), cash flow margin on sales 
(EBITDA as a percentage of sales), employee growth rate, pension expense per 
employee, capital expenditure rate (as a percentage of the market value of assets), 
asset sale rate (as measured by the market value and book value, respectively), and 
R&D rate (R&D expenditure as a percentage of the market value of assets).  
The findings indicated that an increase in asset turnover contributes to an 
improvement in operating performance. The authors found no evidence of decreased 
capital or R&D expenditures following mergers, indicating that cash flow 
improvements do not come at the expense of the long-term viability of the merged 
firm.  
Asset turnover measures the sales dollars generated from each dollar of 
investment in assets. Thus, it essentially captures the productivity of the assets. 
Enhanced productivity from the merger is also reported in plant-level input and output 
data. McGuckin and Nguyen (1995) found that recently acquired plants experience 
productivity improvements. However, they found that the acquirer's existing plants 
suffered productivity losses, making the net change for the acquiring firm zero. The 
general conclusion is that ownership changes are positively related to productivity 
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improvements at the plant level, but the relationship is not present in firm-level data 
(Andrade et al., 2002). 
Among the few studies of M&A that specifically focused on the sources of 
gains from mergers are Fee and Thomas (2004) and Houston, James, and Ryngaert 
(2001). By identifying the supplier, customer, and rival firms of the merged firms, Fee 
and Thomas tried to identify the sources of the synergy more precisely. They also 
examined the stock price reaction of the rivals around the announcement and found 
positive abnormal returns at the announcement but did not find negative abnormal 
returns when the deal was challenged. The announcement stock return and operating 
performance changes of the customer firms were both found to be insignificant. Based 
on the assumption that the presence of anti-competitive collusion would drive the 
customer firm’s stock price reaction and operating performance down, they concluded 
that increased industry collusion is not a significant source of gains to the merged 
firms. Supporting that buying power is an important source of gains in horizontal 
mergers, suppliers were found to experience significant decline in cash flow margins.  
In a study of bank mergers, Houston, James, and Ryngaert (2001) calculated 
the expected net present value of the merger’s net benefit by collecting information on 
the projected cost savings and revenue enhancements from media sources. The 
managers’ projection of the value of the merger was then assessed with respect to the 
stock market’s reaction. The findings suggest that most of the estimated value gains 
stem from cost savings by eliminating overlapping operations and consolidating 
backroom functions, and not from revenue enhancement. The bidder and target 
announcement stock returns were also found to be positively related to the managers’ 
estimated cost savings.  
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2.4 Lodging Industry Literature Review 
M&A Literature. In a study of lodging industry merger activities, Canina 
(2001) analyzed the announcement-day abnormal returns for lodging mergers from 
1982 through 2000. Similar to the general findings, this study reported a positive and 
higher return for the target than for the acquirer. However, the significance of this 
study is that the announcement-day abnormal returns were positive for the acquirer as 
well as the target, which contrasts with the general findings, which reported zero at 
best abnormal return for the acquirer. Beyond the announcement date, the abnormal 
returns were insignificant. Positive abnormal returns are also observed when the 
sample is divided into mergers and tender offers. This implies that the positive 
abnormal returns for acquirers in the lodging industry are not driven by the positive 
abnormal returns associated with tender offers.  
With more recent data from nineteen acquirers during the period 1996 to 2007, 
Yang, Qu, and Kim (2009) reported that hospitality acquirers receive positive 
abnormal returns in the twelve months after an acquisition. These results support the 
notion that lodging mergers and acquisitions are value-enhancing. 
However, using the post-merger financial performance of fifteen acquirers in 
the lodging and gaming industries between 1985 and 2000, Hsu and Jang (2007) 
reported that the shareholders of acquiring hotel companies earned no abnormal equity 
returns over the short term, which indicates no significant relationship between the 
merger announcement and the change in short-term equity value. Contrary to general 
expectations, their study reveals that mergers have a negative effect on the acquiring 
firms’ equity value over the long term relative to the S&P 500 Index. Similarly, the 
ROA and ROE were found to be significantly lower after mergers compared to the 
pre-merger performance.  
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Kwansa (1994) focused on eighteen lodging targets from 1980 to 1990. 
Consistent with the general findings for the target firms, the results showed a 
significantly positive abnormal return around the announcement as well as for the 
thirty-day period after the announcement.  
 
Local Competition.  Pertaining to hotel industry competition in the local 
market, this dissertation is also related to the literature of local competition. Since 
hotel accommodations are demanded when customers travel for business or leisure 
purposes, lodging properties are highly clustered along such demand generators. 
Theoretically, the clustering of firms in the local market was noticed early in 
economics, such as in Hotelling’s (1929) location model. Location is even more 
important in the lodging industry than elsewhere because it is also a nonreplicable and 
nonrenewable resource for hotel properties. Proximity and convenience to points of 
business or tourist interests constitute critical competitive power for lodging 
properties. Research into local competition has focused on the benefits of co-locating 
firms in a certain geographic area (agglomeration effect) (Porter, 1996, 1998, 2000) in 
terms of advantages from the resource-side and demand-side perspectives. For the 
lodging industry, Chung and Kalnins (2001) and Canina, Enz, and Harrison (2005) 
have reported a positive agglomeration effect in the local market. 
While competition at the property level is highly localized within certain 
geographic boundaries, it is also influenced by corporate-level strategies such as 
mergers and acquisitions. Mergers and acquisitions create a shift in the competitive 
landscape at the local level, especially when the target and the acquirer properties co-
exist in the same local market.  
M&A may heighten the degree of tacit collusion in the local market. Hotels are 
known to cooperate as well as to compete within a local market (Ingram and Roberts, 
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2000; Kalnins, 2004). Tacit collusion or collaboration among competitors can be 
valuable in the lodging market because hotels have strong incentives for price-cutting 
due to high fixed costs and the perishable nature of hotel rooms (Tirole, 1988). 
Further, due to the fixed capacity in each hotel property, combined with the cyclical or 
seasonal nature of demand in the local market, individual hotels at times face a 
problem of overbooking. In such cases, a practice known as “call-around” is 
commonly used to refer overflow customers from one hotel to another. Formally, call-
around is defined as the process whereby hotels share, collect, and exchange 
information concerning current room rates and occupancy rate on a regular basis.  
While the information collected through call-arounds is only useful if the 
participants are telling the truth, anecdotal evidence suggests that this is not 
universally the case.3  However, as call-arounds are performed on a regular basis, this 
practice has also been viewed as a possible means of collusion by which hotels fix 
prices and increase costs for consumers. Such concern led to the Connecticut Attorney 
General’s decision to stop La Quinta Corporation from employing the call-around 
practice in 2010, labeling this practice anticompetitive.4   
If there is indeed tacit collusion among properties within a local market, 
mergers and acquisitions will facilitate information sharing among the target and 
acquirer properties within the same local market. The member properties of a chain 
hotel firm in the same city refer patrons to one another through a central reservation 
system. When a merger is completed and the system is integrated, the central 
reservation office begins to cross-sell the target and the acquirer properties to callers 
                                                 
3 Alex McIntyre, Halt to ‘call-arounds’ puts La Quinta in spotlight, HotelNewsNow.com, 2010. 4. 9. 
4 “Attorney General Announces Agreement to Stop Hotels from Anticompetitive Exchanges of Price 
Information”, Connecticut Attorney General's Office Press Release from http://www.ct.gov viewed on 
Jan. 2011. 
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who request one brand or the other.5 There is no regulatory concern involved in this 
practice within the merged company.  
However, there is also a point of potential friction among the member 
properties under the same chain system within the local market. Kalnins (2004) has 
reported that revenues of incumbent chain hotels significantly decrease when a 
proximate same-brand unit is added. This result does not support higher collusion 
among the member properties. Such loss may be explained by territorial conflict.  
Territory is a sensitive issue in the lodging industry. Management and 
franchise agreements in general include a clause regarding territory. Exclusive 
territory means that the franchisor and/or another franchisee will not compete for the 
same business within a certain boundary of a geographic area (e.g. three mile radius in 
Iowa Franchise Act). Such a clause is equivalent to giving the franchisee ownership of 
a particular kind of local asset attached to a property with a certain brand (Lutz, 1995). 
Given that many hotel firms operate multiple brands in the same product type, the 
territorial issue is not restricted within the specific brand. It can be applied to the 
franchisor’s brands in the same product category that serve the same customers. 
Lafontaine and Shaw (1999) reported that about 60 to 65 percent of franchisors offer 
exclusive territories, according to various surveys. However, Azoulay and Shane 
(2001) note that the large, established franchised chains typically do not provide 
exclusive territories to franchisees.  
The territorial conflict refers to the loss of revenue that occurs when 
franchisors add new units of their brand proximately to their franchisees’ existing 
units (Kalnins, 2004).  Azoulay and Shane (2001) have reported that new franchise 
chains that adopt exclusive territories are more likely to survive over time than chains 
that do not. They have also identified an increased probability of conflict between 
                                                 
5 Adams, Bruce. "Hyatt Weighs Brand's Options." Hotel and Motel Management March 7, 2005 
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franchisees and franchisor because of encroachment-related problems as one of the 
factors related to the greater failure rate of non-adopters. Using data from the hotel 
industry in Texas from 1990 to 1999, Kalnins (2004) quantified the impact of 
territorial conflict and found that for hotel chains that do not grant exclusive territories, 
adding a new hotel within the same area as the 10 closest hotels is associated with a 
$66 loss per room and has highly negative effects on the franchisee’s profit. 
Franchisees are very willing to compete aggressively against others affiliated 
with the same brands, although these are typically found in neighboring markets rather 
than in the same market (Kalnins, 2004, 2006). Alike, Conlin (2000) have also found 
that franchising (versus corporate owned hotels) creates greater competition for other 
hotels of the same brand.   
Renard and Motley (2004) recognized that the territorial issue is one of the 
three major areas of hospitality-related litigations. In fact, there are examples 
specifically related to mergers and acquisitions. After the merger of Hilton 
Corporation and Promus Hotel Corporation in 1999, there was litigation by a hotel-
owning company (a third party that own the property and operate under the Hilton 
brands) which alleged that Hilton violated a territorial restriction in the management 
contract prohibiting it from owning or operating other hotels within the restricted 
territory.6  
As seen in this case, the territorial conflict can arise between the different 
brands within the newly merged chain system. As many lodging industry mergers and 
acquisitions lead to a combination of the brands of the target and the acquirer that are 
in the same product category. Thus, without the new entrance of the properties or 
changes of the brand in the existing properties, mergers and acquisition create 
                                                 
6 Franchise Disclosure Document.  Hampton Inns Franchise LLC. Viewed on 
www.hamptonfranchise.com on May 2010. 
36 
perturbation in the local market where there are both target and acquirer properties of 
the same product type. At the individual property level, as a consequence of an 
acquisition, properties now have to share the implicit or explicit territorial privilege 
within the local market with previous competitors who have now become the sister 
chain hotel. Such territorial dilution can lead to fierce competition between the 
member properties within the same local market, which will lead to negative impacts 
on operating performance.  
Target and acquirer properties in the same local market increase collective 
buying power for inputs at the local level. Ingram and Baum (1997), who examined 
the hotel market in Manhattan, described how chains with a strong presence in 
Manhattan should be able to buy advertising, food, subcontracted labor (e.g., security 
staff), and other inputs more cheaply and might be able to collude successfully on 
prices. However, given that the physical property and the brand license are often 
separately owned by different entities through franchising and managing contracts, the 
authors also noted possible “dilution of market power,” i.e. greater market power of 
the corporation at the local market may weaken the buying power of the individual 
properties as they have to share specific resources available to the brand family (e.g. 
brand equity, loyalty program, corporate support) or required as a chain system among 
the member properties (location-specific personnel or supplies). When member hotels 
are operated like independent organizations, their managers are held accountable for 
the performance of their hotels. As a result, there will be many managers who pursue 
their own interests and therefore less likelihood of coordination. Finally, collective 
action is more costly when more players have to be coordinated (Olson, 1965).  
Empirical evidence also supports the dilution of market power. Ingram and 
Baum (1997) have reported a higher failure rate for the member properties of chains 
with a higher number of rooms controlled by the chain within the local market. These 
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results suggest that increasing the contact of target and acquirer hotels within the local 
market may actually bring about adverse impacts on the operating performance of 
those properties.  
 
2.5 Resource-Based Theory of the Firm 
M&A is also related to the literature on the resource-based theory of the firm. 
Fundamentally, M&A is a mechanism for a firm to internalize the resources of the 
target and the acquirer (Lei and Hitt, 1995). This implies that such resources are costly 
to make or develop internally or purchase through the input market. M&A serves as an 
opportunity, which may not be available or imitated elsewhere, to uniquely combine 
specialized resources of the target and the acquirer more efficiently and/or effectively, 
as opposed to operating them separately, as it can be viewed as a means to trade 
otherwise non-marketable resources and to buy or sell resources in bundles to achieve 
synergy in an imperfect market (Wernerfelt, 1984).  
Viewing a firm as a collection of assets has a long tradition in economics (e.g. 
Grossman and Hart (1986)). While there is an alternative view of the firm as a nexus 
of contracts, they argue that contracts may not be complete. As a result, there is a need 
to allocate the right to decide in events not specified by the initial contract. Changing 
the allocation of ownership changes the incentive structure in a way that no contract 
could. Consistent with this view, the firm is defined as a collection of assets that are 
jointly owned. This theory is especially useful in explaining merger activities. If a firm 
is a collection of contracts, the results achieved through a merger could be more 
simply obtained by writing a contract between two separate firms. Pointing to a 
shortcoming of this view, Zingales (2000) claimed that the contract framework 
excludes the insiders’ human capital, i.e. the knowledge and skills held by individuals 
in an organization (Sturman, Walsh, and Cheramie, 2008). In response, Rajan and 
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Zingales (2001) suggested that a firm is “the web of specific investments built around 
a critical resource,” which includes both physical assets and human capital.  
In strategic management literature, the resource-based view of the firm posits 
that the core of an organization consists of unique resources and capabilities (Penrose, 
1959; Wernerfelt, 1984; Wernerfelt and Montgomery, 1988; Prahalad and Hamel, 
1990; Barney, 1991). The resource-based view of the firm has been received as a 
cornerstone of the competitive advantage of the firm in strategic management (Peteraf, 
1993). To be a source of sustained competitive advantage, resources and capabilities 
must be valuable and isolated from imitation or substitution. A valuable resource 
enables a firm to improve its market position relative to competitors. For example, 
resources acquired at a price below their discounted net present value can generate 
rents (Peteraf, 1993).   
The significance of this view is that it recognizes unique resources as the 
foundation of a firm’s competitiveness within the industry. Before this view emerged, 
the determinant of competitiveness was identified by the industry structure (industrial 
organization theory) or the strategy of the individual firms (strategic group approach 
of strategic management). These views have been challenged by the fact that the 
observed performance of firms within the same industry or the same strategic group is 
substantially heterogeneous.  
From the perspective of the firm, the critical issue is how to obtain and sustain 
superior performance over industry competitors who provide goods of similar use to a 
similar group of patrons. Acquisitions provide a means for businesses to exchange 
firm-specific resources that otherwise are not easily redeployed. Such resource 
immobility occurs when resources are not easily transferable on the open market 
because of high transaction costs (Capron and Hulland, 1999). This view is consistent 
with Barney (1988), who recognized that synergy creation is possible when the 
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acquirer enjoys private and uniquely valuable or inimitable synergistic cash flows 
from the target.   
 
2.6 Offer Premium   
As discussed earlier, the acquisition price (P0T) often exceeds the value of the 
target (V0T) and the difference is defined as the price premium paid to the target 
shareholders (PP0T = P0T – V0T).  This implies that for the premium to be justified, the 
acquirer’s expectations of making improvements in the target firm’s future 
performance as well as of producing synergies between the two firms are large enough 
to recapture the premium paid to the target shareholders (Sirower and O’Byrne, 1998).  
In a recent review (Eckbo, 2009), the mean initial (final) offer premiums 
between 1980-2002 were estimated at 43 percent (48 percent), measured by the initial 
(final) offer price over the stock price on 42 trading days prior to the initial (final) 
offer announcement. Day -42 is often used since the run-up in the share price of the 
target is manifested mainly after the 42nd day before the announcement (Schwert, 
1996).  
The conventional view is that run-ups reflect takeover rumors generated from 
various public sources (Betton et al., 2007). Often, the total premium is decomposed 
into run-up and markup (Schwert, 1996), where the run-up describes the target stock 
price movement from day -42 through day -1 relative to the first bid for the target, and 
the mark-up is the target share price movement from day -1 through the offer date or 
until the delisting date. Betton et al. (2008) reported a positive relationship between 
the run-up and the mark-up. They also reported that bidder gains, while decreasing in 
offer price mark-ups, are increasing in run-ups, suggesting that run-ups are consistent 
with increases in the target’s stand-alone values.  
40 
Offer premiums, often viewed as excessive, have been related to the free-riding 
problem of the target shareholders, bidding competition and the winner’s curse 
hypothesis, the bidder’s overconfidence, and the target’s resistance.  
Grossman and Hart (1980) first explained the free-riding problem in tender 
offers. Target shareholders may rationally turn down bids even if a substantial 
premium is offered over the current market price. Individual shareholders of the target 
firm are able to share the improvements generated by a successful acquisition without 
tendering their own shares. Thus, they do not have an incentive to accept an offer 
unless the price equals or exceeds the post-takeover value of the shares (Hirshleifer 
and Titman, 1990).  
The winner's curse hypothesis suggests that the winner of a sealed-bid auction 
tends to be the one who most overestimates the true value of the auctioned object 
(Giliberto and Varaiya, 1989).  As a result, auction winners are likely to be "cursed" 
by having paid more for the object than its true worth. This hypothesis has been 
applied to corporate takeovers (Roll, 1986; Varaiya, 1988) such that the target 
shareholders earn large and positive abnormal returns due primarily to the payment of 
substantial premiums by acquiring firms. 
Roll (1986) introduced the hubris hypothesis, which posits that bidding firms 
infected by hubris simply pay too much for their targets. In line with this argument, 
numerous studies empirically tested the hubris or overconfidence involved in a 
takeover. Hayward and Hambrick (1997) reported that CEO hubris increased 
acquisition premiums, which in turn decreased acquisition performance. Malmendier 
and Tate (2008) reported evidence that overconfident managers tend to make more 
acquisitions and that abnormal returns in such cases are lower. Moeller et al. (2004) 
discussed a size effect in acquisition announcement returns such that the 
announcement return for acquiring-firm shareholders is lower for large acquirers 
41 
irrespective of the form of financing and whether the acquired firm is public or private. 
Based on the premise that managers of large firms are more likely to be driven by 
hubris and thus overpay, the authors examined the relationship between premium, firm 
size, and the probability of the merger success. They reported supporting evidence for 
the hubris hypothesis: the greater premium paid by large firms was found to decrease 
the average abnormal return.  
As seen thus far, offer premiums have been negatively associated with merger 
outcomes. However, ultimately, a premium represents payment for the right to control 
the assets of the target firm (Bradley, 1980), a right which is intended to contribute to 
synergy creation. Built upon the resource-based theory of the firm, Laamanen (2007) 
focused on the technology-intensive sector, which is highlighted by R&D and 
technological resources that take a long time to develop and are difficult to evaluate. 
The high-tech sector was also found to have paid the highest premiums. Laamanen 
argued that such high premiums are explained by the existence of a unique value-
creating resource combination related to the target’s R&D and technological 
capabilities. Consistent with this view, it was found that although a higher premium is 
paid for R&D-related assets, the premium does not cause negative abnormal returns.  
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CHAPTER 3 
MERGER AND ACQUISITION ACTIVITIES IN THE LODGING INDUSTRY 
 
In the U.S. as of 2006, the lodging industry included 50,000 properties owned 
by almost 30,000 distinct firms and sole proprietors (Kalnins, 2006). While the 
ownership of these physical properties is highly decentralized, more than 70 percent of 
the properties in the U.S. are affiliated with a chain.7 According to data released 
annually by Lodging Hospitality, among the top fifty brands in the U.S. (in terms of 
the number of rooms in the U.S.) the number of franchised properties reached 86 
percent in 2006 while the numbers of owned and managed properties accounted for 
about nine percent and five percent, respectively. As a majority of chain properties are 
operated under franchising and management contracts, it is common that the 
ownership of the physical property, the brand, and the management of the property are 
often separated among different entities. In addition to brand-owning lodging firms 
which also provide the management and franchise side of operations, there are firms 
that specialize in owning properties (institutional investment firms including hotel real 
estate investment trusts (REITs)) and firms that focus on the provision of hotel 
management services for the owners of the properties.  
This rather unique structure of the lodging industry, the separation of property 
ownership, management, and/or the brand of the property, emerged out of product 
characteristics and the consumption environment, which have also affected merger and 
acquisition activities. According to Andrade et al. (2001), the lodging industry was 
among the top five industries in M&A activities based on the average annual number 
of mergers in the United States in the 1990s.  
                                                 
7 Basham, M., Kwon, E., 2009. Standard and Poor’s Industry Surveys Lodging and Gaming May 21.  
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In this chapter, I first summarize the M&A activities in the lodging industry. 
Then, I discuss the rationales for lodging mergers. Drawn from the existing literature 
on synergy, motivations, and characteristics specific to the lodging industry, the 
sources of gains to lodging properties are discussed.  
 
3.1 Lodging Industry M&A Activities  
Table 1 summarizes mergers and acquisitions in the lodging industry from 
January 1, 1981, through December 31, 2008. The data are obtained from Securities 
Data Corporation (SDC) and the sample of the lodging industry mergers and 
acquisitions that involve U.S. lodging firms was identified by the following criteria: 
first, either target or acquirer is in SIC 7011, hotels and motels including hotels with 
gaming operations; second, either target or acquirer has hotel operation in the United 
States.   
The data shows that lodging mergers and acquisitions have seen a cyclical 
pattern with distinctive peaks in the late 1980s, late 1990s, and mid 2000s, reflecting 
economic conditions as well as some industry-specific factors. In the mid-1980s, 
favorable tax laws distorted development of commercial real estate including hotel 
properties in the U.S., a situation which also encouraged development and mergers. 
Partially as a result of those laws, Table 1 shows higher total and average overall value 
of the deals in the period of 1984 to 1987 than in the earlier period. Although general 
market conditions in the U.S. deteriorated in the late 1980s, the peak stretched until 
1989, driven by the liberalization in the global financial investment.  
Changes in tax laws altered the industry structure in the early 1990s, but an 
economic bubble and different tax loopholes drove the most dramatic M&A increase, 
which reached a peak in 1997, when the total value of the targets reached 53 billion 
dollars. The tax loopholes involved what was known as the paired-shared REIT.  
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Table 1.  M&A activities in the lodging industry 
 
 
   Overall   Type   Industry  
Year   
Number 
of 
Deals 
Total Average  M&A Asset Acquisition Other  Horizontal 
Hotel Acq. 
Non-Hotel 
Non-Hotel 
Acq. Hotel 
      
1981   10 $1,200.4 $120.0  $700.4 $500.0 $0.0  $56.4 $578.0 $566.0
1982   4 198.5 49.6  56.5 142.0 0.0  24.5 142.0 32.0
1983   21 1,132.7 53.9  321.1 514.2 297.4  600.5 290.2 241.9
1984   17 2,887.5 192.5  1,357.2 1,530.3 0.0  525.0 423.1 1,939.4
1985   20 2,026.2 225.1  623.2 1,403.0 0.0  1,189.5 496.7 340.0
1986   20 2,057.1 205.7  665.6 1,391.5 0.0  342.0 697.6 1,017.5
1987   22 3,485.0 248.9  73.0 3,348.3 63.7  1,778.7 12.0 1,694.3
1988   44 4,521.4 145.9  1,148.8 3,344.1 28.5  1,853.3 1,014.5 1,653.6
1989   38 5,164.0 198.6  2,225.0 2,888.8 50.2  1,339.9 132.2 3,691.9
1990   32 3,523.2 207.2  2,300.0 1,136.0 87.2  3,037.3 156.5 329.4
1991   25 973.2 74.9  315.5 657.7 0.0  14.9 266.0 692.2
1992   26 3,124.1 208.3  81.4 303.1 2,739.6  281.4 74.5 2,768.1
1993   63 1,933.8 53.7  430.7 877.7 625.5  198.2 703.5 1,032.1
1994   92 3,680.1 60.3  2,459.8 1,135.2 85.1  2,300.5 95.8 1,283.7
1995   111 11,974.1 139.2  2,143.1 2,340.4 7,490.7  1,783.2 825.1 9,365.7
1996   198 18,905.5 126.0  9,368.4 8,216.9 1,320.1  7,599.0 4,824.9 6,481.6
1997   263 53,022.6 257.4  35,822.3 10,481.0 6,719.3  16,953.8 3,194.3 32,874.6
1998   196 16,627.5 136.3  11,188.0 4,503.6 935.9  3,862.4 1,291.5 11,473.6
1999   96 12,798.0 220.7  9,148.7 3,102.7 546.6  10,111.8 228.0 2,458.2
2000   68 10,666.2 217.7  7,060.7 3,036.4 569.1  1,279.2 187.4 9,199.7
2001   40 2,493.5 92.4  1,264.5 1,178.4 50.6  970.6 2.2 1,520.7
2002   46 4,574.1 152.5  2,904.5 1,452.6 217.0  1,097.1 191.2 3,285.8
2003   87 5,329.5 100.6  1,610.1 3,710.9 8.5  1,479.6 154.0 3,695.9
2004   94 24,761.4 467.2  19,081.7 5,457.3 222.5  14,948.8 280.0 9,532.6
2005   172 34,127.2 299.4  4,852.3 19,418.1 9,856.8  8,822.9 387.5 24,916.8
2006   161 44,967.5 478.4  32,851.9 12,002.1 113.4  458.5 32.5 44,476.5
2007   161 39,239.6 523.2  20,949.3 18,280.1 10.2  839.6 48.9 38,351.1
2008   68 1,680.4 38.2  0.0 1,679.5 0.9  239.7 0.0 1,440.7
Total  2195 317,074.3 144.45  171,003.7 114,031.9 32,038.8  83,988.3 16,730.1 216,355.6
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Table 1 (Continued) 
 
  Firm Organizational Structure Tender Method of Payment  Domestic/International 
Year   Btw. Public 
Public 
Acq. 
Private 
Public 
Acq. 
Subs. 
Private 
Acq.  Tender 
Non-
Tender  Cash Stock   Domestic 
US Acq. 
Foreign 
Foreign 
Acq. US
       
1981   $163.3 $411.6 $500.0 $125.5  $12.5 $1,187.9       $1,196.8            $3.6   $684.9 $0.0 515.5
1982   0.0 0.0 180.5 18.0  14.0 184.5            255.2            24.5   198.5 0.0 0.0
1983   473.7 40.6 25.0 593.4  0.0 1,132.7         1,187.7 0.0   1,111.6 11.1 10.0
1984   724.6 8.7 995.0 1,159.2  216.0 2,671.5         2,621.9          508.6   2,876.0 11.5 0.0
1985   58.7 0.0 1,112.5 855.0  564.5 1,461.7         2,019.0            58.7   2,013.2 0.0 13.0
1986   586.0 111.6 1,266.5 93.0  500.5 1,556.6         2,761.0          177.1   1,727.1 58.0 272.0
1987   63.7 82.0 1,531.0 1,808.3  123.7 3,361.3         4,640.9 0.0   2,144.4 30.0 1,310.6
1988   84.0 714.6 1,473.0 2,249.9  1,013.5 3,507.9         5,312.8 0.0   3,006.9 809.5 705.0
1989   0.0 231.7 2,731.5 2,200.8  0.0 5,164.0         3,380.9       2,287.2   1,696.6 62.2 3,405.2
1990   2,348.4 7.7 520.4 646.7  2,348.4 1,174.8         3,880.2 0.0   565.3 20.2 2,937.7
1991   266.0 0.0 56.1 651.1  0.0 973.2         1,142.3          280.6   870.1 44.5 58.5
1992   4.8 93.5 211.8 2,814.0  0.0 3,124.1         3,320.7            11.4   2,944.1 80.3 99.6
1993   65.8 631.9 452.7 783.5  344.0 1,589.8         2,891.2              3.0   1,406.2 216.4 311.2
1994   75.2 375.1 2,344.9 884.9  1,874.7 1,805.3         4,424.4          115.5   3,394.1 103.4 182.6
1995   555.7 1,553.4 840.0 9,025.0  153.4 11,820.7       11,117.6       1,323.0   11,224.2 156.5 593.4
1996   9,096.5 3,136.7 3,854.9 2,817.4  59.7 18,845.8       12,575.5       8,090.8   17,782.0 340.2 783.3
1997   32,363.2 6,121.0 7,374.2 7,164.2  468.2 52,554.4       25,678.1     29,388.5   50,283.8 2,254.9 483.9
1998   8,184.3 1,976.8 2,381.0 4,085.4  0.0 16,627.5       13,603.2       7,761.8   15,674.1 540.5 413.0
1999   5,999.8 1,002.0 4,206.3 1,590.0  1,354.1 11,443.9       13,394.8          566.4   10,180.4 750.4 1,867.2
2000   6,870.8 770.6 1,285.6 1,739.1  409.5 10,256.7         6,245.2       6,693.7   9,889.0 83.4 693.9
2001   136.0 42.3 1,493.3 822.0  2.2 2,491.3         3,731.0            46.8   1,989.1 215.0 289.4
2002   2,781.5 840.5 385.3 566.8  0.0 4,574.1         3,736.9       1,234.6   3,696.9 0.0 877.2
2003   107.6 1,783.2 1,193.1 2,245.6  0.0 5,329.5         6,261.8          136.9   4,518.2 583.2 228.2
2004   14,143.6 3,069.0 1,908.4 5,640.5  0.0 24,761.4       20,854.1       6,332.3   24,388.5 182.7 190.2
2005   0.0 1,054.5 13,427.1 19,645.6  1,056.9 33,070.3       32,824.4       4,095.8   25,256.2 8,380.2 490.9
2006   0.0 1,883.0 3,812.5 39,272.0  0.0 44,967.5       21,992.5     30,132.9   37,594.2 7,046.5 326.8
2007   20,168.3 897.4 4,034.2 14,139.6  0.0 39,239.6       43,542.9            33.9   37,864.1 238.6 1,136.8
2008   0.0 54.3 181.1 1,445.0  0.9 1,679.5         2,911.7 0.0   1,169.5 0.9 510.0
Total  105,321.5 26,893.7 59,777.9 125,081.5  10,516.7 306,557.5  257,504.7 99,307.6   276,149.2 22,220.1 18,705.1
 
Note: Figures are in millions except for the number of deals. Data are obtained from SDC Platinum. 
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Starwood Lodging Trust, then a REIT, acquired ITT-Sheraton, defeating the 
competing hostile bid from Hilton, as well as Westin Hotels in 1997; and Patriot 
American Hospitality acquired Wyndham Corporation and InterState Hotels in 1997. 
With a distinct tax advantage awarded to their grandfathered paired-shared status, 
Starwood and Patriot American Hospitality accounted for 33 percent of the total 
transaction volume recorded in 1997. In the following year, Meditrust Corporation, 
another REIT with paired-shared status, acquired La Quinta Inns Inc.  
In subsequent years, the “buying spree” by the paired shared REITs tapered off 
when Congress closed the tax loophole and the U.S. economy slowed down. M&A 
activities picked up again after 2001 with the real estate bubble created by excess 
liquidity. Private equity firms accounted for most of the large-scale deals in this 
decade. The Hilton–Blackstone transaction in 2007 ($26 billion) was recorded as the 
largest lodging deal in history. Fairmont and Four Seasons Hotels also became the 
target of private investment firms in the 2000s. The reason that private equity funds 
were more capable of taking advantage of the low interest rates that prevailed in this 
period is that they were able to make greater use of debt financing than publicly traded 
firms, which were placed under a tighter regulatory environment under the Sarbanes-
Oxley legislation (Corgel, 2008). 
Table 1 also shows the nationality of the target and the acquirer, deal types, 
method of payment, and the firm status of the lodging acquisitions. The pattern in the 
nationality of the firms and the attitudes of the deals are straightforward overall. 
Domestic deals were dominant throughout the sample period except for the late 1980s 
as explained earlier, and overall, a majority of the deals in the lodging industry were 
financed with cash.  
The deal types show that asset acquisitions are also very active in the lodging 
industry in addition to full scale mergers and acquisitions. The U.S. lodging industry 
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exhibits a highly decentralized structure with respect to the ownership of properties. 
Transactions are not only limited within the lodging industry. Hotel properties are also 
invested as commercial real estate by various investment institutions. In particular, 
there are real estate investment trusts (REITs) that specialize in hotel properties, 
commonly referred to as hotel REITs, such as Host Hotels Corporation, FelCor 
Lodging, and Sunstone Hotel Investors. Asset acquisition activities were especially 
strong in the mid-2000s peak, driven by large-scale property sales by brand-owning 
lodging corporations to hotel REITs.  
Another type of asset acquisition is brand acquisition. As lodging firms operate 
multiple brands, some of the transactions involve the divestiture of a brand that is not 
deemed to fit in with the strategic portfolio of the target. Often an individual brand 
unit has the legal status of a subsidiary. Thus, in the firm status category in Table 1, 
this type of transactions is included in the other category, i.e. the acquisition of a 
subsidiary by a private or public acquirer.  
There are numerous private firms on a smaller scale, typically 
owners/franchisors of the properties as well as private equity funds which invested in 
hotel properties. Several brand-owning lodging firms have chosen to be privately held, 
e.g. Hyatt Corporation (which went public in November 2009) and Carlson Hotels. As 
the industry displays a substantial representation of private firms, transactions between 
private firms and public firms are also quite active.  
 
3.2 Characteristics of Lodging Product and Rationale for Expansion 
There are particular characteristics in the lodging product which affects 
consumers’ purchase behavior and shape the industry’s institutional and contractual 
structure. A hotel product is an experience good, i.e. the quality of the product is 
known only after it is actually consumed; the overall purchase frequency is generally 
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low at the individual property level; the service component of the product makes it 
difficult to evaluate due to its intangibility and subjectivity (Holmstrom, 1985; Mills, 
1986; Walsh, 2000); and the product cannot be returned as it is simultaneously 
consumed and evaluated. Hotel rooms are needed when consumers are away from 
their own locality, and thus may have limited information about the product and the 
location where they will stay.  
These characteristics lead to high information asymmetries in the buyer-seller 
relationship, i.e. the buyers do not have full information about the quality of the 
product, which can impose the additional cost of adverse selection for both consumers 
and firms (Nayyar, 1990). One of the ways to mitigate the problems of asymmetric 
information is to establish a contractual arrangement such as the chain system with 
brand reputation (Akerlof, 1970). From the perspective of buyers, reputation reduces 
some adverse consequences of information asymmetry (Nayyar, 1993).   
Customers may economize on information acquisition costs by favoring 
current service providers with whom they are satisfied (Nayyar, 1993). Hotels have 
relatively well-delineated product categories. Although there is no governing 
regulation that defines each category, properties are roughly categorized into luxury, 
upscale, midscale, economy, and budget segment by room rates, amenities, and 
facilities (restaurant or meeting space) attached to the property. Toward the luxury 
segment, the product is more differentiation-oriented; toward the budget segment, the 
product is more cost-efficiency oriented. While properties serve mixed groups of 
customer segments (business, leisure, or convention), depending on the location, each 
type of property may focus on a particular group of customers. Once brand awareness 
and, more importantly, brand reputation are established, lodging firms have a great 
potential to leverage such brand equity on geographic or horizontal diversification 
(Krishnan, 1996). A successful urban upscale hotel may be able to capitalize on its 
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business customers who travel at the corporate expense in promoting its more budget-
oriented resort properties targeted as family vacation destinations.   
Strong seasonality is another factor that favors geographic or horizontal 
diversification in lodging operations. Seasonality arises from natural (regular climate 
patterns) and institutional (social/ industrial events or holidays) factors (Jang, 2004). 
Combined with the capacity constraint and the perishable nature of the product (hotel 
rooms cannot be stored for future sale), the high degree of seasonality causes 
fluctuation of cash flows. While seasonality is universal in the lodging industry, it 
varies considerably from location to location (Butler, 1994). A diversified portfolio 
across different locations and related product line expansion can mitigate the 
fluctuation in sales and cash flow.  
However, expansion is also a costly task. In order to build brand awareness, 
lodging firms need to reach consumers in a broad area, which in turn requires 
extensive marketing efforts, supported by the distribution and reservation systems. 
Such efforts will not be justified unless the scale of the operation reaches a certain 
level. The increase in scale means additional properties in diverse geographic 
locations, especially in superior locations close to demand generators. This requires 
substantial capital investment in real estate development and knowledge of the specific 
local market, where the lodging firm may not have expertise.  
In order to share capital and knowledge requirements, franchising and 
managing have been a common operating format in the U.S. lodging industry, where 
the lodging corporation provides the brand equity and management expertise, and the 
owner of the property provides the capital investment in the physical property.  
At the same time, mergers and acquisitions have also been active in the 
lodging industry as a means to enter complementary segments or geographic markets 
that have been already established. For example, in 1997 Marriott International 
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acquired Renaissance Hotel Group N.V., which doubled Marriott International’s 
overseas operations. The acquisition of Le Méridien brand by Starwood Hotels and 
Resorts Worldwide was also focused on the strong presence of the target brand in 
Europe. Marriott International strengthened its luxury segment by acquiring the Ritz-
Carlton.  
The advantage of M&A over other expansion options, i.e. expanding existing 
brands or developing new ones, is that it allows the lodging firm to obtain established 
brands and an entire network of properties in a speedier manner. The pursuit of speed 
in expansion and its implications in competition were well-expressed in the media 
coverage of Hyatt Corporation’s acquisition of AmeriSuites in 20058: “Hyatt wants 
AmeriSuites to compete with brands such as Hilton Garden Inn and Courtyard by 
Marriott in the upscale limited-service, transient sector… Hyatt has a running start 
with its acquisition of AmeriSuites. Hilton Garden Inn was launched in 1996 and that 
brand just opened its 150th hotel in 2003…  We have 143 AmeriSuites units, plus four 
under construction, so we have [nearly] a 10-year head start on Hilton Garden Inn… 
Hyatt plans to grow the brand primarily through franchising and by building a few 
hotels in highly strategic urban markets where developers don't want to go... There 
also could be some joint ventures with developers who would own the hotels and 
Hyatt would manage them.”  
 
3.3 Sources of Gains of Lodging Mergers 
According to a survey by Kim and Olsen (1999), the top five most important 
stated objectives for lodging M&A were: to accelerate the growth of their firms; to 
                                                 
8 Adams, Bruce. January 10, 2005.  “Global Hyatt's Plan Includes AmeriSuites.” Hotel and Motel 
Management.  
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enhance stockholders’ value; to expand capacity at less cost than constructing new 
hotel properties; to capture scale economies to save costs through combining two 
firms within an industry; and to utilize synergistic attributes of the acquired company 
with reference to the acquiring company. These objectives are broadly aligned with 
the operating, collusive, and managerial synergies that were discussed in the previous 
chapter.  
In this section, based on the theories of synergy and the motivations for 
mergers in the lodging industry, I review the areas of synergy creation and their 
sources specific to the lodging industry in light of the industry’s business structure 
(e.g. product, customer, and procurement system). Along the way, I also discuss 
possible areas of side effects of M&A. 
With more properties within its system, the merged firm may exert greater 
market power and buying power, which can contribute to positive price change and 
cost-savings, respectively. As discussed in the literature review, the market power 
hypothesis predicts that mergers and acquisitions may result in price increases. In the 
theory of oligopoly, the combined entity re-optimizes the profit maximization from the 
consolidated production facilities, which results in higher price and lower quantity 
(Perry and Porter, 1985; Tirole, 1988). In the lodging market, this logic does not fit 
well. While the acquiring hotel firm holds more properties in its chain system through 
M&A, due to the high degree of franchised operation, price is largely determined by 
the individual properties, which act as independent organizations at the local level. 
Thus, consolidations of the production unit or reduction in the quantity do not occur in 
general as a consequence of M&A. Thus, presumably, price increases, if present, can 
be achieved from increased collusive cooperation among the properties. Such 
collusive cooperation will be easier for the properties at the same location.  
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In perfect competition where equilibrium price is set to marginal costs, 
changes in cost are expected to affect the price. Although the U.S. lodging market is 
highly competitive (Kalnins, 2006), the impact of changes in cost on price seems to be 
minimal. Lodging operation is characterized by very low marginal costs relative to 
high fixed costs. Moreover, in each property, capacity is held fixed and regardless of 
demand the fixed number of room nights is produced. Thus, while any pricing 
structure of a hotel must cover marginal costs, it should also incorporate all ex ante 
capacity costs, i.e. the cost of carrying underutilized capacity (Dana, 1998). For this 
reason, marginal cost based pricing scheme does not suit the lodging industry well. 
Instead, hedonic pricing or revenue maximization pricing models (revenue 
management) are more commonly applied (Bitran and Caldentey, 2003; Espinet, 
2003).  
As discussed in the theories of local competition, there is great incentive for 
properties to collaborate while they compete. Due to high fixed costs and the 
perishable nature of hotel rooms, combined with fixed capacity and high seasonality, 
hotels have temporary overbooking problems as well as great price-cutting incentives. 
Both can make cooperation a viable solution to solve overflow in demand and can 
help hotels avoid excessive price cuts. Empirically, Ingram and Roberts (2000) have 
shown that collaboration with competitors leads to a dramatic improvement in the 
revenue per available rooms for hotels. While walking overflowing demand to a 
neighboring competitor may not be viewed as problematic from the regulatory 
perspective, periodic information exchanges regarding price and occupancy rates can 
be viewed as price-fixing behavior. The merger effectively abolishes such regulatory 
concerns and can facilitate cooperation among properties as there is no restriction in 
sharing information among member properties of a chain. In the merger 
announcement of Cavanaughs Hospitality Corporation and Westcoast Hotels, Inc. in 
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1999, it was stated, "Revenue enhancement opportunities include cross-selling among 
hotels and overflowing to company hotels in cities that have multiple properties, such 
as Seattle, Washington, where previously Cavanaughs only had one hotel."9 Thus, 
mergers are expected to help maintain high prices among the properties of the merged 
firm.  
Buying power is expected to lower the costs of the merged firm. Lodging 
operations require ongoing purchasing and procurement of amenities, FF&E (furniture, 
fixtures and equipment) for the room operations, food and beverages for the 
restaurants, IT infrastructure (property management system, point-of-sale system, 
central reservation system, etc.), and housekeeping service/equipment. Thus, 
collective buying power constitutes an important source of competitiveness for big 
hotel corporations. Buying conditions are negotiated at the corporate level.  
For instance, Hilton Corporation’s website states “Leveraging the power of the 
entire Hilton portfolio of brands of over 3,500 hotels within Hilton Worldwide (HW), 
HW Supply Management negotiates and implements contracts and agreements with 
hundreds of suppliers of hospitality products and services. Supply management 
secures and offers to the hotels competitive, nationally negotiated contract pricing and 
top quality products and services that meet or exceed each brand’s specific standards.”  
Other hotel corporations provide similar purchasing systems which emphasize 
negotiated savings based on economies of scale. In an attempt to further boost 
purchasing volume, in the early 2000s Hyatt Hotels Corporation, Marriott 
International, ClubCorp USA, Inc., and InterContinental Hotel Group together 
launched an independent purchasing and procurement firm (Lawlor and Jayawardena, 
2003).   
                                                 
9 From http://investor.shareholder.com/rlhcorp/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=12635 viewed on Mar. 
2010 
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By adding more properties to the merged entity, a lodging firm can have 
greater buying power with its suppliers, which translates into cost savings at the 
property level. Although it is not mandatory for properties to participate in a chain-
wide purchasing system, accessibility to the larger purchasing network may increase 
bargaining power with the existing suppliers, putting pressure on them to lower input 
prices. 
So far, possible price increases and cost savings through M&A have been 
discussed. However, many studies have also raised the possibility of adverse impacts 
of increasing capacity within the local market on price and costs (Olson, 1965; Ingram 
and Baum 1997; Kalnins, 2004). As discussed, many member hotels operate like 
independent organizations, maximizing the profit of their own properties. If chain-
specific resources are scarce but have to be procured locally, then having more 
properties within the local region may actually increase the factor cost (Ingram and 
Baum, 1997). More members of the chain system within the local market may make 
coordination more costly (Olson, 1965) or create territorial conflict (Azoulay and 
Shane, 2001; Kalnins, 2004).  
Empirical evidence has indicated that additional member properties within the 
same local market reduce the price of the incumbent properties (Kalnins, 2004). If 
there is an overlap in the location where both target and the acquirer properties operate, 
mergers and acquisitions create virtually the same conditions for the target and the 
acquirer properties as additional family brand properties enter the vicinity. Thus, the 
local friction argument predicts that a higher concentration of merged properties 
within a local market will have a negative impact on price and cost savings.  
In terms of product line extension, the rationale in the hospitality industry is to 
better meet more heterogeneous consumer tastes (Tepeci, 1999) by cross-selling 
different or differentiated products. If customers are loyal to the overall brand family, 
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they will increase the share of cross-purchases within the brand family of a hotel chain 
when alternative products become available (Kim and Cha, 2002) instead of seeking 
the same or substitute lodging products from other chains. In order to incentivize the 
customer to be retained within the family brand, lodging firms in turn try to develop 
an attractive customer loyalty program.  
The cross-selling motivation is frequently found in press releases announcing 
mergers and acquisitions. For example, in the merger of Doubletree Corporation and 
Promus Hotel Corporation in 1997, it was announced, "Our ability to cross-sell and 
cross-market our brands will be a key driver of our future growth."10   
Technically, cross-selling is performed by integrating the target properties into 
the central reservation system (CRS) of the acquirer, and simultaneously consolidating 
the loyalty programs. CRS is the computerized system for centralizing the reservation 
process for all of affiliated members within the chain system, and is connected to the 
various distribution channels such as call centers, the company’s own website, or on-
line/ off-line travel agents (Egger and Buhalis, 2008). Many major hotel chains have 
their own CRS, e.g. Holidex (InterContinental Hotel Group), Starlink (Starwood 
Hotels and Resorts Worldwide), Marsha (Marriott International), and SPIRIT (Hyatt). 
CRS plays a central role in effectively allocating rooms system-wide.  
The significance of the integration of the system is well expressed in the press 
release upon system integration of Starwood and Le Méridien. In its announcement, 
Starwood described the expected outcome as follows: "As of today Le Méridien’s 
reservations, distribution, loyalty and sales functions have been fully integrated and 
these hotels will now be able to harness the power of Starwood’s global infrastructure 
and sales and marketing systems, giving it a solid foundation for growth…. [T]he 
alignment of the Le Méridien brand with a larger, multi-branded hotel group has 
                                                 
10 "Doubletree and Promus to merge, creating No. 3 hotel chain." Associate Press September 2, 1997 
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terrific benefits for the brand and we are committed to enhancing revenue and 
accelerating growth. … [I]n just the first 100 days, Starwood’s global sales force 
delivered leads worth over $85 million in potential revenue to Le Méridien Hotels." 11 
Again, as discussed, there is a contrasting view of product line extension into 
the heterogeneous category, which predicts the adverse effect of brand dilution or 
cannibalization among the brands (Loken, 1993). Although the strategy of brand 
extension is aimed at encouraging customers to patronize a brand family on various 
occasions (Jiang, Dev, and Rao, 2002), the acquisition of a budget-oriented brand can 
dilute the brand equity of an existing upper-tier brand, and a newly introduced upper-
tier, differentiation-oriented brand may make it difficult to maintain the brand image if 
an existing budget image is strong. Conversely, the acquisition of products in similar 
categories may lead to a more favorable outcome by fortifying customer confidence in 
the overall family brand image (Aaker and Keller, 1990; Boush and Loken, 1991; Park 
et al., 1991; Romeo, 1991; DelVecchio and Smith, 2005).  
The theory of the market for corporate control argues that a takeover offers a 
mechanism whereby inefficient managers of the target company are replaced by the 
more efficient management of the acquirer (Jensen, 1983; Walsh and Ellwood, 1991; 
Kini, Kracaw, and Mian, 2004). In lodging mergers, while the management at the 
target corporation may change, management at the individual property level will not 
necessarily change. Still, better managerial skills and knowhow can flow down to the 
properties from the newly merged corporation.  
With only a small proportion of directly controlled properties, many lodging 
firms identify themselves as “management” companies, emphasizing the knowledge 
and intellectual components of management. For example, Accor S.A. recognizes high 
                                                 
11 “Starwood announces integration of Le Méridien into sales and marketing systems; Merging of 
loyalty programs brings 100 new hotels to Starwood Preferred Guest” Starwood Hotels and Resorts 
Worldwide, Inc. Press Release March 21, 2006. 
57 
value-added skills and service via technological, marketing, sales, human resources 
and training, and maintenance as a source of higher operating margins.12  Thus, if 
better management is obtained from mergers and acquisitions, overall performance of 
the target properties is expected to improve.  
 
 
                                                 
12 “Accor hospitality: The new hotel business model” Accor S.A. Press Release October 23, 2007 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
In this chapter, I develop a research framework to investigate the sources of 
synergy and their realization into synergistic gains. Motivated by the existing literature 
and theory on mergers and acquisitions, in Section 4.1 I formulate hypotheses. To 
guide the reader in understanding the variables that will be used in the test of the 
hypotheses, Section 4.2 outlines the variables along with their definitions and 
computation methods. Then, in Section 4.3, I describe the methodology employed in 
this study, followed by the data sources and sample collection process that was 
performed to obtain necessary measures and construct the variables in Section 4.4. 
 
4.1 Hypotheses 
It is clear from the existing literature that synergy manifests as higher product 
price, greater quantity of goods sold, cost savings, and/or expense reduction. In this 
study, I use the term “synergy outcome” for each of these. Combined, the synergy 
outcome boil down to the net incremental cash flows of the merged firm, which in turn 
determine the value of synergy. Mergers create conditions under which synergy 
outcomes can be affected. When these conditions indeed lead to the realization of 
synergy, they become “sources of synergy”. For example, the increased buying power 
from M&A (source of synergy) leads to cost savings (synergy outcome); the greater 
market power (source of synergy) results in price increase (synergy outcome).  
Based on these insights from the existing research, the key testing strategy 
employed in this study is as follows: if a synergy outcome from M&A is realized, then 
there will be an association between changes in the synergy outcome variable and 
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changes in the sources related to the particular synergy outcome. In contrast, if there 
is no synergy outcome realized from M&A, then there will be no such association. For 
instance, if cost savings actually materialize as a result of the merger, we will observe 
that the greater buying power will lead to higher cost savings. If there are no cost 
savings realized through M&A, then changes in the buying power will have no impact 
on changes in cost savings.  With this testing strategy, Hypotheses 1 through 6 test the 
relationship between the synergy outcome and the sources of the outcome. In addition, 
Hypotheses 7 and 8 test the relationship between the operating performance and the 
tender offer and industry environment, respectively. Hypothesis 9 examines the offer 
premium and the operating performance.  
Hypotheses 1 and 2 are motivated by the market power hypothesis. Unlike 
previous approaches, which tested the market power hypothesis indirectly by using the 
stock price reaction of rival firms upon announcement (Eckbo, 1983, 1985; Stillman, 
1983; Song and Walkling, 2000, Fee and Thomas, 2004), this study directly examines 
price. Kim and Singal (1993) also examined price of merger-affected firm and the 
rivals and found supporting evidence for price increases after mergers in the airline 
industry. This paper also examines the price directly, but different from Kim and 
Singal, price improvement is defined as a relative measure to that of the product 
competitor.  
In the lodging industry, price increases are likely to be achieved through 
enhanced collusive cooperation among the member properties. Then, as more 
properties are combined between the target and the acquirer relative to the number of 
properties in their stand-alone status, it is expected that the information exchange will 
be more active, which will increase the price of the member properties. This leads to 
hypothesis H1:  
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H1. The price increase of the target and the acquirer properties is greater with 
higher property growth induced by the merger.  
 
As discussed, competition among hotel properties is highly localized (Kalnins, 
2001; Canina et al., 2005). Thus, in H2, market power is examined through the lens of 
local competition. Mergers and acquisitions create an opportunity to increase local 
market power if the target and the acquirer properties co-exist in the same local area 
(Ingram and Baum, 1997; Kalnins, 2004). This argument suggests that the properties 
of the target and the acquirer will achieve a greater price increase when there is a 
higher degree of overlap in the properties of the target and the acquirer within the 
same local market. This is tested in H2.1.  
 
H2.1. Merger-induced market power in the local market is positively 
associated with an increase in price of the properties of the target and the acquirer.  
 
There is a contrasting argument. Many studies have raised the possibility of 
adverse impacts of increasing market power of the properties of the target and the 
acquirer in the same local market (Olson, 1965; Ingram and Baum 1997; Kalnins, 
2004). Territorial conflicts, as defined earlier, refer to the loss of revenue that occurs 
when franchisors add new units of their brand proximately to their franchisees’ 
existing units. As discussed earlier, mergers and acquisitions put previously unrelated 
properties within the local market under the same umbrella of the newly merged chain 
system. Thus, even if there is no new entrant or change of brands, mergers and 
acquisitions create virtually the same condition where territorial conflicts may occur 
since target and acquirer properties have to share their territorial privileges with one 
another. Empirical research on territorial conflict (Azoulay and Shane, 2001; Kalnins, 
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2004) suggests that additional member properties of the chain in the vicinity 
negatively affect the incumbents’ price. This finding suggests that greater local contact 
among the properties of the target and the acquirer will decrease the price of the 
member properties. This leads to H2.2. 
 
H2.2. Merger-induced territorial conflict in the local market is positively 
associated with a decrease in price of the properties of the target and the acquirer.  
  
In the next set of hypotheses (H3 and H4), I test the buying power hypothesis 
in relation to the cost-savings effect. As the volume of purchases can increase after the 
acquisition, the merged firms will have greater buying power over the suppliers 
(Given, 1996; Snyder, 1996; Fee and Thomas, 2004), which translates into a cost-
savings effect down at the property level. If there is a buying power effect induced by 
a merger, the higher property growth will lead to greater cost savings.  
 
H3. The greater the property growth induced by the mergers, the greater the 
cost savings.  
 
Again, the local competition literature predicts two contrasting impacts of 
buying power and cost savings. If the rationale for buying power applies to the local 
setting, then greater buying power at the local level will lead to greater cost savings 
(H4.1).   
 
H4.1. The greater buying power in the local market, the greater cost savings of 
the target and the acquirer properties.  
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However, if chain-specific resources are scarce in the local region but have to 
be procured locally, then more properties within the local region may actually increase 
the factor cost (Ingram and Baum, 1997). More members of the chain system within 
the local market may make coordination more costly (Olson, 1965).  Thus, if the local 
friction argument prevails, a higher concentration of merged properties within the 
local market will have a negative impact on cost savings (H4.2).   
  
H4.2. The greater buying power in the local market, the lower cost savings of 
the target and the acquirer properties.  
 
The next hypotheses (H5 and H6) are motivated by the possible value creation 
through product extension from the merger and acquisition. The rationale for product 
extensions in the hospitality industry is to better meet more heterogeneous consumer 
tastes across the different product categories, i.e. luxury to budget tier (Tepeci, 1999). 
M&A is an important means for lodging firms to expand into a different product line. 
If customers are loyal to the firm and have needs for diverse lodging products, they 
will increase the share of cross-purchases within the brand family (Kim and Cha, 
2002) instead of seeking the same or a substitute product from other firms. If this is 
the case, a combination of more heterogeneous products through acquisition will lead 
to a greater improvement in the occupancy rate through the spillover of customers 
across the target and the acquirer brands. This is tested in H5.1 as below:  
 
H5. The greater the product distance between the target and the acquirer, the 
higher the occupancy rate of the target and the acquirer properties.  
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However, there is also a contrasting view which predicts detrimental effects of 
combining heterogeneous products into the product family, such as cannibalization or 
brand dilution (Loken, 1993). Numerous studies have reported that an extension into a 
similar product category results in more favorable consumer evaluations in the overall 
family brand image (Aaker and Keller, 1990; Boush and Loken, 1991; Park et al., 
1991; Romeo, 1991). More specifically, increased consumer confidence in the firm 
contributes to a reduction of the risk involved with the product purchase, which in turn 
contributes to a price premium for the product provided by the firm (DelVecchi and 
Smith, 2005).  Motivated by this premise, hypothesis H5.2 tests whether a 
combination of products that are more similar (i.e. lower product distance between the 
target and the acquirer) contributes to greater price improvements.  
 
H6. A lower product distance between the target and the acquirer contributes 
to a higher price.  
 
Hypothesis 7 tests the relationship between tender offers and post-acquisition 
performance. The theory of the market for corporate control claims that mergers and 
acquisitions replace inefficient managers of the target (Jensen and Ruback, 1983; 
Jenson, 1986). In particular, in tender offers where the acquirer directly approach to 
the target shareholder and typically the incumbent managers of the target are replaced, 
performance is found to be superior to that of non-tender offers (Betton et al., 2007; 
Bouwman et al., 2009; Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Jensen, 1986). H7 tests whether 
tender offers perform better than non-tender offers in the lodging industry in terms of 
operating performance of the target properties. The bidder, seeing that profits would 
be higher if different strategic choices were made on the target’s current operation, 
acquires a controlling stake of the target from the stock market, takes the company 
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over, and enforces new profit-maximizing policies through the tender offer (Scherer, 
1988). In the lodging industry, if such corporate level strategy is successfully 
implemented to the target corporation, the effect will be realized at the properties of 
the target. While most of lodging corporations do not directly manage all the 
properties, marketing and sales outreach at the national level, novel service concepts, 
enhanced purchasing power, and human resource management skills and know-how 
affect operating performance of the properties.  
 
H7. The improvement of operating performance of the target properties is 
superior with tender offers. 
 
In Hypothesis 8, the relationship between the market/industry environment and 
post-acquisition operating performance is examined. The performance extrapolation 
hypothesis predicts that mergers announced in high industry periods perform poorly in 
the post-acquisition period (Rau and Vermaelen, 1998). If the merger is driven by 
wrongly extrapolating the past performance into the future, it is likely that the 
expected synergy is overestimated. It follows that without solid grounds for actual 
generation of synergy, these deals that are announced during high industry cycles will 
perform poorly. This is tested in H9:   
 
H8. Transactions announced in a high industry cycle perform poorly in the 
post-acquisition period.  
 
Finally, Hypothesis 9 tests the relationship between synergy gains and the offer 
premium. Drawing from the resource-based theory of the firm, Laamanen (2007) 
argued that in spite of general criticism of excessive premiums, firms continue to pay 
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premium due to the existence of unique value-creating resource combinations that can 
be realized only through combining the target firm’s resources with those of the 
acquirer. This view applies to the lodging industry as well. In the lodging industry, the 
resources of the target, i.e. established brand equity or location, are difficult to 
replicate or build in a short time. Thus, if the premium is consistent with value 
creation, it will show a positive relationship with the post-acquisition operating 
performance. The total synergy is the composite sum of the synergistic gains realized 
at the individual property level (cost savings, price gain, and so on) as well as at the 
corporate level (removing the overlapping functional areas). If higher premium is 
associated with the higher value of synergistic gains of the merged firm, the property 
performance at the micro level is expected to be positively associated with the 
premium. This is tested in Hypothesis 9.1.  
 
H9.1. Offer premiums are positively associated with the post-acquisition 
operating performance of the target and acquirer properties.  
 
Contrasting views argue that offer premiums are excessive and value-
destroying, especially to the acquirer. The excessive premium can be driven by the 
free-rider problem (Grossman and Hart, 1986), winner’s curse (Varaiya and Ferris, 
1987), or manager’s hubris (Roll, 1986; Malmendier and Tate, 2008; Moeller et al., 
2004). Often, the underperformance of the acquirer’s stock return surrounding the 
merger announcement is ascribed to the excessive premium paid to the target 
shareholders (Jarrell and Poulsen, 1989, Agrawal and Jaffe, 2000). If premium reflects 
a value-destructive motivation, then higher premiums will lead to more negative 
performance consequences. For this ground, Hypothesis 9.2 tests whether there is a 
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negative association between the size of the premium and the post-acquisition 
performance of the acquirer and the target.  
 
H9.2. Offer premiums are negatively associated with the post-acquisition 
operating performance of the acquirer properties.  
 
The list of hypotheses and the related theoretical/analytical framework are 
summarized in Table 2. Several points should be noted regarding these hypotheses. 
First, for Hypotheses 7 through 9, the outcome variable is overall operating 
performance. The theories do not pinpoint the specific outcome measures related to 
the tender offer or the offer premium. The regression analysis will actually uncover 
which measures are more closely related to these factors. In the lodging industry 
context, given the high proportion of franchising and management contracts, the main 
source of cash flow for the lodging firm is revenue and operating income, since these 
are the bases for the franchise fee and the incentive fees from the properties. Thus, it is 
conjectured that revenue and operating income measures will be more closely related.  
Second, many empirical studies examined the payment method in relation to 
the abnormal stock return of the acquiring firm. It is well documented that bidders 
experience significantly negative abnormal returns when they pay for their 
acquisitions with equity. However, the impact of the stock payment is not included in 
this study. The rationale for the underperformance of stock-financed deals is that they 
signal that the acquirer share price is overvalued. Therefore, subsequent to the 
announcement, the market’s correction leads to a negative abnormal announcement  
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Table 2. Hypotheses and related theoretical/analytical framework 
 
Hypotheses Related theoretical/analytical framework 
A. Market Power
H1. The price increase of the target and the acquirer properties is greater 
with the higher property growth induced by the merger. Market power hypothesis 
H2.1 The merger-induced market power in the local market is positively 
associated with the increase in price of the properties of the target and 
the acquirer. 
Local cooperation 
H2.2. Merger-induced territorial conflict in the local market is positively 
associated with a decrease in price of the properties of the target and 
the acquirer. 
Local friction 
B. Buying Power 
H3. The cost saving of the target and the acquirer properties is greater with 
the higher property growth induced by the merger. Buying power hypothesis 
H4.1. The cost saving of the target and the acquirer properties is greater 
with the higher buying power at the local market. Local cooperation 
H4.2 The cost saving of the target and the acquirer properties is lower with 
the higher buying power at the local market. Local friction 
C. Relatedness of Target and Acquirer 
H5 The higher the product distance between the target and the acquirer, the 
higher the occupancy rate of the target and the acquirer. 
Cross-selling across heterogeneous 
product types 
H6 The lower product distance between the target and the acquirer 
contributes to the higher price. Product confidence 
D. Tender Offer 
H7. The operating performance of the target properties is superior with the 
tender offer. Market  discipline 
E. Industry environment
H8. The transactions announced in a high industry cycle perform poorly in 
the post-acquisition period. 
Performance extrapolation 
Managerial overconfidence 
F. Premium
H9.1. The offer premium is positively associated with the post-acquisition 
operating performance of the target and the acquirer properties. Resource-based theory of firm 
H9.2. Offer premiums are negatively associated with the post-acquisition 
operating performance of the acquirer properties Management self-interest 
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return for the acquirer. There is no clear theoretical connection between the ex post 
realized synergy and the information contained in the method of payment.13 As 
presented in the literature review, several studies included the financing method in 
their regression models testing post-acquisition operating performance, but no 
significant results were found in case of the stock-financed deals (Ghosh, 2001; 
Bouwman et al., 2010). Further, Heron and Lie (2002) concluded that there is no 
association between the method of payment and the acquirer’s future operating 
performance.  
In a similar vein, the private and public status of the firms is not included in the 
study. While research has been suggesting that the firm’s status (especially the target’s 
private status) conveys information that can affect the stock price of the acquirer, such 
a link is unclear about the actual operating performance of the merged firms.  
Third, each hypothesis will be tested for the target and the acquirer properties 
separately. While the main interest is in the post-acquisition performance of the target 
and the acquirer, there is no theory specifying the direction of the impact for each 
counterfactual stand-alone entity after the merger.  
Fourth, given that merger activities frequently occur in the lodging industry 
with various degrees and scales, previous merger experience was not included in the 
test. Similarly, the number of brands was not included either. Most of the target and 
the acquirer firms were shown to operate the multiple brands. The geographic 
expansion is commonly tested in the studies of mergers and acquisitions. In this study, 
the capacity concentration in the local market is examined along with the property 
                                                 
13 If the deal is financed by debt, then interest expense can affect the net profitability of the merged 
firm. In operating performance studies, however, in order to exclude the impact of the financing 
method, operating income measures before interest expense (most typically EBITDA) are used. This 
study uses a similar measure.  
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growth. The geographic expansion (or overlap) is not expected to provide discernable 
information. Thus, this measure is not additionally constructed. 
 
4.2 Variables: Definition and Construction 
To facilitate the discussion in the rest of this dissertation, I define the variables 
in this section. The variables are grouped by the synergy outcome, synergy factor, and 
control variables. The outcome measures include price, quantity sold, profitability, and 
cash flow measures, specific to the lodging industry. The definitions of these variables 
are presented in Section 4.2.1. 
It is crucial to evaluate the operating performance against the proper 
benchmark. Simply using the same firm's pre-merger performance will be unsatisfying 
since mergers may come in response to an industry shock that changes the prospects 
for overall firms in the industry (Andrade et al., 2004). In this study, the outcome 
variables are matched by the properties of the same product type and similar 
performance. I describe the process about how the peer-adjusted measures are 
constructed.  
In the following section in 4.2.2, the variables related to the sources of synergy 
are defined. These variables include measures of market power and buying power at 
the national level and the local level, and the product distance between the target and 
the acquirer. The control variables are also discussed in this section. In the assessment 
of synergy creation by M&A, it is important to control for supply and demand 
conditions, which also affect price and performance of lodging properties.  
In Section 4.2.3, moderators and control variables are discussed. Moderators 
include whether the deal is the tender offer or not; and whether the deal is announced 
in a high industry cycle or not. Since demand and supply conditions in the local 
market have profound impacts on the price and performance of the hotel properties, 
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additional control variables are considered in this study. Finally, in Section 4.2.4, the 
definitions of offer premium is presented. The list of the variables is summarized in 
Table 3 at the end of Section 4.2.4. 
 
4.2.1 Synergy Outcome  
Price, Quantity Sold, and Revenue.  In the hotel industry, the industry term for 
price is average daily rate (ADR). Hotels charge various room rates depending on the 
customer segment, booking channel, time of year, day of the week, and so on. ADR is 
the average of these various rates at which rooms are sold. Formally, ADR is 
computed by the total annual room revenue divided by the total annual number of 
rooms sold. The market power hypothesis predicts that mergers and acquisitions will 
drive ADR higher, while the local friction argument predicts a negative impact of 
M&A on ADR.  
Regarding the quantity of goods sold, the occupancy rate is used. Occupancy 
rate measures the percentage of rooms occupied on average during the year. 
Essentially, it represents the degree of capacity utilization in a lodging property. 
Formally, occupancy rate is computed by the annual number of rooms sold divided by 
the annual number total rooms available. If cross-selling is successfully achieved by 
M&A, the occupancy rate of the properties will improve after M&A. 
Revenue per available room (RevPAR) is total annual revenue divided by the 
annual number of rooms. The difference between ADR and RevPAR is that while 
ADR is per room-sold basis, RevPAR is per room-available basis. In a way, RevPAR 
can be viewed as a measure of asset turnover which is defined by sales over average 
assets, where the assets are measured by the number of total rooms. It can be also 
shown that the above definition of RevPAR is equivalent to ADR multiplied by 
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occupancy rate. Thus, RevPAR effectively summarizes information of ADR and 
occupancy simultaneously.  
Due to high fixed costs and small marginal costs combined with the perishable 
nature of the product (fixed room nights are produced each day regardless of demand, 
but unused inventory cannot be stored for later sale), revenue maximization is a more 
prevalent business goal in lodging operations rather than profit maximization. Thus, 
RevPAR is the most widely used performance metric in the lodging industry (Chung 
and Kalnins, 2001; Canina et al. 2005).  
 
Profitability. Two profitability measures, gross profit margin and operating 
income margin, are used. Gross profit (G_PROFIT) is total revenue less the cost of 
goods sold divided by the total revenue. It captures changes in cost savings per 
revenue generated. The buying power hypothesis predicts that greater economies of 
scale generated by the mergers lead to greater buying power of the post-merger entity, 
which will result in an improvement in the gross profit margin.  
Operating profit margin (OI) measures overall operating profitability per unit 
of sales generated, incorporating the managerial efficiency in the administrative and 
sales functions in addition to the cost savings but before paying out fixed charges. 
Operating profit margin is computed by the income before interest, taxes, depreciation 
and fixed charges divided by the total revenue. If M&A brings about a reduction in 
expenses through introducing better managerial or sales skills and practice, the 
operating profit margin will improve after M&A. 
 
Operating Cash Flow Return on Assets. Instead of profitability, which 
measures the percentage of operating income over sales, operating cash flow return on 
assets measures the operating income per unit of assets. The most commonly used 
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measure of operating cash flow is operating income normalized by assets either by 
book value or market value, depending on the focus of the study. Typically, earnings 
before interest, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) are used as an income 
measure instead of net income in order to avoid any influence from the financing 
method of the deal or extraordinary items.  
The income measure is usually normalized by the market value or the book 
value of the assets. Since information on the asset value of the property is not 
available, I used the annual room supply as a proxy for the size of the assets. Thus, the 
operating cash flow return (OCFROA) is defined by the income before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and fixed charges divided by the total annual room supply of the property. 
 
Peer-Adjusted Measures. In the evaluation of a financial performance induced 
by any corporate event, it is crucial to control for industry performance. Raw variables 
are a noisy measure as it is not discernible whether the observed performance change 
is due to the event or other factors that affect the performance of the industry as a 
whole. For instance, Andrade and Stafford (2004) reported that mergers are responses 
to an industry-specific shock which result in an expansionary and contractionary role 
in the industry. Under this circumstance, the raw variables are likely to go up or down, 
which will disguise the impact of the acquisition.   
As a control, researchers have used a peer group of companies that were not 
involved in mergers and then computed the performance of the merged firms relative 
to this control group. In many cross-sectional industry studies, the industry as a whole 
was used as the peer group (2- or 4-digit SIC), with the industry median (Andrade et 
al., 2001; Healy et al., 1992) excluding the merged firms. Barber and Lyon (1996) 
documented that in the event study framework the long-run operating performance is 
only well specified when sample firms are matched to firms of similar pre-event 
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performance within the same industry. Following Barber and Lyon’s matching firm 
approach, the vast event study literature in finance has defined peer firms defined by 
the two-digit SIC code, similar size and pre-event performance.  
In this study, a variant of Barber and Lyon’s approach is employed. 
Specifically, peer properties are defined by the simultaneous consideration of 
performance (RevPAR) in the pre-acquisition year and product similarity (product 
type). One of the main purposes of this study is to evaluate the impact of the 
acquisition on the performance of the company, i.e. the realization of synergy. In order 
to isolate the synergy correctly, it is important to control for industry conditions that 
affect the performance of lodging properties overall.  
One simple way to identify the direct rivals is to use product type. Products of 
the same type have similar overall outward characteristics which appeal to the same 
general customer set; similar types of products are produced from similar resources 
and capabilities (Peteraf and Bergen, 2003). Nevertheless, it is not an easy task to 
define the competitors of merged firms. Often firms operate in multiple business lines, 
or products can be defined very narrowly or broadly. The most commonly used metric 
is the 4-digit SIC industry codes. However, this unit does not always coincide with a 
single category of products and their substitutes (e.g. Eckbo (1983) discusses this issue 
briefly).  
In this aspect, the hotel dataset has an advantage as the product type is 
relatively straightforward. While there are no uniform regulations that define hotel 
type, hotels are broadly categorized by luxury, upper-upscale, upscale, midscale with 
and without food and beverage facilities, and economy. In this study, the price 
segment scheme of Smith Travel Research (STR) is used as a proxy for the product 
type. More formal definitions of each of these product types are presented in 
Appendix.  
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For the matching year, three years prior to announcement was chosen. It is 
important that event firms must be matched to control firms at a time when the event 
firms are experiencing ‘normal’ performance (Barber and Lyon, 1996). The three year 
prior to the announcement year is expected to provide such normal performance of 
both event properties and the control properties. The detailed algorithm for choosing 
the peer properties is as follows: 
1. Standard deviations of annual RevPAR were computed for Year -3 using 
all properties in the sample by product type and year.  
2. For each focal property (target or acquirer properties whose peer properties 
need to be defined), a set of properties were selected from a pool of non-
deal involved properties if they were the same product type as the focal 
property and their RevPAR is within plus or minus one standard deviation 
from the focal property. 
3. In this set of properties, peer properties are only those properties that have 
data throughout Year -3 to +3. 
4. In order to maintain a clean benchmark, the peer properties are restricted to 
those that are not involved in acquisitions before and after three years from 
Year -3.  
5. For each year and property, peer-adjusted measures are defined by 
subtracting the peer-group median from the sample firm value. For 
example, peer-adjusted RevPAR of a firm is RevPAR of the focal hotel 
minus the median RevPAR of the product peers (RevPARpeer), i.e. Peer-
adjusted RevPAR (A_RevPAR) = RevPAR - RevPARpeer 
Further, performance change is defined by the peer-adjusted measures in Year 
+3 and Year -1. For example, peer-adjusted RevPAR change of the focal property is 
defined by:  
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Change of peer-adjusted RevPAR (D_A_RevPAR)  
= Peer-adjusted RevPARt=+3 – Peer-adjusted RevPARt=-1 
 = (RevPARt=+3 – RevPARpeer,t=+3) – (RevPAR t=-1 – RevPARpeer,t=-1) 
 
 The difference-in-difference form of the above is intended to control for any 
time trends specific to the product type that would have occurred regardless of the 
acquisition. After such trends are removed, the peer-adjusted improvement measures 
better represent the synergy created by the acquisition. Still, it is likely that there are 
some latent factors that drive the properties to be selected into the sample of targets 
and acquirers. Such selection issues and other details of the estimation are discussed 
later in Chapter 7. 
 
4.2.2 Sources of Synergy 
Property growth. Property growth (PR_GROWH) at the national level is 
constructed by target and acquirer firm. In order to mitigate the scale difference, 
PR_GROWH is defined in terms of the logarithmic growth, which is computed by the 
natural log of the number of properties of the merged firm as of Year +3 minus the 
number of properties of the target (acquirer) as of Year -1. Year +3 is used to capture 
the stable state of post-acquisition operation after the integration is completed. A 
detailed rationale is given in the next chapter. This variable is constructed to test 
market power and buying power at the national level (H1 and H3).  
 
Local Market Power. Before defining the measure for market power at the 
local level, we must first define the boundary of the local market. For the purpose of 
this study, the local market is defined as a tract unit within a metropolitan statistical 
76 
area. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, census tracts are small, relatively 
permanent statistical subdivisions of a county, which are delineated for most 
metropolitan areas and other densely populated counties.14  For example, the Boston 
MSA is divided into 10 tracts (Canina et al., 2005). While counties and MSAs vary far 
too greatly in terms of size, zip codes are too small to capture local competition 
(Kalnins, 2004). Since tracts are designed to be relatively homogeneous units with 
respect to population characteristics, economic status, and living conditions,15 tracts 
serve as a more refined geographic unit for studying the local competition than MSAs, 
better reflecting the realistic options available to a consumer who desires to visit a 
particular location (Canina et al., 2005). The lodging competition at the local market 
level is engaged in relatively small geographic units, which are closely related to 
regional demand attractions. Thus, this study also uses the tract unit for the local 
competition.  
A variable for the market power in a local market is constructed by the number 
of rooms of the chain system before and after the acquisition, normalized by the total 
number of rooms in the tract. Namely, the pre (post)-acquisition market power of the 
focal property is the number of all the properties of the chain system that the focal 
property belongs to over the total properties in the tract at Year -1 (+3). The change in 
the market power (D_MP) is then defined as the difference between the post- and pre-
acquisition market power. This variable is related to Hypothesis 2.1 and 2.2, and 
Hypothesis 4.1 and 4.2, which test market power and buying power at the local level, 
respectively.  
 
                                                 
14 From http://www.census.gov/geo/www/cen_tract.html viewed on Mar. 2010. 
15 From https://ask.census.gov/app/answers/detail/a_id/245/kw/tract viewed on Mar. 2010. 
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Product Extension. Another continuous variable, product distance (P_DIST), is 
defined at each deal level as the absolute difference between the weighted average of 
product type (measured by the price segment of the STR as mentioned in the previous 
section) of the target and the acquirer as of Year -1. The weighting scheme is as 
follows. Each product type is represented by a numeric value from 1 (luxury) to 5 
(budget). 
 The product type of the acquirer firm is then computed by the summation of 
the product type times the number of properties in that product type over the total 
number of properties of the firm. The product type of the target firm is computed in 
the same way. The absolute difference of these measures between the target and the 
acquirer is defined as the product distance. This variable is constructed to test 
Hypotheses 5 and 6, which examine the relationship between product line extension 
and both cross-selling (H5) and brand confidence (H6). The cross-selling argument 
predicts that if a new product type becomes available through M&A, the firm may 
attract loyal customers with diverse demands. Thus, the product difference is 
positively associated with the performance improvement. In contrast, the brand 
dilution hypothesis predicts that adding more brands into the product line may dilute 
overall brand loyalty, which will negatively affect performance.  
 
4.2.3 Moderators and Control Variables 
In this section, two moderators and control variables are defined. The 
moderators include the indicator variables for the tender offers and deals announced in 
high industry cycles. While these are not the sources of synergy, these variables play a 
moderating role, i.e. a variable that affects the direction and/or strength of the relation 
between an independent or predictor variable and a dependent variable (Baron and 
Kenny1986).  
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This study also defines various control variables. While the variables are 
matched by the product category, performance, and the year, peer-adjusted measures 
can still be affected by various factors such as local supply and demand condition 
where the property is located. In the lodging operation, the local market condition has 
a particularly significant impact on the performance of hotel properties. While one 
may attempt to construct the matching properties to incorporate these factors, the 
problem is that the narrower the criteria, it becomes more difficult or even infeasible 
to find the matching properties. Thus, instead, this study defines the peer by 
conceptually meaningful criteria, i.e. product competitors, and at the same time try to 
control these other factors in order to discern the impact of mergers and acquisitions 
more clearly.  
 
Tender Offer. Hypothesis 7 predicts that the operating performance of the 
target and the acquirer properties will be superior with the tender offer. Thus, a 
dummy variable TENDER is constructed for the tender offers. TENDER is equal to 
one if the deal is identified as a tender offer and zero otherwise.  
 
High Market. A dummy variable ANN_HIGH is constructed for deals 
announced in the high periods in the industry cycle. The purpose of this variable is to 
test the impact of the industry environment on performance (Hypothesis 8). Based on 
the notion that that RevPAR growth is explained by GDP (Slattery, 2002), a high 
market is determined by the relationship between GDP growth and RevPAR growth. 
First, using annual data from 1982 to 2010, RevPAR growth is regressed on GDP 
growth.16 From this, predicted RevPAR and the standard deviation of the residual 
                                                 
16 The data for RevPAR growth was obtained from the American Hotel and Lodging Association, which 
report annual industry performance for the properties in the U.S. with 15 or more rooms. The data for 
GDP growth was obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.    
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(differences between the actual and predicted RevPAR) are computed. Then if the 
actual RevPAR is more than one standard deviation above the predicted RevPAR, that 
year is defined as a high year; if the actual is less than one standard deviation below 
the predicted RevPAR, that year is defined as a low year; otherwise, the year is 
defined as neutral. In all sample deals, the deals are either announced in a high or 
neutral year. Thus, the dummy variable is created only for high years.  
 
Local Demand Condition. The local demand condition (D_LOC_DM) is 
defined by the changes in the local market occupancy rate between Year -1 and Year 
+3, using the tract unit as a definition of the local market. In each tract where the focal 
property is located, total number of room sold and room supplied are computed by 
aggregating all the properties within the tract except for the focal properties. Local 
market occupancy rate is then computed by the total room sold over the total room 
available in the tract.  
 
Local Supply Condition. The local supply condition (D_LOC_SP) is defined 
by the percentage change in the room supply in the tract where the property is located 
between Year -1 and Year +3. This measure is computed by using all the properties 
within the tract excluding the focal properties.  
 
Property Size. It is well-documented that the property size affects the 
performance of the hotels. Thus, property size is included in the most of lodging 
industry empirical studies (Baum and Mezias 1992; Ingram and Inman 1996, Canina 
and Enz, 2005). Although main variables (ADR, occupancy rate, RevPAR, 
profitability, and OCFROA measures) are per-room or per-sales basis and our interest 
is on the changes in these variables, preliminary analysis showed that still there is a 
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size impact. Thus, in this study, the size of the property is included in the analysis as 
the log of the annual room supply (LOG_RM). The logarithmic measure is used in 
order to mitigate the scale difference.  
 
Location. Location is important performance driver of the hotel property. In 
this study, the location type is included in the model to control the location impact on 
the outcome variables. The location type has five categories, urban, suburban, high 
way, airport, and resort. According to O’Neill and Mattila (2006), the location type 
influences hotel’s performance (measured by net operating income percentage), but 
the region does not significantly affect NOI. Thus, no other locational factors (such as 
U.S. regions or state) are included in the model.  
 
Product Type. While the peer-adjusted measures are constructed by the 
properties of the same product type, the level of peer-adjusted measures across 
different product categories still express statistically significant difference for some 
outcome measures. In such cases, product type is also included in the model.  
 
4.2.4 Offer Premium  
The definition of offer premium varies by study. For example, Moeller et al. 
(2005) defined the premium as the value of the deal divided by the market value of the 
target 50 days prior to the announcement day while Betton et al. (2009) used the target 
share price on day -41 relative to the offer price. Since these studies are mainly 
focused on the acquirer’s bidding strategy, the reference price goes back much earlier 
in order to reflect the value the shareholders attribute to the company before rumors 
which trigger a run-up.  
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Table 3. Description of variables, related hypotheses, and expected impact 
 
 
Panel A. Synergy Outcome 
 
Name Description 
ADR Revenue / Number of rooms sold 
Occupancy Rate (Occ) Number of rooms sold /Number of rooms available 
RevPAR Revenue / Total Number of rooms available  (= ADR*Occupancy rate) 
Gross Profit Margin (G_Profit) (Revenue – Cost of goods sold)/Revenue 
Operating Income Margin (OI) 
 
(Income before interest, tax, and depreciation) /Revenue 
 
Operating Cash Flow Return on Assets 
(OCFROA) 
(Income before interest, tax, and depreciation)/Number of 
Rooms Available 
  
 
 
Panel B. Source of Synergy and Premium 
 
Name Description Related Theory Expected 
Relationship with 
Synergy Outcome 
Product Distance 
(P_DIST) 
Absolute value of weighted 
price segment difference 
between target and the 
acquirer 
i) Cross-selling with heterogeneous 
demand (+) 
ii) Dilution of loyalty (-) 
Property Growth 
(PR_GROWH) 
Log of the number of the 
properties of the combined 
firm as of Year +3 over the 
number of properties of the 
firm as of Year   -1 
Market power and buying power at 
the national level (+) 
   
Change local 
market power 
(D_LOC_MP) 
Change in the fraction of 
room inventory in the MSA 
tract 
i) Market power and buying power 
at the local level (+) 
ii) Cross-selling at the local market (+) 
ii) Increased local friction (-) 
PREMIUM (pfin-p-1)-1 
i) Unique synergy creation 
ii) Managers self-interest 
(+) 
(-) 
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Table 3 (Continued) 
 
 
Panel C. Moderators of Synergy 
 
Name Description Hypothesis Expected 
Relationship with 
Synergy Outcome
TENDER 
Dummy variable that equals one if 
the deal is tender offer and zero 
otherwise. 
Managerial discipline (+) 
ANN_HIGH 
Dummy variable that equals one if 
the deal is announced in the high 
year of the industry cycle, and zero 
otherwise. 
The deal announced in the 
high industry cycle is 
likely to be driven by the 
agency problem. Thus, it 
performs poorly.   
(-) 
 
 
 
Panel D. Control Variables 
 
Name Description 
Local Demand Condition (D_LOC_DM) Change in aggregate room sold / aggregate room supply 
within the tract 
Local Supply Condition (D_LOC_SP) Percentage change in room supply within the tract  
Property Size (LOG_RM) Log of the annual room supply of the property 
Location Type (LOCATION dummies) 1= urban, 2=suburban, 3=highway, 4=airport, 5=resort 
Product Type (PRODUCT dummies) 1=luxury, 2=upscale, 3=midscale, 4=economy, 5=budget 
  
 
83 
The offer premium defined in this way contains the components of the 
acquirer’s toehold, possibility of the target’s resistance, the investor’s expectations 
about the progress of the bidding, and potentially competing bidders’ response on top 
of the initial bidder’s assessment about the value of the target under the new 
management. In order to remove these factors, since the main focus of this study is the 
relationship between the offer premium and the post-acquisition synergy, the premium 
is defined as a the offer price as a percentage of the target’s final offer price one day 
prior to the announcement of the deal, i.e. (pfin/p-1) – 1 where pfin is the final offer price 
and p-1 is the stock price the day before the announcement.  Essentially, this measure 
is the additional value that the acquirer manager is willing to pay on top of all the 
runups realized in the market. Thus, it better serves as a measure of the acquirer 
manager’s view on the target as valuable resources or the manager’s value-destroying 
motivation.  
 
4.3 Event Study Structure  
While the event study framework is widely used in applied work, there is no 
set rule that prescribes the construction of event windows. In studies of merger 
performance over a long horizon, Healy et al. (1992) used a five-year period before 
and after the deal, while Bouwan et al. (2007) used a two-year period. Others (e.g. 
Magenheim and Mueller (1988), Franks, Harris, and Titman (1991), Rau and 
Vermalelen (1998), and Ghosh (2001)) used a three-year post event window.  
This study also uses a three-year period for two reasons. First, the study needs 
to isolate the impact of one takeover event without interference from other takeovers 
in the post-acquisition period. As mergers and acquisitions occur frequently in the 
lodging industry on various scales, a post-event window longer than three years would 
lead to dropping too many sample events.  
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Second, the study has to analyze the steady state of the operation after the 
completion of the transaction. Since one-time integration costs in the transition period 
can disguise the operating gains achieved shortly after the merger completion (Piloff 
and Santomero, 1998), researchers typically exclude Year 0 from the post-acquisition 
performance analysis (e.g. Healy et al., 1992), assuming that the integration is 
completed in Year 0. In hotel mergers, the integration phase is expected to be longer 
due to the geographically dispersed and highly decentralized operations. Some 
anecdotal examples support this notion about the integration procedure. For instance, 
in the merger of USFS Inc. by Pritzker Group, which is affiliated with the Hyatt Hotel 
chain, while the deal was completed in 2000 between the corporations, a vote was held 
in 2002 among the franchisees to decide whether or not to join Hyatt’s loyalty 
program. According to the USFS bylaws, 66 percent approval was required from open 
hotels for any change in major cost items to franchisees.17  
Given that synergistic gains are expected to be generated once the integration 
is completed, a three-year post-acquisition time frame appears to be adequate in the 
context of the lodging industry. In parallel to the three-year post-acquisition period, 
the pre-acquisition window is defined as the three years prior to the announcement. 
For the same consideration, performance change is defined by the change in peer-
adjusted performance between Year -1 and Year +3 in order to reflect the post-
acquisition performance in the stable state after the integration phase has passed.  
 
                                                 
17 From Adams, Bruce. “USFS aims for 950 properties.” Hotel and Motel Management April 1, 2002. 
The same source also reported that the cost of the points-based frequent stay program would impose a 
6.75 percent assessment on franchisees. 
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CHAPTER 5 
SAMPLE AND DATA 
 
This chapter describes the sample and the data. In Section 5.1, data sources and 
the sample collection process are described. In Section 5.2, the final sample is 
described in a series of representation with respect to the industry environment and 
property characteristics. Once the final sample was established, all the necessary 
variables were identified or constructed. Section 5.3 briefly describes the explanatory 
variables that were obtained or computed from the sample data. Summary statistics for 
the offer premiums for the public targets are also presented in this section. Section 5.4 
is devoted to the peer-adjusted performance measures, i.e. peer-adjusted ADR, 
occupancy rate, RevPAR, gross profit margin, operating income margin, and 
OCFROA by event year. In particular, the peer-adjusted measures are presented at the 
property level and at the firm level separately for the target and the acquirer as well as 
from the merged firm’s perspective. The rationale for presenting both property-level 
and the firm-level analyses is provided in Section 5.4.  
 
5.1 Data Sources and Sample 
The primary data for the hotel properties were obtained from Smith Travel 
Research (STR) from 1991 to 2009. Smith Travel Research is an independent private 
company that specializes in lodging property data in the U.S. and North America. STR 
supplied two databases. The first consist of monthly room revenue, number of rooms 
available and rooms sold. For each property, the annual ADR, occupancy rate and 
RevPAR are computed by aggregating monthly room revenue, the number of rooms 
sold, and the number of rooms available. The database also provides the product type, 
location type, tract information, and chain affiliation of the hotel properties. For a 
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smaller subset of the hotel properties, annual revenue and expense data are available 
from The Hotel Operating Statistics (HOST) data of STR. According to STR, it is 
currently the most extensive database on the U.S. hotel industry.  
Merger and acquisition information was collected from the SDC global 
mergers and acquisition database for the period of 1994 to 2006 in consideration of the 
event window structure (Year -3 to +3) and the availability of the hotel property data 
(1991 to 2009). The qualifying transactions were identified through the following 
criteria.  First, the deal was completed. Rumored or unsuccessful deals were not 
included. Second, both the target and the acquirer were in the lodging industry, 
defined by the four-digit SIC of 7011. The REITs with paired-shared status, which 
have exclusive rights to operate the hotel properties, were included. A total of 1,736 
deals were identified at this step. Third, only transactions that involved the whole unit 
of single or multiple lodging brands were included. This includes full-blown mergers 
between two corporations as well as the acquisition of a brand unit from another 
lodging firm (e.g. Starwood purchases the Le Méridien brand), but excludes 
transactions involving physical hotel properties between hotel-owning firms, or REITs 
without paired-shared status (e.g. Starwood purchases a single or group of Ritz-
Carlton properties). As shown in Table 1 earlier, deals identified in step 2 are mostly 
asset transactions, i.e. transactions regarding an individual hotel property or a group of 
properties. After removing these deals, 58 transactions are identified.  
Next, the STR datasets are matched with the SDC data. After this step, only 
transactions where the target or the acquirer was not resold within three years from the 
completion of the deal were maintained in the sample. This resulted in the final sample 
of 32 deals. Many deals were dropped as the target or the acquirer which purchased 
the targets was resold to another acquirer within three years from the completion date. 
Some of the offer premium data were not available from the SDC. In such cases, the 
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offer premiums were computed using the stock price from the CRSP daily database 
and the offer price from the various media sources.  
 
5.2 Sample Description 
Table 4 shows the number of deals by year in the final sample as well as 
various industry statistics by year. Panel A presents the industry environment of the 
sample period.  The number of deals by year show a very similar pattern found in the 
overall M&A activities of the lodging industry, which were presented in Chapter 3. 
The sample also shows that the peaks in M&A activities are observed in the late 1990s 
(1995 to 1999) and mid 2000s (2005 and 2006), which also coincide with a strong 
industry RevPAR. Thus, although a relatively small number of deals are drawn from 
the total acquisitions in the lodging industry, the sample seems to be a reasonable 
representation of the merger activities in the lodging industry. 
Panel B summarizes mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, and 
maximum of the raw price (ADR), occupancy rate, profitability, and cash flow 
measures by the target versus acquirer and by the product type as of one year before 
the announcement. A total of 11,358 property-year data are included in the acquirer 
group; a total of 2,522 property-year data are included in the target group. Among 
these properties, the profitability and cash flow return on assets measures were 
available for 1,797 property-year data for the acquirer group and 796 property-year 
data for the target group.  
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Table 4. Sample description  
 
 
Panel A. Industry Environment during the Sample Period 
 
 
Year of 
Announe- 
ment 
Number 
of 
Deals in 
Sample 
Industry Environment 
  
Average 
Room Rate
CPI-Adj* 
ADR 
Average 
Occupancy 
Rate 
RevPAR** CPI-Adj.* RevPAR 
Industry 
Sales 
($ billions) 
CPI-Adj.* 
Industry 
Sales 
($ billions)
1991 1 $58.08 $88.50 60.9% $35.37 $53.90 $62.9 $95.85
1992 0 $58.91 $84.85 61.7% $36.35 $52.35 $59.5 $85.70
1993 1 $60.53  $84.79 63.6% $38.50 $55.66 $61.7  $85.43 
1994 1 $62.86  $85.48 65.2% $40.98 $57.14 $66.0  $89.06 
1995 3 $66.65  $87.06 65.5% $43.66 $59.98 $72.0  $93.04 
1996 2 $70.93  $88.06 65.2% $46.25 $59.88 $75.4  $92.78 
1997 3 $75.31  $89.16 64.5% $48.57 $59.66 $85.6  $99.74
1998 3 $78.62  $88.95 64.0% $50.32 $59.20 $93.1  $103.95 
1999 4 $81.33  $89.46 63.2% $51.40 $59.50 $99.7  $107.09 
2000 2 $85.89  $90.28 63.7% $54.71 $60.91 $108.5  $111.83 
2001 0 $88.27  $92.20 60.3% $53.23 $57.92 $103.6  $104.90 
2002 2 $83.54  $88.16 59.1% $49.37 $54.65 $102.6  $104.49 
2003 2 $82.52  $86.81 50.4% $41.61 $45.74 $105.3  $111.17 
2004 0 $86.23  $86.23 61.3% $52.86 $56.96 $113.7  $110.49 
2005 6 $90.88  $87.93 63.1% $57.35 $59.15 $122.7  $113.11 
2006   2   $97.78 $90.83 63.3% $61.93 $57.53 $133.4 $123.92
Overall 32 $76.77 $88.05 $0.62 $47.65 $56.88 $91.6 $102.03
 
 
* Based on Consumer Price Index - All urban consumers not seasonally adjusted item: Other lodging 
away from home including hotels and motels by The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.   
   
** Average RevPAR of the U.S. lodging properties from American Hotel and Lodging Association  
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Table 4 (Continued) 
 
Panel B. Sample Description by Product Type 
 
The sample properties include properties in the year before the announcement. ADR, RevPAR and Operating 
Income per Room are CPI-adjusted with 2004=100. Product Type is as follows: 1=Luxury, 2=Upscale, 3=Midscale, 
4=Economy, and 5 = Budget. 
 
Overall Acquirer Target 
Acquirer Target Product Type Product Type 
        1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
N 11358 2522 1027 2831 4191 1980 1329 270 457 850 582 363
(% of total) 9.0% 24.9% 36.9% 17.4% 11.7% 10.7% 18.1% 33.7% 23.1% 14.4%
ADR 
N 11358 2522 1027 2831 4191 1980 1329 270 457 850 582 363
Mean 68.5 71.8 122.4 82.3 63.2 50 41.5 140.4 82.2 65.2 55.7 48.8
Median 61.4 62.2 113.9 77.8 59.9 48.3 40.9 131.1 75 62.8 53.5 48.2
St Dev. 27.8 32.7 36.3 20 14 8.1 6.2 43.6 23 13.1 9.8 10.4
Maximum 296.3 313 296.3 194 149 88.7 68.1 313 201 134 101 88.9
Minimum 23.6 23.6 63.4 50.4 42 34.2 23.6 63.8 52.4 44.7 34.6 23.6
Occupancy Rate 
N 11358 2522 1027 2831 4191 1980 1329 270 457 850 582 363
Mean 61.3% 67.9% 74.3% 66.2% 58.7% 55.5% 57.5% 73.3% 69.9% 66.6% 67.5% 65.4%
Median 61.9% 69.8% 75.6% 66.8% 58.8% 54.7% 58.4% 73.7% 71.2% 68.0% 69.7% 66.5%
St Dev. 14.3% 12.0% 8.9% 12.5% 13.7% 14.2% 14.1% 6.1% 10.6% 12.2% 12.6% 13.7%
Maximum 92.1% 95.1% 91.4% 92.0% 92.1% 90.3% 89.5% 88.5% 90.4% 92.9% 95.1% 91.4%
Minimum 21.1% 29.4% 44.0% 31.0% 26.4% 24.5% 21.1% 52.6% 35.1% 33.9% 33.9% 29.4%
RevPAR 
N 11358 2522 1027 2831 4191 1980 1329 270 457 850 582 363
Mean 43.6 49.5 91.2 55.3 37.6 28 24 103.5 57.6 43.8 37.5 31.6
Median 36.9 42.2 86.5 51.3 35.2 26.4 23.7 95.4 54.1 42.1 37.3 31.2
St Dev. 24.7 26.6 29.9 19.6 14.2 9.6 7.2 35.3 19.1 13.3 9.6 8.6
Maximum 231.8 265.1 231.8 147 115 66 47.4 265.1 147 108 75.8 60.2
Minimum 7.7 13 35.5 20.1 13.8 11.4 7.7 48.4 25.3 19.3 17.5 13
Gross Profit Margin 
N 1797 796 618 661 380 102 36 137 96 307 178 78
Mean 66.1% 71.4% 63.5% 66.8% 67.9% 70.3% 67.6% 65.3% 69.0% 72.0% 74.4% 76.0%
Median 67.5% 72.8% 61.5% 69.2% 70.1% 71.8% 69.2% 65.0% 71.5% 72.3% 76.5% 78.5%
St Dev. 9.4% 8.5% 9.3% 9.7% 8.4% 8.4% 8.9% 9.9% 8.3% 5.9% 8.8% 6.9%
Maximum 89.6% 89.2% 83.0% 83.7% 86.5% 89.6% 80.9% 83.0% 82.0% 89.2% 86.9% 84.9%
Minimum 35.7% 34.3% 43.0% 44.2% 43.4% 35.7% 45.0% 41.0% 46.0% 47.4% 34.3% 54.6%
Operating Income Margin 
N 1797 796 618 661 380 102 36 137 96 307 178 78
Mean 41.2% 47.7% 40.2% 41.9% 42.2% 42.4% 31.3% 41.6% 45.9% 49.4% 49.8% 49.2%
Median 41.7% 50.0% 39.0% 43.1% 43.7% 44.6% 32.8% 41.6% 49.5% 50.0% 52.5% 53.5%
St Dev. 11.5% 12.0% 10.8% 12.1% 11.3% 11.6% 10.5% 12.4% 11.1% 9.8% 13.9% 11.7%
Maximum 69.3% 71.2% 65.0% 69.3% 65.9% 67.4% 49.1% 65.0% 63.7% 71.2% 69.6% 65.8%
Minimum -6.0% 4.0% 13.0% 9.1% 8.5% -6.0% 9.0% 5.4% 14.1% 18.7% 4.0% 22.1%
Cash Flow Return on Assets  
N 1797 796 618 661 380 102 36 137 96 307 178 78
Mean 38.8 29.1 53.7 36.9 25.8 18.8 10.9 58.4 33.5 22.7 20.6 16.9
Median 36.2 23.6 50.1 36 23 18.2 9.6 52.8 29 21.3 20.9 17.8
St Dev. 20.9 19.7 20.8 16.2 12.8 7.8 6.8 24.9 16 9.4 8.4 6
Maximum 131.3 148.6 131.3 93.9 76.2 39.6 30.5 148.6 104 74.7 45.7 34.4
Minimum -2.5 0.6 11.7 4.4 4.6 -2.5 1.6 9.9 9.3 4.8 0.6 2.5
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Table 4 (Continued) 
 
Panel C. Property Characteristics as of Year -1 
 
 
Acquirer  Target 
Mean Median  Mean Median 
Number of Brands  3.75 3.50  1.45 1.00 
Number of Properties*  709.88 347.50  76.40 18.00 
Number of States  37.81 44.00  14.24 10.00 
Age (Years)*  34.77 23.00  24.35 17.00 
 
 
 
Modes of operation  
Number of 
Properties Percent 
 
Number of 
Properties Percent 
 Owned  103 0.2%  78 1.6% 
 Managed  3133 14.1%  1440 29.5% 
 Franchised  13648 85.7%  3368 68.9% 
 
 
* Since the data does not cover the entire universe of lodging properties, information on the number of 
properties of the lodging firm are collected from 10-K reports, the industry media (The Brand Report, 
Lodging Hospitality), and database search (Factiva).  Firm age is collected from the same sources.  
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Comparing the overall acquirer to the target, ADR, occupancy rate, RevPAR, 
and profitability measures (gross profit margin and operating income margin) are 
slightly higher for the target than for the acquirer. Although the operating cash flow 
return on assets show a lower value for the target properties, this seems to be driven by 
the lower performance of the upscale and midscale properties of the target as shown in 
the data by product type. While the managerial discipline hypothesis argues that M&A 
is intended to improve poorly performing firms by replacing inefficient management 
of the target, this result does not appear to support the claim. Agrawal and Jaffe (2003) 
also found little evidence that target firms were performing poorly prior to the 
acquisition.  
Panel C shows the number of brands, properties, and states where properties 
are present as well as the firm age and the modes of operation as of one year before 
the announcement. The acquirer firms have more brands (3.75 in mean) than the target 
firms (1.45 in mean) in broader geographic areas (on average in 37.81 states) than the 
target (on average in 14.24 states). In addition, as expected, acquirer firms have more 
properties in their systems (709.88 properties in mean) than do target firms (76.40 
properties in mean). Thus, the property growth realized by the merger will be much 
bigger for the target side than for the acquirer side. Acquirers are also shown as more 
mature firms (average age of 34.76) than the target firms (or brands) (average age of 
24.35). This observation is consistent with the life cycle view of the mergers and 
acquisition, which claims that the mature acquirers are more willing to participate 
actively in mergers and acquisitions (Owen and Yawson, 2010). The modes of 
operation shows that franchised properties account for an absolute majority for both 
acquirer and target firms (80.8% overall, 85.7% for acquirer, and 68.9% for the target 
in mean). This indicates that for the lodging corporations in the sample, the franchise 
fees from the properties constitute a major portion of operating cash flows. Franchise 
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fees are determined as a fixed percentage of the room revenue of a franchised property. 
In management contracts, base fees are tied to gross revenue, and incentive fees are 
tied to profits (deRoos, 2010). Thus, the financial performance of a hotel corporation 
is critically dependent on the revenue of the member hotel properties. Among the 
variables defined earlier, RevPAR measures the revenue in per-room basis. Thus, the 
analysis will examine the change in RevPAR thoroughly in the discussion. 
 
5.3 Explanatory Variables 
This section presents the descriptive statistics for the major explanatory 
variables, i.e. property growth, changes in local market power, changes in local 
demand and supply, number of rooms, and product type. The property characteristics 
shown in the previous section (Table 4 Panel C) indicated that the acquirer and target 
properties are not alike in terms of the number of brands and properties, the 
geographic presence, and the firm age. These findings lead to an expectation that the 
explanatory variables mentioned above may also exhibit differences between the 
target and the acquirer properties.  
In Table 5, the property growth between Year -1 and Year +3 (PR_GROWH), 
shows that the target has a much greater growth (0.94) than that of the acquirer (0.26). 
As shown earlier, target firms have a much smaller number of properties prior to the 
merger, and thus the property growth impact is bigger on the target side. 
The change in the market power at the local level between Year -1 and Year +3 
(D_LOC_MP) shows a slight negative change on average overall (-0.53% in mean and 
-0.06% in median). This means that on average, the fraction of the total room 
inventory accounted for by the sample properties within the tract declined from Year -
1 to Year +3, although the change is small. So, it appears that new properties opened 
on average in these locations. While the mean reduction is shown to be bigger for the 
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acquirer properties, the median reduction shows an opposite result. This is because 
there are a few acquirer properties experiencing a relatively high reduction in the local 
market power, dragging the mean down.  
For the local market demand and supply conditions, the local demand change 
(D_LOC_DM) shows a slight reduction for both target and acquirer properties in the 
tract. The target group (-0.029) shows a lower reduction than the acquirer group (-
0.039). In contrast, for the local market supply condition, the local supply change 
(D_LOC_SP) shows a slight increase in the room supply in the local market, with the 
target properties showing a higher figure (0.15) than those of the acquirer (0.09).  
The gap between the supply change and the demand change is greater for the 
target properties. Since the supply change is the change in the number of room and the 
demand change is the occupancy rate, the lower occupancy growth means that the 
supply growth exceeds the increase in demand in the local market. When the rate of 
supply growth exceeds the increase in demand, the market tends to be oversupplied 
and hotel occupancies decline (Rushmore and Goldhoff, 1997). This result again 
confirms the importance of controlling for the local demand and supply factors. The 
target properties may show different performance pattern from that of the acquirer not 
because of the impact of the merger, but because of certain locational attributes. For 
example, supporting the different local market dynamics and cyclical demand and 
supply patterns, Rushmore et al. (1997) argued that in the early 1990s, the southern 
California cities were the last to feel the downturn, but these markets showed lagged 
the recovery in the subsequent upturn. With respect to property characteristics, target 
properties are shown to be slightly bigger in terms of the number of rooms. In terms of 
the product type, both target and acquirer properties are centered in the midscale 
category.  
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Table 5. Descriptive statistics for independent variables* 
 
 
 
  Overall Acquirer Target     Overall Acquirer Target 
Property Growth (PR_GROWH)  
 Change in Local Market Power (D_LOC_MP) 
N 13325 11476 1849 N 9990 8261 1729 
 Mean 0.35 0.26 0.94  Mean -0.53% -0.62% -0.06% 
 Median 0.11 0.11 0.25  Median -0.06% -0.03% -0.23% 
 SD 0.63 0.44 1.13  SD 3.98% 3.94% 4.10% 
 Minimum 0.04 0.04 0.04  Minimum -31.89% -31.89% -18.46% 
 Maximum 3.49 2.75 3.49  Maximum 19.01% 15.80% 19.01% 
   
 
  
Change in Local Demand (D_LOC_DM) 
 
Change in Local Supply (D_LOC_SP)  
N 12974 11230 1744 N 12974 11230 1744 
 Mean -0.038 -0.039 -0.029 Mean 0.099 0.091 0.155 
 Median -0.042 -0.044 -0.032 Median 0.018 0.018 0.028 
 SD 0.072 0.072 0.075 SD 0.418 0.411 0.457 
 Minimum -0.335 -0.335 -0.265 Minimum -0.959 -0.959 -0.504 
 Maximum 0.279 0.279 0.209 Maximum 15.442 15.442 6.881 
 
 
   
Number of Rooms (LOG_RM) Product Type (PRODUCT) (1=luxury, … 5 = budget) 
N 13151 11358 1793 N 13325 11476 1849 
 Mean 10.47 10.42 10.79  Mean 2.98 2.98 2.96 
 Median 10.46 10.30 10.70  Median 3 3 3 
 SD 0.63 0.64 0.44  SD 1.14 1.12 1.23 
 Minimum 9.30 9.30 9.73  Minimum 1 1 1 
  Maximum 12.30 12.30 12.30   Maximum 5 5 5 
 
* Differences between target and acquirer are significant at 1% level except for price segment, which is insignificant.  
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Table 6. Offer premium for the public target 
 
Table 6 presents the mean (median) run-up and final offer premium of the public targets defined by      
p-1/p-42 - 1 and poffer/p-1 -1, respectively. Superscripts indicate the level of significance of the one-sided 
test: a indicates significance at the 10% level, b indicates significance at the 5% percent level and c 
indicates significance at the 1% level. 
 
 
Run-up Final Offer Premium 
p-1/p-42 – 1 poffer/p-1 – 1 
N = 14 N = 14 
Mean 8.48%  b 27.43%  a 
Median 11.39%  b 23.47%  a 
Standard Deviation 13.35% 24.84%
Max 29.17% 94.29%
Min -17.77%   3.07%   
 
 
 
Finally, Table 6 summarizes the offer premiums for the public targets in the 
sample. Both runups (p-1/p-42 – 1) and post-runup final offer premiums (poffer/p-1 – 1) 
are computed. Following Betton et al. (2008), the runup is measured by the stock price 
of price prior to 42 trading days before the announcement (p-42) and one trading day 
prior to the announcement (p-1).  The run-up is shown as 8.48% for mean and 11.39% 
for median. The offer premium is 27.43% for mean and 23.47% for median. These 
results indicate that the stock price of the target on average increased 8.48% from day 
-42 to day -1 and the final bid price jumped 27.43% from day -1 to the final offer price 
on the announcement date. In a study using cross-sectional market-wide data over the 
period between 1980 and 2002, Betton et al. (2008) reported18  that the mean runup 
and final offer premium for successful bids were 14.5% and 27.8%, respectively.  
                                                 
18 The final offer premium in this paper (poffer/p-1 – 1) is referred to as “markup” in Betton et al. (2008). 
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The average final offer premium of this lodging industry sample is remarkably 
similar to the results found in the market wide cross-sectional study of Betton et al. 
(2008). However, the average runup in this study is lower than that found by Betton et 
al. (2008). Runups reflect the additional information conveyed by the takeover of the 
target’s fundamental or stand-alone value (Schwert, 1996), while the offer price 
fundamentally reflects the value of synergy (Betton et al., 2008).  
If the market already has a good estimate of the stand-alone value of the target, 
the run-up may not be very high. In the lodging industry, there may be a low degree of 
uncertainty regarding the current supply of rooms, the future development pipeline, 
and the demand forecasts in the local market since they are relatively well-known. As 
these supply and demand factors are critical to project the future cash flows of the 
lodging operation, it may be the case that there is a relatively lower surprise 
component in the merger related news compared to other industries with higher 
uncertainty regarding the product development and competition. Nonetheless, the 
lower runup may not necessarily indicate a lower final offer premium. Because of the 
unique non-replicable nature of the resources of the target, the synergy value to the 
merged firm can be still as high as that of the overall market level.  
 
5.4 Peer-Adjusted Measures 
 This section delves into the peer-adjusted ADR, occupancy rate, RevPAR, 
gross profit margin, operating income margin, and OCFROA measures by event year. 
In Section 5.4.1, the mean and median of each peer-adjusted variable are examined at 
the property level. The purpose of this analysis is to identify the general patterns over 
the event horizon. Since the peer group consists of the product competitors with 
similar performance, the peer-adjusted measures represent the relative competitive 
position of properties within the industry. While these year-by-year measures are 
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computed as a preliminary step to construct the performance change, which is defined 
by the difference between Year -1 and Year +3, the analysis by event year itself 
provides useful information about the pre- and the post-acquisition competitive 
conditions of the target and the acquirer. Such information helps illuminate the 
underlying nature of the merger by revealing the competitive strengths of each party.  
While this study focuses on the synergistic impacts at the property level, firm-
level analyses are also performed by aggregating the property data. The results are 
presented in Section 5.4.2. The biggest difference between the property-level measures 
and the firm-level measures is that at the property-level, each of the properties are 
equally weighted, i.e. big properties and small properties are treated equally, while at 
the firm level, small-sized properties have proportionally less weight. Merger 
decisions are made at the corporate level and eventually the aggregate synergy 
measure enters the decision-making process. Thus, the aggregate analysis provides 
meaningful information regarding the performance of mergers and acquisitions.  
The firm-level analyses are further broken down into an analysis that separates 
the target and acquirer and an analysis of the target and the acquirer aggregated. The 
former provides insights into the separate firm-level post-acquisition performance 
trends of the target and the acquirer. The question of value creation after the merger 
evaluates the post-acquisition performance of the merged firm. To make the 
evaluation comparable, the post-acquisition performance is compared with the pre-
acquisition performance of the aggregate target and the acquirer. Thus, the latter 
analysis illustrates the performance of the aggregate combined entity in the pre- and 
post-acquisition period. The weighting scheme is presented in Section 5.4.2 in detail.  
In all of the analyses, the raw variables are Winsorized at the first and 99th 
percentiles in order to control for the influence of extreme values. All dollar variables 
are adjusted by the relevant Consumer Price Index (CPI) to 2004 dollars.  
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5.4.1 Property-Level Analysis  
Table 7 presents the peer-adjusted measures for the target and the acquirer 
properties. In Panel A, which shows the mean and median by event year from -3 to +3, 
it is first noted that the target and the acquirer properties maintain overall consistent 
signs within each measure. This pattern suggests that there are no drastic changes in 
the competitive position before and after the merger, although values do change. The 
discussion in this section is organized by each peer-adjusted measure.  
For the peer-adjusted ADR, both the target and the acquirer properties show 
negative signs throughout the event years, meaning that these properties charged a 
lower price than their product competitors. Hotels often attempt to lower their price 
compared to their competitors to win customers. If this strategy is successful, the peer-
adjusted occupancy rate will show a positive sign for both the target and the acquirer 
properties. In Panel A, the target properties indeed show significantly positive peer-
adjusted occupancy rates throughout the event years. However, the acquirer properties 
show mixed signs in the mean, although the median is consistently positive.  
ADR and occupancy rate jointly affect RevPAR. According to Enz, Canina, 
and Lomano (2009), the lower price relative to competitors does not boost the 
occupancy rate enough to increase revenue. For revenue to increase, demand should 
be quite elastic so that a small cut boosts the demand substantially. In general, this is 
not the case for the lodging products. Consistent with this notion, the acquirer group 
shows significantly negative or insignificant results in peer-adjusted RevPAR. 
However, the target properties show consistently positive peer-adjusted RevPAR 
throughout the event years.  
In order to verify whether the observed differences in value between the target 
and the acquirer group are statistically meaningful or not, the group differences in 
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each measure are also analyzed. The results are depicted in Panel B. The values are 
presented as the acquirer’s measure minus the corresponding target’s measure for each 
peer-adjusted variable by event year. The differences are significant except for the 
peer-adjusted ADR and the peer-adjusted OCFROA.  
No statistical differences in peer-adjusted ADR between the target and the 
acquirer mean that both target and acquirer properties offered the same degree of price 
discount relative to their peers. However, this pricing tactic led to a positive impact on 
the RevPAR only for the target group. These findings suggest that the target properties 
are quite competitive in terms of RevPAR performance.  
The profitability and cash flow measures are only available for a much smaller 
subset of the data. The peer-adjusted gross profit margins are significantly positive for 
both target and acquirer properties. Further, as Panel B shows, the acquirer’s measure 
is significantly higher than the target’s except for Year +3, indicating superior cost 
efficiency of the acquirer group especially in the pre-merger period.  
Since the acquirers were shown to have more properties in their system than 
the targets, they are expected to exert greater buying power. In Year +3, the target 
properties show a substantial improvement in the peer-adjusted gross profit margin, 
suggesting a possible synergy impact from the M&A. Such performance 
improvements will be discussed in detail in a later chapter.  
 
100 
Table 7. Peer-adjusted performance measures: Property level  
 
The pre-merger period is the years before the announcement and the post-merger period is the years 
after the completion of the merger. The peer group is same-product type with similar RevPAR 
excluding the properties that were involved in the acquisition before or after the three-year period for 
the given year. The peer-adjusted variables are calculated from the observations that are Winsorized at 
the 1st and 99th percentile. All non-ratio variables are adjusted by the relevant Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) to 2004 dollars.  Superscripts a, b, and c indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level of the 
two-sided t-test for mean and Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test for median. 
 
Panel A. Performance by each year 
 
  Acquirer Properties Target Properties 
  Yr -3  Yr -2  Yr -1  Yr 0 Yr+1 Yr+2 Yr +3 Yr -3 Yr -2 Yr -1 Yr 0  Yr+1  Yr+2  Yr +3
Peer-Adjusted ADR 
N 11355 11356 11356 11356 11359 11360 11361 1821 1820 1820 1820 1815 1814 1813
Mean -2.52 a -2.45 a -2.53 a -3.02 a -3.13 a -3.09 a -2.71 a -2.22 a -2.57 a -3.43 a -4.25 a -4.14 a -4.42 a -4.92 a
Median -2.92 a -2.67 a -2.47 a -2.73 a -2.91 a -2.83 a -2.57 a -2.63 a -2.68 a -3.62 a -3.44 a -3.10 a -3.46 a -3.69 a
Peer-Adjusted Occupancy Rate 
N 11355 11356 11356 11356 11359 11360 11361 1821 1820 1820 1820 1815 1814 1813
Mean 0.8% a 0.0% -0.5% a -0.8% a -0.2% c 0.0% 0.9% a 4.0% a 4.3% a 5.3% a 5.0% a 3.8% a 4.8% a 5.5% a
Median 1.4% a 0.7% b 0.4% 0.5% c 1.0% b 1.0% a 1.6% a 4.5% a 5.0% a 5.9% a 5.5% a 4.7% a 5.5% a 6.6% a
Peer-Adjusted RevPAR 
N 11355 11356 11356 11356 11359 11360 11361 1821 1820 1820 1820 1815 1814 1813
Mean -0.55 a -0.71 a -0.93 a -1.14 a -0.96 a -0.70 a 0.13 1.48 a 1.74 a 1.64 a 1.06 a 0.26 1.00 a 1.38 a
Median -0.31 a -0.83 a -1.23 a -1.41 a -1.28 a -1.23 a -0.44 c 2.47 a 2.26 a 1.95 a 1.71 a 1.06 b 1.45 a 1.58 a
Peer-Adjusted Gross Profit Margin 
N 529 529 528 528 528 529 529 184 184 184 184 183 184 183
Mean 3.9% a 4.6% a 3.8% a 4.1% a 2.4% a 3.7% a 2.7% a 2.3% a 2.3% a 2.7% a 2.2% a 1.7% a 1.5% b 11.0% a
Median 4.3% a 4.1% a 3.5% a 4.2% a 1.4% a 3.1% a 3.0% a 0.9% a 0.3% b 1.2% a 0.8% a 0.7% b -0.2% 11.4% a
Peer-Adjusted Operating Income Margin 
N 529 529 528 528 528 529 529 184 184 184 184 183 184 183
Mean 7.1% a 7.3% a 7.2% a 5.9% a 4.6% a 3.9% a 4.1% a 10.0% a 11.4% a 9.1% a 9.4% a 5.8% a 6.4% a 10.8% a
Median 7.8% a 7.1% a 7.7% a 8.1% a 5.0% a 3.8% a 4.8% a 11.3% a 12.6% a 9.3% a 10.2% a 6.5% a 6.5% a 10.9% a
Peer-Adjusted Operating Cash Flow Return on Assets 
N 529 529 528 528 528 529 529 184 184 184 184 183 184 183
Mean 7.64 a 6.67 a 8.05 a 7.71 a 4.17 a 2.33 a 2.87 a 2.65 a 3.97 a 2.95 a 2.19 a 0.54 0.01 3.12 a
Median 7.53 a 5.59 a 7.58 a 6.89 a 2.26 a 1.28 a 2.27 a 3.42 a 3.48 a 2.71 a 3.01 a -0.06 -0.56 1.54 a
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Table 7 (Continued) 
 
Panel B. Difference between Acquirer and Target Properties 
 
 
Acquirer minus Target 
 
   
Yr -3  Yr -2  Yr -1  Yr 0  Yr+1  Yr+2  Yr +3  
Peer-Adjusted ADR 
Mean -0.30 c 0.12 c 0.90 1.23 1.01 c 1.33 2.21
Median -0.29 a 0.01 a 1.15 0.71 0.19 a 0.63 1.12
Peer-Adjusted Occupancy Rate 
Mean -3.20% a -4.30% a -5.80% a -5.80% a -4.00% a -4.80% a -4.60% a 
Median -3.10% a -4.30% a -5.50% a -5.00% a -3.70% a -4.50% a -5.00% a 
Peer-Adjusted RevPAR 
Mean -2.03 a -2.45 a -2.57 a -2.2 a -1.22 a -1.7 a -1.25 a 
Median -2.78 a -3.09 a -3.18 a -3.12 a -2.34 a -2.68 a -2.02 a 
Peer-Adjusted Gross Profit Margin 
Mean 1.60% a 2.30% a 1.10% 1.90% a 0.70% a 2.20% b -8.30% a 
Median 3.40% a 3.80% a 2.30% c 3.40% a 0.70% a 3.30% b -8.40% a 
Peer-Adjusted Operating Income Margin 
Mean -2.90% a -4.10% a -1.90% a -3.50% a -1.20% a -2.50% a -6.70% a 
Median -3.50% a -5.50% a -1.60% a -2.10% a -1.50% a -2.70% a -6.10% a 
Peer-Adjusted Operating Cash Flow Return on Assets 
Mean 4.99 a 2.7 b 5.1 a 5.52 3.63 2.32 -0.25
   Median 4.11 a 2.11   4.87 b 3.88   2.32   1.84 c 0.73   
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The peer-adjusted operating income margin is also positive for both acquirer 
and target properties throughout the event period year. Between the target and the 
acquirer, target properties have a significantly higher peer-adjusted operating income 
margin, suggesting that the target is already operating better than the acquirer with 
some degree of operating efficiency.  
Finally, peer-adjusted operating cash flow return on assets shows overall 
positive signs for both the target and the acquirer. Moreover, in the pre-acquisition 
years (up to Year -1), the acquirer’s value is significantly higher than the target’s. 
However, Panel B shows that in the post-acquisition period, the difference between 
the target and the acquirer is insignificant. Thus, the acquirer’s competitive advantage 
relative to the target appears to dwindle toward Year +3, although peer-adjusted 
operating cash flow return on assets still remains in the positive range.  
In sum, the peer-adjusted measures by event year show that the target 
properties have superior peer-adjusted RevPAR performance thanks to the strong 
occupancy rate, while the acquirer properties have superior peer-adjusted gross 
profitability. Both the target and the acquirer group show overall robust operating cash 
flow performance relative to their peers. While the acquirer group shows superior 
operating cash flow performance compared to the target group in the pre-acquisition 
period, the difference becomes insignificant toward the post-acquisition period. As in 
other studies (Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1989; McGuckin and Nguyen, 1995;  Agrawal 
and Jaffe, 2003), the target does not appear to underperform prior to the merger, which 
contradicts the argument that, among many reasons for mergers, the takeover occurs in 
order to improve the underperforming target firms through more efficient management.  
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5.4.2 Firm-Level Analysis  
Table 8 illustrates the peer-adjusted measures on an aggregate basis by firm. In 
each deal, the performance measures are computed by aggregating the property data 
for the target and for the acquirer firm. For example, an acquirer’s ADR in year t is 
computed by the aggregate room revenue over the aggregate rooms sold for all the 
properties of the acquirer firm in that year, i.e. by treating the firm as one big hotel 
property. For the peer group, the peer properties of the acquirer are aggregated in the 
same manner. All the other measures (occupancy rates, RevPAR, and so on) are 
computed in the same way.  
Some of the peer-adjusted measures show a different pattern at the firm level 
compared to the property-level analysis. In Table 8, both the target and the acquirer 
group display insignificant results in peer-adjusted ADR, which is in contrast with the 
negative results for both groups in the property-level analysis. For the peer-adjusted 
occupancy rate, both groups show positive results in Table 8. Together with the 
insignificant peer-adjusted ADR at the firm level for both, these results indicate that at 
the firm level, both the target and acquirer achieved higher occupancy rates by 
charging the same price as their product peers. For the peer-adjusted RevPAR, the 
acquirer firms show significantly positive results throughout the event period; the 
target firms also show positive results, but they are significant only in the pre-
acquisition years. In the property-level analysis, the acquirer showed mostly negative 
results in peer-adjusted RevPAR while the target showed positive results.  
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Table 8.  Peer-adjusted aggregate performance measure: Firm level 
 
The pre-merger period is the years before the announcement and the post-merger period is the years 
after the completion of the merger. Property-level data are aggregated by the firm. Peer group 
performance is constructed by aggregating the peer properties. The peer-adjusted variables are 
calculated from the observations that are Winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. All non-ratio 
variables are adjusted by the relevant Consumer Price Index (CPI) to 2004 dollars.  Superscripts a, b, 
and c indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level of the two-sided t-test for mean and Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney test for median. 
 
 
 
  
Acquirer Target 
  Yr-3 Yr-2 Yr-1 Yr0 Yr+1 Yr+2 Yr+3 Yr-3 Yr-2 Yr-1 Yr0 Yr+1 Yr+2 Yr+3 
Peer-Adjusted ADR 
N 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 31 31 31 31 31 31 31
Mean 0.6 -0.2 0.4 -1.0 1.2 2.8 2.1 3.8 2.5 0.6 1.9 0.8 -1.1 -2.2
Median 0.9 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 2.9 1.0 -0.6 0.7 -1.2 -1.8 -0.9 -1.0 -3.6 c
Peer-Adjusted Occupancy 
N 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 31 31 31 31 31 31 31
Mean 3.0% b 2.6% c 2.2% c 2.0% c 3.1% b 4.5% a 3.8% a 4.1% a 3.0% b 3.7% b 3.2% b 2.6% c 2.8% c 2.8% c
Median 2.2% b 1.2% b 1.2% c 1.7% c 3.2% b 4.3% a 4.2% a 4.6% a 3.9% b 3.7% b 3.0% c 0.7% 3.1% c 2.8%
Peer-Adjusted RevPAR 
N 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 31 31 31 31 31 31 31
Mean 3.1 a 2.2 a 2.5 b 1.3 4.1 a 5.7 a 4.9 a 3.8 a 2.8 b 2.9 3.2 c 2.2 1.8 0.6
Median 3.0 a 1.7 b 2.6 b 0.1 2.5 b 4.9 a 4.4 a 3.4 a 2.2 a 1.8 c 1.4 0.3 3.1 0.9
Peer-Adjusted Gross Profit Margin 
N 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
Mean 1.0% 1.5% 1.2% 1.4% 2.0% b 2.8% b 3.6% a 7.0% 3.2% 3.3% 5.5% b 5.1% c 6.0% b 7.9% a
Median 1.3% 0.7% 1.3% 1.3% 1.8% b 2.1% b 3.5% a 6.1% 2.3% 0.6% 5.4% c 2.7% a 4.8% b 7.6% a
Peer-Adjusted Operating Income Margin 
N 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
Mean 4.1% b 4.4% b 4.7% b 4.3% b 5.6% a 5.6% a 7.0% a 12.6% 7.2% 6.7% 10.0% a 7.8% a 10.3% a 9.7% a
Median 4.4% b 3.9% b 5.4% a 4.2% b 6.5% a 6.1% a 7.3% a 11.3% 7.0% 5.7% 11.6% b 7.1% a 8.2% a 11.0% a
Peer-Adjusted Operating Cash Flow Return on Assets 
N 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
Mean 0.4 0.0 2.1 -1.0 0.1 0.8 3.7 2.5 -0.3 -0.8 -3.5 -3.9 -0.2 -1.2
Median 1.2 -1.9 -0.6 -2.2 -3.2 -2.9 0.9 0.0 1.1 0.9 -1.1 -2.9 0.5 -2.3
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The differences between the firm-level and the property-level analysis indicate 
that there is a size effect in the performance. The size effect was statistically verified 
as well by dividing the properties by size quintile. For example, for the peer-adjusted 
RevPAR, the acquirer group showed that a large number of small properties perform 
poorly and a small number of very big properties perform well. Since the size effect is 
not the main focus of this paper, the results of this quintile analysis are not reported 
herein.  
Thus, when the properties are aggregated disproportionately into the firm, the 
firm-level mean and median can be different from the results obtained in the property-
level mean and median. Commenting on the size effect, McGuckin and Nguyen 
(1995), who examined the post-acquisition productivity change, stated that the 
productivity aggregated at the firm level may hide important information on the 
productivity of each of the components of the firm.  
For the remaining profitability and cash flow measures, the peer-adjusted gross 
profit margin shows that the acquirer group has significantly positive results 
throughout the event years, and the target group has significantly positive results in the 
post-acquisition period but non-significant results in the pre-acquisition period, again 
suggesting possible cost-savings benefits from the merger. For the peer-adjusted 
operating income margin, the acquirer group exhibits consistently positive peer-
adjusted operating income margin, demonstrating operational efficiency. The target 
group again shows insignificant results in the pre-acquisition period and significantly 
positive results in the post-acquisition period. For the peer-adjusted cash flow return 
on assets, both the target and the acquirer group show insignificant results.  
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Table 9.  Peer-adjusted aggregate performance measure: Merged firm 
 
 
The pre-merger period is the years before the announcement and the post-merger period is the years 
after the completion of the merger. The performance in each event year is aggregated performance of 
the merged firm. The peer-adjusted variables are calculated from the observations that are Winsorized 
that the 1st and 99th percentile. All non-ratio variables are adjusted by the relevant Consumer Price 
Index (CPI) to 2004 dollars.  Superscripts a, b, and c indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10% level of the 
two-sided t-test for mean and Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test for median.  
 
 
Year-3 Year-2 Year-1 Year0 Year+1 Year+2 Year+3
Peer-Adjusted ADR 
N 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
Mean 1.50 0.86 0.61 -0.26 0.73 1.59 1.19
Median 2.19 1.79 0.20 -0.93 1.21 0.03 1.05
Peer-Adjusted Occupancy Rate 
N 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
Mean 2.18% c 1.78% 1.69% 1.37% 1.99% 2.91% b 3.36% b 
Median 1.55% c 1.02% 1.10% 1.98% 2.98% 3.73% c 3.90% b 
Peer-Adjusted RevPAR 
N 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
Mean 2.95 a 2.18 a 2.12 b 1.34 2.70 b 4.12 a 4.03 a 
Median 2.62 a 2.12 b 1.58 b 0.21 0.89 4.30 a 4.07 a 
Peer-Adjusted Gross Profit Margin 
N 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
Mean 3.23% 3.51% 2.78% 2.52% 2.58% b 3.50% b 4.51% a 
Median 1.26% 0.86% 1.80% 1.63% 2.58% b 2.40% b 3.51% a 
Peer-Adjusted Operating Income Margin 
N 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
Mean 6.59% b 6.31% b 6.47% b 5.10% b 5.54% a 6.46% a 8.00% a 
Median 6.14% b 6.56% b 7.05% a 6.12% b 6.65% a 6.27% a 7.45% a 
Peer-Adjusted Operating Cash Flow Return on Assets
N 
11  11 11 11 11 11  11
Mean 
0.61  0.75 2.81 -0.50 2.04 3.24  5.13
Median 
0.51  -2.25 2.49 -2.01 -3.21 -3.26  1.17
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In sum, the analysis so far shows that i) there is a size effect which may lead to 
different performance consequences for the property-level and the aggregate firm-
level analysis, ii) the peer-adjusted measures show that both the target and the acquirer 
firms possess a certain degree of competitiveness relative to their product peers in 
terms of occupancy rate, RevPAR, and profitability, and iii) profitability measures of 
the target (peer-adjusted gross profit margin and operating income margin) exhibit a 
possible performance improvement in the post-acquisition period.  
Now the analysis turns to the perspective of the merged firm on the aggregate 
basis. The results are presented in Table 9. Merged firms sustain a positive peer-
adjusted RevPAR throughout event period (except for Year 0). Although the peer-
adjusted ADR is insignificant throughout event years, peer-adjusted occupancy rate 
show mostly positive results while it is not all significant. The peer-adjusted gross 
profit margin (except for Year -3) and operating income margin also show positive 
results overall. Ghosh (2001) and Heron and Lie (2002) also reported above-peer 
operating income margin for the acquiring firms both before and after acquisition. 
Thus, although this study looks into a single industry sector, the general pattern does 
not seem to be different from that of other industries.  
One of the main interests in studying post-acquisition operating performance is 
to determine whether or not performance actually improves. In Table 9, a roughly 
upward trend is detected in the peer-adjusted occupancy rate, RevPAR, and the 
profitability measures. The performance change is formally presented and analyzed in 
the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 6 
PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT 
 
The main focus of studies on post-acquisition performance is first, whether 
performance improves after the merger relative to a control group and second, whether 
performance changes are in fact due to the merger. This second point is then related to 
the sources of gain (or loss) realized in the post-acquisition period. In this paper, the 
first aspect was analyzed by investigating the changes in peer-adjusted synergy 
outcome measures. The second aspect was verified by regression analysis. The 
following two chapters present these analyses and discuss the results.  
This chapter reports the changes in performance by the change in peer-adjusted 
ADR, occupancy rate, RevPAR, gross profit margin, operating income margin, and 
the OCFROA. As before, the analyses are performed at the property level (Section 
6.1) as well as the firm level (Section 6.2). Although the performance changes in Year 
+1 and +2 relative to Year -1 are also presented, the discussion will mainly focus on 
the change in Year +3 relative to Year -1.  
 
6.1 Property-Level Analysis  
This section discusses the performance changes in the peer-adjusted measures 
at the property level. The mean and median are examined for each year. In order to 
verify whether the observed change is meaningful in a statistical sense, t-tests are 
performed for the significance of the mean, and Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests are 
performed for the median. Table 10 summarizes the results. The discussion in the 
remaining section is presented by each peer-adjusted measure. 
The changes in peer-adjusted ADR are significantly negative for both the 
target and the acquirer properties (-0.19 and -1.46 by mean, -0.21 and -0.77 by median, 
respectively). The findings here show that on average the merger does not raise the 
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price at the property level relative to the product peers. The market power hypothesis 
predicts that after horizontal mergers the merged firm consolidates production and 
limits output, which leads to a price increase. Such a scenario is not plausible for 
lodging properties. At each property, the quantity of room nights is fixed. Neither do 
lodging mergers lead to a consolidation of multiple properties. An investigation by the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) also found no evidence of possible anticompetitive 
pricing behavior following a lodging industry merger. In 2005, a pricing analysis was 
performed by the FTC in connection with the proposed acquisition of Mandalay 
Resort Group by MGM Mirage Inc. The Commission concluded that due to the 
complexity involved in hotel pricing with volatility in the booking cycle, it was not 
likely that the acquisition would lead to anticompetitive pricing behavior (Gotts and 
Hemli, 2006).  
The observed price changes are rather consistent with the local friction 
argument (Olson, 1965; Azoulay and Shane, 2001; Kalnins, 2004). The fear of losing 
guests coming into the local area by sharing a common reservation network may drive 
the member properties of the merged firm to lower prices. Alternatively, there may be 
a brand dilution (Jiang et al., 2002) associated with the product extension which 
negatively affects the price of the properties. These suppositions are tested more 
formally through regression analysis in the next chapter.  
Regarding the occupancy rate, the acquirer properties show a significant 
improvement in peer-adjusted occupancy rate (1.4% in mean and 1.2% in median) 
while the target properties show a positive but insignificant result. For the acquirer 
properties, the improvement found in the acquirer group seems to support the cross-
selling effect realized by the acquisition (Mahajan et al., 1994; Morgan and Rego, 
2009). It is intriguing to see that the improvement was only significant for the acquirer  
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Table 10. Changes in peer-adjusted measures: Property level 
 
 
The pre-merger period is the years before the announcement and the post-merger period is the years 
after the completion of the merger. The peer group is same-product type with similar RevPAR 
excluding the properties that were involved in the acquisition before or after the three-year period for 
the given year. The peer-adjusted variables are calculated from the observations that are Winsorized 
that the 1st and 99th percentile. All non-ratio variables are adjusted by the relevant Consumer Price 
Index (CPI) to 2004 dollars.  Superscripts a, b, and c indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10% level of the 
two-sided t-test for mean and Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test for median. 
 
Acquirer Properties   Target Properties 
-1 to +1   -1 to +2   -1 to +3   -1 to +1   -1 to +2   -1 to +3   
Peer-Adjusted ADR 
N 11356 11356 11355 1815 1814 1813
Mean -0.61 a -0.58 a -0.19 b -0.68 a -0.96 a -1.46 a 
Median -0.69 a -0.78 a -0.21 a -0.34 a -0.59 a -0.77 a 
Peer-Adjusted Occupancy Rate 
N 11356 11356 11355 1815 1814 1813
Mean 0.20% a 0.40% a 1.40% a -1.50% a -0.60% a 0.10%
Median -0.10% 0.20% a 1.20% a -1.30% a -0.40% b 0.30%
Peer-Adjusted RevPAR 
N 11356 11356 11355 1815 1814 1813
Mean -0.03 0.23 a 1.06 a -1.39 a -0.65 a -0.27
Median -0.26 b 0.05 c 1.06 a -0.98 a -0.35 b -0.12
Peer-adjusted Gross Profit 
N 1068 1240 1273 488 495 289
Mean -1.20% a 0.50% a -0.20% 1.10% a 2.00% a 6.20% a 
Median -1.50% a 0.80% a 0.00% 0.60% a 1.90% a 6.20% a 
Peer-Adjusted Operating Income Margin
N 1068 1240 1273 488 495 289
Mean -2.20% a -1.20% a -0.80% a -1.30% a 1.10% a 1.40% a 
Median -2.10% a -1.10% a -0.50% a -1.40% a 1.50% a 1.10% a 
Peer-Adjusted Operating Cash Flow Return on Assets
N 1068 1240 1273 488 495 289
Mean -3.54 a -3.69 a -2.61 a -3.1 a -2.13 a 0.48
   Median -3.69 a -3.52 a -1.9 a    -3.3 a -2.27 a 0.05   
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properties. Although the target properties showed an insignificant improvement, recall 
that that the target had consistently positive peer-adjusted occupancy rate throughout 
the event years while the acquirer showed mixed results (in Table 7). Thus, these 
results indicate that while the target properties, which demonstrated competitive 
occupancy performance relative to their peers, their performance still stayed above 
their competitors through Year +3.  
Similarly, peer-adjusted RevPAR shows a significant improvement for the 
acquirer properties only (1.06 for both mean and median). The results in peer-adjusted 
ADR and occupancy improvements indicate that such RevPAR gains stem from the 
improvement in occupancy rate. For the target, while the properties maintained 
competitiveness throughout Year -3 to +3 (see Table 7), no significant improvement is 
found between Year -1 and +3. In addition, it is also detected that for the peer-adjusted 
occupancy rate and RevPAR, the changes from Year -1 to +1, +2, and +3 in Table 10 
show an upward trend for both the target and acquirer properties, suggesting that the 
improvements in these measures occur gradually.  
Next, in profitability measures (gross profit margin and operating income 
margin), the most distinctive finding is a strong improvement in the peer-adjusted 
gross profit margin, which reflects cost savings for target properties (6.2% in both 
mean and median). For acquirer properties, the result is insignificant. While other 
studies also reported significant cost savings in horizontal mergers (Fee and Thomas, 
2004), these results show that on average the benefit is greater on the target side at the 
property level. As discussed earlier, collective buying power is an important source of 
competitiveness for hotel corporations. With more properties in their system, acquirers 
are expected to have greater buying power and therefore higher cost efficiency. The 
improvement found in the target indicates that the cost efficiency of the acquirer may 
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spill over to the target properties. Again, this claim will be tested through regression 
analysis. 
The peer-adjusted operating income margin of the target and acquirer 
properties shows that they move in opposite directions. The acquirer properties show a 
significantly negative change (-0.8% in mean and -0.5% in median) while the target 
properties show a significantly positive change (1.4% in mean and 1.1% in median). It 
might be the case that the acquirer intends to rejuvenate its property base through 
mergers and acquisitions.  
While the reason behind the deterioration of the operating income margin for 
the acquirer properties is not immediately clear, a possible explanation may be related 
to the property’s age. Researchers have reported a negative association between 
property age and revenue for franchised properties (Sorenson and Sørensen, 2001). As 
shown earlier, the acquirer firms in the sample are more mature in terms of firm age. 
Thus, it is likely that their properties are also relatively older. Since maintenance 
expenses tend to increase with property age, the operating income margin of a 
property tends to decline with age.  
It is also important to note that in spite of the decrease in the peer-adjusted 
operating income margin in Year +3 relative to Year -1, it still remained above the 
peer group in Year +3 (+4.1% in mean, shown in Table 7). Thus, the change between 
Year -1 and +3 indicates that the competitive basis of the acquirer properties is 
maintained but dwindling. McGuckin and Nguyen (1994) also reported similar 
findings. They found that acquirers were the most productive firms and experienced a 
small decline in relative productivity in the post-acquisition period. Such a decline was 
most salient in the firm’s existing old plants.   
The decline in the peer-adjusted operating income margin found in the acquirer 
properties is contrasted by the strong improvement found in the target properties. It 
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should be noted that such positive result in target properties is entirely due to the gains 
created in cost savings. If there is an additional reduction in the operating expenses, 
the improvement of the peer-adjusted operating income margin should be greater than 
the improvement of the peer-adjusted gross profit margin, which is not the case 
observed here.19 Thus, there is no evidence of improved managerial efficiency found 
in the target properties.  
The operating cash flow return on assets (OCFROA) shows a significant 
decrease for the acquirer properties (-2.61 in mean) and an insignificant result for the 
target properties. It can be shown that the OCFROA measure is jointly affected by the 
operating income margin and RevPAR as below:  
 
OCF Return on assets = Operating Income/Room Available 
   = [Operating Income / (Room Sold × ADR)]  
× (Room Sold / Room Available) × ADR 
  = Operating Income Margin × RevPAR  
 
Thus, the target properties show an insignificant OCFROA change in spite of 
an improvement in the peer-adjusted operating income margin, due to the weak result 
in the RevPAR improvement. For the acquirer properties, while the RevPAR shows a 
                                                 
19 Peer-adjusted operating income margin can be decomposed into the gross profit margin and the 
expense to revenue as follows:  
Peer-adjusted Operating Income Margin=Operating Income Margin focal - Operating Income Margin peer   
= [(Gross Income – Expense)/Revenue]focal – [(Gross Income – Expense)/Revenue]peer 
= [Gross Profit Margin – Expense to Revenue]focal – [Gross Profit Margin – Expense to Revenue]peer 
= [Peer-adjusted Gross Profit Margin] – [Peer-adjusted Expense to Revenue] 
Thus, ∆Peer-adjusted Operating Income Margin = [∆Peer-adjusted Gross Profit Margin] – [∆Peer-
adjusted Expense to Revenue] 
If there is additional expense reduction, then ∆Peer-adjusted Operating Income Margin should be bigger 
than ∆Peer-adjusted Gross Profit Margin. 
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significant improvement, operating income margin shows a significantly negative 
result, driving the improvement of peer-adjusted OCFROA to be negative as well. The 
peer-adjusted OCFROA measure also shows a roughly upward trend in Year -1 to +1, 
+2, and +3 for both target and acquirer properties. In an additional analysis that looked 
into year-to-year changes (results are not reported, for brevity), the acquirer properties 
displayed a roughly downward trend for these measures while the target properties 
exhibited no distinct trend. Thus, while no significant change is detected for the peer-
adjusted OCFROA between Year -1 and Year +3, there might be a trend reversal in 
the post-acquisition period.  
To summarize, the property-level analysis does show some evidence of 
performance improvements after the merger. Most notably, the acquirer properties 
show RevPAR improvement relative to their peers driven by positive occupancy 
gains; the target properties show an improvement in the gross profit margin, which 
also affects the improvement in the operating income margin. Although these gains 
did not result in a positive improvement in the final cash flow measure (peer-adjusted 
operating cash flow return on assets), at least both the target and the acquirer 
properties show an upward trend in the post-acquisition period as shown in the 
improvements in each post-acquisition event year (Year +1, +2, and +3) relative to 
Year -1. 
 
 6.2 Firm- Level Analysis 
In this section, the performance changes are analyzed on the aggregate basis. 
Table 11 shows the changes in the peer-adjusted measures by the target and the 
acquirer firm separately. Table 12 reports the aggregate results from the merged firm’s 
perspective. Again, the firm-level results are not exactly the same as the property-level 
results. Some improvements found in the property-level analysis are no longer 
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detected in the firm-level analysis and vice versa. As discussed earlier, the difference 
is ascribed to the size effect and the different weight schemes between the property-
level metric and the aggregate metric. Detailed explanations of these respects are 
presented as the discussion goes through the change in each peer-adjusted measure.  
First, findings in Table 11 are discussed. The discussion is arranged by results 
found in the acquirer firms followed by those of the target firms. For the acquiring 
firms, the peer-adjusted ADR improvement is insignificant. Recall that in the 
property-level analysis, the result was significantly negative. In order to investigate the 
differences found in outcome, the size effect was examined by breaking down 
properties by size quintile with the size being the number of rooms. Overall, an 
inverse U-shaped relationship was found between the peer-adjusted ADR 
improvement and the property size (results are not reported herein). In particular, the 
largest properties (in quintile 5) displayed severe underperformance, which were 
driven by negative changes in the property-level analysis. However, when the 
properties were aggregated by firm, the underperforming properties are spread into a 
few firms. While the performance changes in those firms were negative, their impact 
was not dominant in the overall mean and median. As a result, the firm-level mean and 
median for the acquirer are positive but insignificant.  
The peer-adjusted occupancy rate and RevPAR for the acquirer firms show 
improvements as in the property-level analysis. The results in peer-adjusted ADR and 
occupancy rate suggest that such improvement in the peer-adjusted RevPAR for 
acquirer firms is achieved through an enhanced occupancy rate relative to the peers.  
The change in the peer-adjusted gross profit margin of the acquirer also shows 
a different result from the property-level analysis. While the property-level analysis 
showed an insignificant decline, the firm-level analysis shows a significant 
improvement. Here, the size effect showed that properties in the top two size quintiles 
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exhibited positive improvements while the other quintile groups showed negative 
changes. Since there are more properties that experienced a decrease, the mean change 
at the property level was negative although it was insignificant. When aggregated, the 
results become positive as properties are disproportionately distributed among the 
firms.  
The changes in the peer-adjusted operating income margin and cash flow 
return on assets of the acquirer firms also show similar results. Both measures show 
positive results, although only the improvement of the peer-adjusted operating income 
margin is significant. In the property-level analysis both measures showed 
significantly negative results. The underlying reason is the same as before, i.e. the size 
and aggregation effect.  
Now, the discussion turns to the target firms in Table 11. For the target firms, 
all the changes between Year -1 and Year +3 are insignificant. In the property-level 
analysis, the strongest improvement for the target group was found in the peer-
adjusted gross profit margin and operating income margin. Here, the change is still 
positive but it is no longer significant. Different from the acquirer properties, where 
the big properties showed the strongest cost-saving effect, the target properties showed 
the strongest gross profitability improvements among the small-scale properties in the 
lower quintiles (quintiles 1 through 3). It makes sense because the larger properties of 
the target may not be able to promptly discontinue the existing supplier relationship 
and switch to the merged firm’s procurement network. Larger properties (quintiles 4 
and 5) showed conspicuously lower improvement, although it was still positive on 
average. Driven by the improvements realized in many small properties, the mean at 
the property level was positive. However, when aggregated, the positive result did not 
persist.  
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The same pattern is detected in the peer-adjusted operating income margin; the 
target showed a significant improvement in the property-level analysis, but the result 
becomes insignificant in the firm-level analysis. For the peer-adjusted operating cash 
flow return on assets, the improvement is insignificant as in the property-level analysis.  
In sum, the aggregate analysis by target and acquirer firms show that there are 
gains realized from M&A although they are only shown in acquirer firms. The 
acquirer firms show improvements in the peer-adjusted occupancy rate, RevPAR, 
gross profit margin, and operating income margin. The property level gains detected in 
the target group no longer persist through aggregation. In spite of such neutral results 
found on the target side, given that the gains realized by the acquirer would not have 
been materialized without mergers, the findings here support the value creation from 
M&A.  
Findings thus far also provide useful precautions about the regression analysis. 
As seen so far, the property-level improvement does not imply the same results at the 
firm level due to the size effect and the aggregation effect. Thus, first, although all the 
measures are normalized either by revenue or number of rooms, the property size still 
needs to be controlled for in later analysis. Second, some of the complementary nature 
is detected in synergy creation, for example, a possible spillover of the acquirer’s 
buying power to the target. Thus, in order to control for such characteristics, the deal 
effect is incorporated in the regression model. Details about the regression model are 
presented in the next chapter.  
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Table 11. Changes in peer-adjusted measures: Firm level 
 
The pre-merger period is the years before the announcement and the post-merger period is the years 
after the completion of the merger. Property-level data are aggregated by the firm. Peer group 
performance is constructed by aggregating the peer properties. The peer-adjusted variables are 
calculated from the observations that are Winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. All non-ratio 
variables are adjusted by the relevant Consumer Price Index (CPI) to 2004 dollars.  Superscripts a, b, 
and c indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level of the two-sided t-test for mean and Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney test for median. 
 
 
Acquirer Target 
-1 to +1 -1 to +2 -1 to +3 -1 to +1 -1 to +2 -1 to +3 
Peer-Adjusted ADR   
N 17 17 17 31 31 31
Mean 0.83 2.37 1.71 0.22 -1.7 -2.73
Median 0.85 0.87 0.56 -0.28 -0.79 -1.97
Peer-Adjusted Occupancy 
N 17 17 17 31 31 31
Mean 0.90%c 2.30%b 1.70%b -1.10% -0.90% -0.90%
Median 1.20%b 1.90%a 2.20%b -1.00% -1.70% -0.60%
Peer-Adjusted RevPAR 
N 17 17 17 31 31 31
Mean 1.58 3.19a 2.34b -0.73 -1.11 -2.31
Median 0.68 1.84a 1.78a -0.97 -0.74 -1.39
Peer-Adjusted Gross Profit Margin 
N 12 12 12 8 8 8
Mean 0.90% 1.60%c 2.50%b 1.80% 2.70% 4.60%
Median 1.40% 1.30% 2.40%b 1.90% 1.00% 4.80%
Peer-Adjusted Operating Income Margin 
N 12 12 12 8 8 8
Mean 0.90% 0.90% 2.30%b 1.00% 3.60% 3.00%
Median -0.20% 0.40% 3.50%c 0.90% 1.50% 3.70%
Peer-Adjusted Cash Flow Return on Assets 
N 12 12 12 8 8 8
Mean -1.96 -1.26 1.61 -3.13 0.6 -0.46
  Median -2.08  -3.61  0.21    -2.98  -0.56  -2.25  
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The remainder of the section is devoted to an aggregate analysis from the 
merged firm’s perspective. The results are summarized in Table 12. Again, focusing 
on the changes between Year -1 and Year +3, significant improvements are found in 
the peer-adjusted occupancy rate and RevPAR. The changes in peer-adjusted ADR, 
profitability measures, and operating cash flow return on assets show insignificant 
results although they are all positive. As discussed earlier, from the corporation’s 
perspective, cash flow from properties largely depends on the revenue and operating 
profit. Thus, the improvement in the peer-adjusted RevPAR indicates a beneficial 
impact of mergers and acquisition.  
It should be noted that the profitability and cash flow measures in Table 12 do 
not represent the merged firm’s income statement. The figures shown in Table 12 are 
the property measures aggregated by the merged firm. Thus, they represent the 
profitability and cash flow return on asset in on the aggregate system base. In the 
merged firm’s accounting book, the costs and the expenses reflect those that occur in 
the owned properties and at the corporate offices. Thus, additional cost savings (or 
losses) occur by merging the corporate offices of the target and the acquirer by 
consolidating functional areas of the two organizations. While Table 12 captures the 
main sources of cash flow to the lodging corporations (RevPAR) and the system-wide 
cost efficiency, it does not reflect the impact of integrating functional areas of the 
corporations.  
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Table 12. Changes in peer-adjusted measures: Merged firm 
 
 
The pre-merger period is the years before the announcement and the post-merger period is the years 
after the completion of the merger. The performance in each event year is aggregated performance of 
the merged firm. The peer-adjusted variables are calculated from the observations that are Winsorized 
that the 1st and 99th percentile. All non-ratio variables are adjusted by the relevant Consumer Price 
Index (CPI) to 2004 dollars.  Superscripts a, b, and c indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10% level of the 
two-sided t-test for mean and Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test for median.  
 
 
Combined Acquirer and Target 
      -1 to +1   -1 to +2   -1 to +3  
Peer-Adjusted ADR   
N 16 16 16 
Mean 0.12 0.98 0.58 
Median 0.24 0.04 0.79 
Peer-Adjusted Occupancy Rate  
N 16 16 16 
Mean 0.29% 1.21% b 1.67% b 
Median 0.80% 1.45% c 1.50% b 
Peer-Adjusted RevPAR   
N 16 16 16  
Mean 0.58 2.00 b 1.92 b 
Median 0.46 1.51 b 2.25 b 
Peer-Adjusted Gross Profit   
N 11 11 11 
Mean -0.21% 0.72% 1.73% 
Median -0.79% 0.83% 0.94% 
Peer-Adjusted Operating Income Margin  
N 11 11 11 
Mean -0.93% -0.01% 1.53% 
Median -0.95% -0.50% 0.87% 
Peer-Adjusted Operating Cash Flow Return on Assets  
N 11 11 11 
Mean -0.78 0.42 2.32 
Median -2.65 -2.70 2.42 
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CHAPTER 7 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
 
 In this chapter, regression methodologies and the results are presented. In the 
regression analysis, the deal-level random effects and the possible selection issues are 
considered in the modeling process. The regression results are examined with respect 
to each hypothesis that relates the sources of synergy and its expected outcome.   
 
7.1 Regression Methodology 
In order to test the hypotheses defined in Section 4.1, multivariate regression 
was employed using the change in the peer-adjusted performance measure as a 
dependent variable and the factors that are expected to affect the realization of the 
synergy as independent variables, along with control variables.  
The dependent variables are the changes in peer-adjusted ADR (D_A_ADR), 
peer-adjusted occupancy rate (D_A_OCC), peer-adjusted RevPAR (D_A_REVPAR), 
peer-adjusted profitability measures (gross profit margin and operating profit margin, 
denoted by D_A_G_PROFIT and D_A_OI respectively), and peer-adjusted cash flow 
return on assets (D_A_CFROA), taking a form of difference-in-difference form of 
Year +3 versus -1 as below: 
 
Peer-adjusted Performance Change = (yt=+3 – yPt=+3) – (yt=-1 – yPt=-1)  (1) 
 
where yt denotes the performance measure of the focal properties at event year t and 
yPt  is the corresponding measure of the median peer-adjusted properties of the same 
product type and similar performance in the same calendar year.  
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The dependent variable was constructed in this way due to its meaningful 
interpretation as a measure of relative competitive gain achieved through mergers and 
acquisition, since peers are defined by the product competitors. From an econometric 
standpoint, the advantage of a difference-in-difference form is that it may resolve 
problems involving selection bias. Given that the properties of the target and the 
acquirer are likely to be a non-random sample, there may be underlying characteristics 
that affect the probability of being selected into the sample as well as the performance 
the properties. If selection bias is present, the application of OLS leads to inconsistent 
parameter estimates (Heckman, 1979).  
Assuming that the contributing factors underlying selection bias are constant in 
different time periods before and after the merger, differencing the differences 
between merger-affected properties and peers can eliminates such bias (Heckman, 
Ichimura, Smith, and Todd, 1998). This can be shown as below: 
 
E[yt=+3 | M =1] – E[ yPt=+3 | M = 0 ] = f(Xt=+3) + selection bias + synergy   (2) 
E[yt=-1 | M =1] – E[ yPt=-1 | M = 0 ] = f(Xt=-1) + selection bias   (3) 
 
where M = 1 indicates that the property is a subject of a M&A at t = 0 and M = 0 when 
it is not. Xt refers to the observed covariates that explain the performance difference 
between the focal property and its peers. Selection bias is unobservable attributes that 
may present in the properties of the target and the acquirer. Synergy refers to the 
synergistic gain realized in the merger affected properties in t = 3. Subtraction of (3) 
from (2) removes the selection bias. The synergy is modeled by the function of the 
sources of synergy, i.e. property growth, local market power, product distance, and so 
on. Control variables are included in the model for the known attributes that affect the 
performance. In addition, in order to account for the cross-correlation between error 
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terms for properties in the same deal, a random effect specification was employed. 
Since several variables are defined at the deal level (e.g. product distance between the 
target and the acquirer), there is no within-deal variation and thus fixed effects are not 
feasible. Therefore, a random effect model is used instead of a fixed effect model. A 
random effect model was used in a similar context in La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (2002) and Hau (2001). The final model is shown as below:  
 
y*ij = β0 + β1TENDER + β2P_DIST + β3D_LOC_MP + β4PR_GROWH   
 +β5ANN_HIGH+ β6D_LOC_DM + β7D_LOC_SP + β8LOG_RM  
+ [Product Dummies] + [Location Dummies] + ζj + εij   (4) 
 
Here, for simplicity y*ij is used for the change in the peer-adjusted performance 
measure of the property i of deal j. y*ij ,which captures the synergistic outcome, is 
modeled as a function of the sources of synergy, moderators, and the control variables. 
ζj  is the deal random effect which is distributed normally with mean zero and variance 
σj2. εij is a random error distributed normally with mean zero and variance σ2. Equation 
(4) is estimated separately by the target and the acquirer properties. 
The validity of the random effect is tested by the z-test through examining 
whether σj2 (variance of ζj, random effect for deal j, in Equations (4) and (5)) is zero or 
not (Littell et al., 2006). While Breusch and Pagan Lagrange multiplier test is often 
used to check the validity of the random effect, it is only applicable when the dataset is 
balanced panel. Since our sample is unbalanced, this method is not feasible. When the 
random effect is insignificant, the estimation is performed by ordinary least square 
with a verification of no heteroscedasticity through White’s test.  
In order to test Hypotheses 9.1 and 9.2, the relationship between the post-
acquisition performance and the offer premium is examined in separate regressions. 
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As stated in Chapter 5, the offer premium is defined by taking the final offer price per 
stock over the price one day prior to the announcement and subtracting one from that 
(pfin/p-1) -1. Theoretically, both pfin and p-1 are expected to be associated with the 
expected synergy of the acquisition. In particular, p-1, which incorporates all the run-
ups realized in the market until a day before the announcement, reflects information 
updated in the market about the value of synergy released by the takeover rumors. 
Thus, the premium measure used in here, (pfin/p-1) -1, which is a post-runup premium, 
may actually capture additional information about the expected synergy which is only 
available to the managers (Eckbo et al., 2008) or a value destructive motivation driven 
by the manager’s self-interest (Roll, 1986).  
In order to avoid multicollinearity between the deal unit explanatory variables 
and premiums, only property level explanatory variables are included in the model. 
While there are alternative ways to construct the model, i.e. a structural equation 
modeling in which premium is separately modeled, given that there are such a small 
number of deals with the offer premium data, these other methods were not viable. A 
random effect model is again applied since the premium is defined at the deal unit. 
The final model is shown as below:  
 
y*ij = β0 + β1PREMIUM + β2D_MP + β3D_LOC_DM 
+ β4D_LOC_SP + β5LOG_RM  
+ [Product Dummies] + [Location Dummies] + ζj + εij (5) 
 
The critical assumption of difference-in-difference estimator is that selection 
bias is non-time varying. With this implicit assumption, most of studies that used a 
difference-in-difference measure as a dependent variable estimated the model of 
interest without addressing the selection issue (e.g. Ghosh (2001), Heron and Lie 
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(2002), and Zollo and Singh (2004)).  However, it is possible that this assumption may 
not hold. The unobservable attributes underlying selection bias may be time varying 
and such time variant change may actually drive the corporate event of interest 
(Campa and Kedia, 2002; Li and Prabhala, 2007). In such case, the difference-in-
difference form of Equation (1) will still contain the selection component and omitting 
the selection component in the model leads to a specification error (Heckman, 1979; 
Maddala, 1983).  
Thus, in order to verify the robustness of the results, a two-stage selection 
model was also estimated. In the first stage, a probit model was estimated to obtain the 
probability of being a target or acquirer property using the pre-acquisition RevPAR (in 
Year -1), product dummy and year dummy variables20. The inverse Mill’s ratio was 
obtained from this first stage and included in the second stage regression models as an 
additional independent variable (SELECTION) in Equation (4) and (5).   
Technical details of the two step procedures are as follows. The equation of 
primary interest is written as:  
 
yi* = β'xi + εi         (6) 
 
where yi* is the peer-adjusted performance measure as in Equation (4) and (5).  
The probability that a property would be a subject of the target or the acquirer 
in the sample is estimated through the probit regression. The general form of the 
selection equation is as follows:  
                                                 
20 The probability of being a target or acquirer property was estimated separately. The inverse Mill’s 
ratio for the target (acquirer) group was obtained from the probit model applied to the target (acquirer) 
properties and the non-merger affected properties. Supporting the independence of irrelevant 
alternatives, when the probability of being a target (acquirer) property was computed against the non-
merger affect group pooled with the acquirer (target) properties, there was no material change in the 
Mill’s ratio. The second stage regression results remained the same for both methods. 
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zi* = γ'wi + ui         (7)
  
where zi* is the selection variable, which equals 1 if the subject is selected into the 
sample and 0 otherwise;  γ is a vector of probit coefficients; and wi is publicly known 
information influencing the sample selection.  
The selection means that yi*, which contains the synergy created by the 
acquisition, is only observed when zi* is greater than zero, i.e. when the properties are 
selected into the sample. Assuming that εi and ui in (6) and (7) have a bivariate normal 
distribution with zero means and correlation ρ, then for the observed values of 
dependent variable yi, given that yi is selected into the sample, we have: 
 
  E[yi*| zi* > 0]  = E[yi | ui >– γ'wi ] 
  = β'xi + E [εi | ui >– γ'wi] 
  = β'xi + ρσελi(αu) 
  = β'xi + βλλi(αu)      (8) 
 
where αu= – γ'wi /σu  and λi(αu) = ø(– γ'wi /σu)/ Φ(– γ'wi /σu)    (9) 
 
In Equation (7) and (8), ui is the part of zi* not explained by public variable w. 
Thus, ui can be viewed as the private information that drives a corporate decision (Li 
and Prabhala, 2007). In Equation (9), ø (.) and Φ(.) denote the standard normal 
probability density function and the standard normal cumulative density function, 
respectively. λi(αu) is commonly referred to as the inverse Mill’s ratio and is obtained 
from the first stage of the probit estimation. Thus, we have:  
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  yi*| zi* > 0 = E[yi | zi*] + vi 
 =  β'xi + βλλi(αu) + vi      (10) 
 
 In the second stage, the regression is estimated by adding λi(αu) as a regressor 
to the x variables of the model using maximum likelihood estimation. Technically, the 
selection model is an omitted variable bias problem which we solve by adding the 
selection variable λi(αu).When λi(αu) is ignored, the specification error of an omitted 
variable occurs. Consequently, in the presence of selection issues, the application of 
OLS in (6) alone leads to inconsistent estimation of β. The sign of the coefficient of 
λ(αu) is determined by the sign of ρ (the correlation between the error terms in εi and 
ui), which appears in the derivation of Equation (8).  
If one wishes to test whether the private information in a firm’s choice affected 
post-choice outcomes, we would regress outcome y on E(ui| z* > 0). Qualitatively, the 
variable added to correct for self-selection, λi(αu), can be interpreted as an estimate of 
the private information underlying a firm’s choice since ui, recalling Equation (7), is 
the component not explained by public variable vector wi. The ex-ante expectation of 
ui is zero. Ex-post, after property i becomes the target or acquirer, the expectations of 
ui is updated. The revised expectation is an updated estimate of the firm’s private 
information. Thus, testing its significance is a test of whether private information 
possessed by a firm explains ex-post outcomes (Li and Prabhala, 2007). 
The Heckman procedure, which is widely used in applied work, uses OLS in 
the second stage. Although the Heckman procedure provides consistent estimators, 
researchers have pointed out that the maximum likelihood (ML) method is more 
efficient than OLS (Greene, 2000; Kennedy, 2003). Thus, in this study, maximum 
likelihood estimation is chosen over the OLS procedure.  
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Table 13. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Coefficients* 
 
 N Mean St.Dev 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1.D_A_ADR 13148 -0.35 8.63 1.00                     
2.D_A_OCC 13148 0.01 0.11 -0.01 1.00                    
3.D_A_REVPAR 13148 0.89 8.94 0.59 0.73 1.00                   
4.D_A_G_PROFIT 1553 0.01 0.06 0.10 0.25 0.17 1.00                  
5.D_A_OI 1553 0.00 0.08 0.20 0.40 0.36 0.72 1.00                 
6.D_A_CFROA 1553 -2.01 12.81 0.48 0.47 0.68 0.50 0.74 1.00                
7.TARGET 13151 0.14 0.34 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 0.41 0.12 0.10 1.00               
8.TENDER 13151 0.09 0.29 -0.04 0.07 0.02 0.06 0.22 0.16 -0.01 1.00              
9.PR_GROWH 13151 0.34 0.62 -0.08 -0.05 -0.08 0.11 0.25 0.18 0.38 0.40 1.00             
10.D_LOC_MP 9827 -0.55 3.99 -0.02 -0.12 -0.07 -0.11 -0.15 -0.09 0.05 -0.28 -0.02 1.00            
11.P_DIST 12490 1.05 0.52 0.00 -0.11 -0.08 0.05 0.01 0.03 -0.27 -0.07 -0.03 0.07 1.00          
12.D_LOC_DM 12974 -0.04 0.07 0.21 0.23 0.31 0.08 0.09 0.22 0.04 -0.07 0.02 0.00 0.14 1.00        
13.D_LOC_SP 12974 0.10 0.42 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.18 0.07 0.01 0.05 -0.08 0.10 -0.36 0.04 0.04 1.00      
14.ANN_HIGH 13151 0.22 0.41 0.01 0.08 0.05 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.16 -0.17 -0.11 0.08 -0.64 -0.25 -0.03 1.00    
15.LOG_RM 13151 10.47 0.63 -0.09 -0.07 -0.09 -0.03 0.06 0.02 0.20 0.15 0.33 -0.19 -0.12 0.15 0.17 -0.23 1.00   
16.PRICE 13151 2.98 1.13 0.11 0.06 0.06 0.16 -0.04 0.07 0.00 0.08 -0.17 0.06 -0.04 -0.16 -0.12 0.18 -0.40 1.00  
17.SELECTION 13151 1.55 0.91 0.01 -0.06 -0.05 0.29 0.11 0.10 0.62 0.04 0.25 -0.08 -0.49 0.09 0.16 0.07 0.27 -0.02 1.00
 
* Coefficient of 0.07 and above are significant at p < 0.05 and those above 0.09 are significant at p < 0.0001. 
 
7.2 Correlation and Descriptive Statistics  
As a preliminary analysis, Pearson correlation coefficients between the 
variables were analyzed.  The results are presented in Table 13. As is typical for 
differenced variables, no strong correlation is detected between the dependent 
variables (the change in peer-ADR, occupancy rate, RevPAR, gross profit margin, 
operating income margin, and OCFROA) and the explanatory variables. Changes in 
local market power (D_LOC_MP) show a moderately negative relationship with 
occupancy rate (-0.12). The peer-adjusted gross profit change shows a moderate 
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positive correlation with property growth (0.11) and target (0.41), suggesting a 
positive impact of property growth on cost savings, with the target being more 
strongly affected. The property growth and target show a significant positive 
correlation (0.38). Among the independent variables, ANN_HIGH and P_DIST show a 
fairly high negative correlation (-0.64).  
 
7.3 Regression Results 
In this section, the regression results are presented in connection with each 
hypothesis. Several points are clarified before the results are discussed. The regression 
results are reported in Table 14 for models (1) through (6) which are arranged 
according to the dependent variable, i.e. the change in peer-adjusted ADR, occupancy 
rate, RevPAR, gross profit margin, operating income margin, and OCFORA for each 
model. Each model is estimated separately for the target and the acquirer properties in 
order to investigate how synergy creation differs between the target and the acquirer, 
and to infer what role is played by the target and the acquirer. The separate estimation 
approach is also supported by the previously performed descriptive analyses, which 
suggested that the target and the acquirer differ in both synergy outcome variables 
(changes in peer-adjusted measures) and their characteristics (number of properties, 
firm age, and so on).  
Panel A reports the results without the selection variable and Panel B presents 
the results with the selection variable. In Panel A, all the models are presented; in 
Panel B, only models (1) through (3), (ADR, occupancy rate, and RevPAR models) 
are presented. When the selection variable was added to the model, it was significant 
only for models (1) through (3), except for the RevPAR models for the acquirer group. 
For models (4) through (6) (gross profit margin, operating income margin, and 
OCFROA models), SELECTION was insignificant while all the main results remained 
130 
the same as in the model without SELECTION. Thus, the estimation results are not 
reported. In the models where SELECTION is included, the main results remain 
strongly robust. In this regard, the results refer to both Panel A and B unless otherwise 
specified. The only exception is P_GROWTH in occupancy rate and RevPAR models 
for the acquirer and the implications of SELECTION itself. These aspects will be 
discussed in detail later in this section. 
In the estimation, product and location dummies are included only if there is a 
significant fixed effect for the dependent variable.21 The rationale is that while it is 
necessary to control for the relevant factors in order to evaluate the sources of synergy 
more accurately, too many dummy variables cause a loss of degree of freedom, which 
may make the parameter estimates less reliable (Chase, 2009). This can be especially 
problematic in profitability and operating cash flow models where the observation is 
only available for a small subset of the data. Following this criterion, location 
dummies are not included in Model (4) through (6). Also in Models (4) through (6), no 
observations are available for TENDER and ANN_HIGH for the target group. Thus, 
the coefficients for these variables are estimated only for the acquirer. 
Now the results of the regression analysis are discussed. The discussion 
focuses on the verification of the hypotheses. Recall that the first hypothesis (H1) 
stated that the price increase of the target and the acquirer properties is greater with 
higher property growth induced by the merger.  H1 is tested in model 1. In model (1), 
the coefficients of the property growth (PR_GROWTH) are insignificant for both the 
target and the acquirer group.  Thus, H1 does not appear to be supported. Given that 
the price is generally determined by local economic forces, property growth at the 
                                                 
21 For each dependent variable of property i, a multi-factor fixed effect model is estimated as: yijkt = µ + 
pj + lk + yt + εijk, where yijk is property i with product type pj and location type lk in year t. εijk is a random 
error term. The product type and location are not included in the regression model if the fixed effect is 
not significant as determined by the joint F-test.  
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national level does not seem to be related to collusion among the properties. In 
addition, with a high proportion of franchised operations, the property owners, who 
are also responsible for day-to-day management including pricing, are highly 
decentralized nationwide. Thus, collusion among the properties at the national level is 
not very plausible.  
Hypothesis 2.1 and 2.2 presents contrasting views about the relationship 
between local market power and price. H2.1 predicts a positive relationship whereas 
H2.2 predicts an inverse relationship. These hypotheses are also tested in Model (1). 
The variable that captures the change in the local market power is D_LOC_ MP, the 
change in the fraction of the room inventory within the tract. The higher the overlap in 
the target and the acquirer properties in the local market, defined by the tract, 
D_LOC_MP will be greater. In Model (1), both the target and the acquirer group show 
negative and significant coefficients for D_LOC_MP. This result supports the local 
friction argument (H2.1), which predicts that increasing contact of the properties of 
the merged firm within the local tract unit by the merger results in a peer-adjusted 
ADR loss. The local friction argument explains such loss by elevated price 
competition between the members of the same chain properties within the local market 
(Azoulay and Shane, 2001; Kalnins, 2004). There are several theoretical explanations 
possible, which are all aligned in the local friction argument. Through mergers and 
acquisitions, perceived substitutability of the properties of the target and the acquirer 
within the same local market will increase than before the acquisition. The theory of 
microeconomics predicts that the availability of the substitutes decreases the 
equilibrium price. Due to the concern of losing the territorial privilege, the properties 
may lower the price in order to attract more customers of the chain system into their 
properties. Alternatively, the negative result may be due to the increasing difficulty of 
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coordination (Olson, 1965) as the number of member properties of the merged chain 
increases within the local market.  
The negative result is against the local collusion argument (H2.2), which 
predicts that greater contact between the target and the acquirer properties within the 
local market leads to higher collusive cooperation and thereby a price increase.  
In order to understand let’s look at the relationship between market power and 
RevPAR. Territorial conflict argument also shows a consistent result in Model (3), 
namely, Model (3) shows that D_LOC_MP is also negatively associated with the 
change in peer-adjusted RevPAR. Thus, this result is consistent with the supposition 
of territorial conflicts, which refer to the loss of revenue due to the increasing 
properties of the same chain within the local market. The detrimental impact of local 
competition is also reflected in the occupancy rate model. In Model (2), D_LOC_MP 
is negative for both groups with a significant result for the acquirer group. The fact 
that the local market power (D_LOC_MP) is negative for the peer-adjusted ADR and 
occupancy indicates that the increasing local contact within the tract unit can lead to 
substantial value erosion for the merged firm.  
Hypotheses 3 and 4 test buying power at the national and the local level. These 
hypotheses are tested in Model (4). Supporting Hypothesis 3, Model (4) shows that 
property growth (PR_GROWH) is positively associated with the change in the peer-
adjusted gross profit margin for both target and acquirer properties. Many lodging 
firms emphasize the collective buying power as their competitive advantage. The 
results show that indeed the increasing number of properties for both target and the 
acquirer result in a significant cost-saving effect.  
Regarding buying power at the local market level (H4.1 and H4.2), H4.1 
predicts that greater market power contributes to cost savings by placing greater 
pressure on local suppliers to reduce input prices. In contrast, H4.2 predicts that 
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greater market power makes it more difficult for the properties to monitor and 
coordinate with one another and therefore buying power is actually diluted with a 
higher concentration of properties in the local market. The results in Model (4) show 
that D_LOC_MP is insignificant for both the target and the acquirer. There may be no 
significant part of supplies that are dependent on the local condition. If so, local 
market power will not have any impact on costs. Thus, neither Hypothesis 4.1 nor 
Hypothesis 4.2 is supported for either target or acquirer properties.  
Hypothesis 5 relates higher occupancy gains to a more heterogeneous 
combination of the product families of the target and the acquirer. Model (2), which 
presents the regression of the peer-adjusted occupancy changes, shows that the 
product distance (P_DIST) is insignificant for both the target and acquirer. Thus, the 
heterogeneous demand hypothesis (H5) is not supported. This result indicates that the 
product difference between the target and the acquirer does not seem to facilitate 
cross-purchases across the different brands. Perhaps customer demand is not quite 
heterogeneous but rather it is more segmented into a particular product category.  
Regarding the cross-selling effect, it is worth mentioning that in Model (2), 
P_GROWTH shows different results in Panel (A) and (B), i.e. P_GROWTH is 
insignificant in Panel (A) but it is significant and positive in Panel (B) for the acquirer 
properties. The property growth captures an increasing availability of merged 
company properties in more locations, which can contribute to a higher occupancy rate 
of these properties if successful cross-selling is performed. The positive result for the 
acquirer suggests that there is a spillover of target customers to the acquirer properties. 
However, the same effect is not detected for the target properties (from the acquirer 
customers). Given that the acquirer was shown to have a broader geographic presence, 
once the target is merged with the acquirer, the target customers may find it beneficial 
to purchase hotel rooms in previously unavailable locations within the newly 
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expanded system instead of from other firms. In addition, the effect is only detected 
when the probability of being an acquirer property (SELECTION) is included in the 
model. While this selection variable will be discussed in detail later in this section, a 
negative sign for the acquirer means that the probability of being an acquirer property 
is negatively associated with the change in the peer-adjusted occupancy rate. 
Geographical cross-selling may become significant only when such a tendency of the 
acquirer properties is controlled for.  
Hypothesis 6 predicts that lower product distance between the target and the 
acquirer contributes to higher prices by boosting consumer confidence regarding the 
product category. In model (1), which regresses the peer-adjusted ADR changes, the 
coefficient of the product distance between the target firm and the acquirer firm 
(P_DIST) is indeed negative and significant but it is only for the target. This result 
suggests that as hypothesized the lower the product distance, i.e. a more homogeneous 
combination of the brand families of the target and the acquirer, the greater the price 
changes, supporting the product confidence hypothesis (H6). However, this is true 
only for the target. It is likely that the acquirer, which has higher firm age and a 
broader geographic presence, already enjoys a higher degree of brand recognition and 
stability. By being merged into the acquirer, targets seem to gain benefits in terms of 
the brand equity of the acquirer.  
Hypothesis 7 tests whether the tender offer is positively associated with the 
operating performance of the target properties. The tender offer (TENDER) is found to 
be insignificant in all the models where it is included. From this result, the argument 
that mergers and acquisitions replace the inefficient managers of the target and 
improve the efficiency (H7) does not seem to be supported. While the disciplinary role 
of the takeover through a tender offer was supported in some studies (Martin and 
McConnell, 1991; Kini, Kracaw, and Mian, 2004), others refuted the idea on the 
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grounds that the target typically did not underperform in the pre-acquisition period 
(McGuckin and Nguyen, 1995; Agrawal and Jaffee, 2003) and thus the motivation of 
improving the target’s performance by removing inefficiency is not validated.  
Regarding Hypothesis 8, which tests whether M&As announced in a high 
industry cycle perform poorly in the post-acquisition period, the dummy variable 
ANN_HIGH is found to be negative for the target properties in the ADR model, and 
for the acquirer properties in OCFROA models. In the OCFROA models, the 
ANN_HIGH was not tested for the target due to the lack of available data. Thus, the 
performance extrapolation hypothesis (H8) seems to be supported for both the target 
and acquirer properties, i.e. management may overestimate the post-acquisition 
performance in the deals announced in the high industry environment.   
The regression analysis also shows useful information about which synergy 
sources affect the revenue and operating cash flow. Model (3), which reports the 
regression results for the peer-adjusted RevPAR changes, shows that for the acquirer, 
the peer-adjusted revenue change is mainly related to: local market power, which 
affects both price and occupancy rate; and property growth (in Panel B), which affects 
the occupancy rate. For the target, the peer-adjusted revenue change is again 
associated with the local market power and the product distance between the target 
and the acquirer, both of which affect ADR.  
Model (6) shows that for both target and acquirer properties, cost savings 
induced by the property growth flow down to the peer-adjusted OCFROA measure. 
For the target, P_DIST is negative and significant in models (4), (5), and (6), 
indicating that when the products are more similar, then the volume purchase benefit 
is stronger. Overall, the results show that the operating cash flow measure is most 
strongly affected by the cost savings effect of the M&A.  
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Table 14. Multivariate regression: Sources of synergy 
 
PANEL A. Estimation without the selection variable 
 
The model validity for the random effect model is tested by the log likelihood ratio, which tests the null 
model likelihood ratio that measures the difference between the given model specification and one with 
a constant intercept only, with degrees of freedom equal to the number of covariate coefficients minus 
one. Standard errors are in parentheses. Superscripts a, b, and c indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 
10% level. 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
D_Peer_ADR D_Peer_Occ D_Peer_RevPAR 
Acquirer    Target  Acquirer   Target  Acquirer     Target  
     
Intercept 15.6812 a  47.4227 a 0.1644 a  -0.2029   20.0334 a  23.79 c
  (2.3889)    (14.874)   (0.0472)    (0.0913)   (3.7864)    (12.7581)   
TENDER -1.2267    0.8508   0.05471    0.07749   2.7758    5.0366   
  (0.9521)    (21.0879)   (0.0389)    (0.0587)   (3.0480)    (16.6347)   
PR_GROWTH 0.05079    9.0959   0.009048    0.004845   -0.1104    6.6163   
  (0.5047)    (5.532)   (0.0172)    (0.0184)   (1.3544)    (4.4189)   
D_LOC_MP -0.08298 a  -0.1806 b -0.00138 a  -0.00089   -0.1113 a  -0.171 b
  (0.0294)    (0.0771)   (0.0004)    (0.0007)   (0.0296)    (0.0721)   
P_DIST 0.1557    -18.2128 a -0.04783    -0.03149   -2.8546    -15.5442 c
  (0.7462)    (10.8945)   (0.0297)    (0.0362)   (2.3279)    (8.6861)   
D_LOC_DM 27.7733 a  38.065 a 0.7199 a  0.6463 a 65.1351 a  73.6901 a
  (1.5939)    (4.9814)   (0.0190)    (0.0477)   (1.5972)    (4.6603)   
D_LOC_SP 0.5114 b  3.0031 b 0.000606    0.006108   0.4891 b  2.9627 b
  (0.2378)    (1.3059)   (0.0029)    (0.0123)   (0.2395)    (1.2208)   
ANN_HIGH -0.1485    -27.2261 b 0.001402    0.04233   -1.3766    -15.5797   
  (0.8858)    (14.3069)   (0.0337)    (0.0482)   (2.6468)    (11.4362)   
LOG_RM -1.1345   -4.5375 a -0.01105 a  0.01738 b -1.4115 a  -2.2227 a
  (0.201)    (0.8719)   (0.0024)    (0.0075)   (0.2006)    (0.8155)   
      
Product Dummies Yes   Yes  Yes   No Yes   Yes
Location Dummies Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes Yes   Yes
      
Random Effect Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Z-stat for Random 
Effect 1.32 c  2.33 a  2.26 b  1.73 b  2.24 b  2.27 b
      
N 8149   1045  8149  1045 8149  1045
Chi-square  11.82  a    110.37 a    629.81  a   50.21 a    478.83  a    139.19  a
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Table 14 (Continued) 
 
PANEL A. (Continued) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
D_Peer_G_Profit D_Peer_OI D_Peer_OCFROA 
Acquirer    Target  Acquirer   Target  Acquirer    Target  
    
Intercept 0.0217    -0.04836 -0.0547   -0.0081 -10.0121    -0.0081
 (0.0515)    (0.1438) (0.0869)   (0.9692) (12.3449)    (0.9692)
TENDER 0.00582    0.0069   0.5425    
 (0.0242)    (0.0469)   (6.1844)    
PR_GROWTH 0.0174 a  0.01407 b 0.0376 b 0.0178 b 5.2527 a  0.01781 b
 (0.0097)    (0.0068) (0.0184)   (0.0747) (2.4536)    (0.0747)
D_LOC_MP -0.00002    -0.0010 -0.0006   -0.0019 -0.09418    -0.00186
 (0.0004)    (0.0009) (0.0006)   (0.1514) (0.0899)    (0.1514)
P_DIST -0.0020    -0.05622 b 0.0069   -0.0985 a 1.1849    -0.09846 a
 (0.016)    (0.0225) (0.0304)   (0.0032) (4.0438)    (0.0032)
D_LOC_DM 0.1703 a  0.03172 0.3395 a 0.1165 63.5700 a  0.11646
 (0.0306)    (0.0702) (0.0501)   (0.2561) (7.2383)    (0.2561)
D_LOC_SP 0.0010    0.0002 0.0086 c 0.0307 1.0245    0.03072
 (0.0029)    (0.0208) (0.0048)   (0.312) (0.6929)    (0.312)
ANN_HIGH -0.0061       -0.0548    -8.6062 a    
 (0.0195)       (0.0366)    (4.9021)      
LOG_RM -0.0063 c   0.00989 -0.0004   0.00459 0.2130    0.00459
 (0.0038)    (0.0125) (0.0062)   (0.8012) (0.9032)    (0.8012)
           
      
Product Dummies Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes Yes   Yes
Location Dummies No   No  No   No No   No
      
Random Effect Yes   No   Yes   No   Yes   No  
Z-stat for Random Effect 1.58 c  N/A  1.63 c  N/A 1.55 c  N/A
      
N 800   120   800   120   800   120
Chi-Squared  50.08  a    N/A    55.64  a    N/A      39.44 a     N/A   
F-Stat N/A   7.28  a N/A   8.21 a  N/A   3.55 a
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Table 14 (Continued) 
 
PANEL B. Estimation with the selection variable 
 
The model validity for the random effect model is tested by the log likelihood ratio, which tests the null 
model likelihood ratio that measures the difference between the given model specification and one with 
a constant intercept only, with degrees of freedom equal to the number of covariate coefficients minus 
one. Standard errors are in parentheses. Superscripts a, b, and c indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 
10% level. 
 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
D_Peer_ADR D_Peer_Occ D_Peer_RevPAR 
Acquirer    Target  Acquirer   Target  Acquirer     Target  
    
Intercept 15.1798 a  7.3178  0.2895 a  -0.4244   27.3173 a  -34.4001 c
 (2.370)   (19.364)  (0.0689)    (0.1333)   (4.5666)  (17.9347)
TENDER -1.1059   10.8865  0.01565    0.1308   0.5471  19.6649
 (0.861)   (22.685)  (0.0636)    (0.0813)   (3.96)  (20.9873)
PR_GROWTH -0.252   9.0438  0.09188 a  0.005411   4.6888 a  6.7572
 (0.517)   (5.876)  (0.0278)    (0.0233)   (1.764)  (5.4369)
D_LOC_MP -0.08265 a  -0.1568 b -0.0012 a  -0.00071   -0.1012 a  -0.1378 c
 (0.0293)   (0.0769)  (0.0003)    (0.0007)   (0.02929)  (0.07132)
P_DIST 0.07174   -21.3748 c -0.04057    -0.05128   -2.3559  -20.562 c
 (0.672)   (11.611)  (0.0481)    (0.0458)   (3.0053)  (10.7429)
D_LOC_DM 27.925 a  34.084 a 0.6696 a  0.6275 a 62.1772 a  67.976 a
 (1.600)   (5.088)  (0.0188)    (0.0488)   (1.5964)  (4.7166)
D_LOC_SP 0.4955 b  3.1057 b -0.00087    0.005254   0.418 c  3.1652 a
 (0.237)   (1.299)  (0.0028)    (0.0124)   (0.2371)  (1.2039)
ANN_HIGH -0.463   -35.0566 b 0.06601    -0.00539   2.4934  -27.6308 c
 (0.856)   (15.345)  (0.0548)    (0.0629)   (3.4293)  (14.1986)
LOG_RM -1.1579 a  -3.8524 a -0.00727 a  0.02154 a -1.1837 a  -1.2318
 (0.202)   (0.890)  (0.0023)    (0.0077)   (0.1992)  (0.8253)
SELECTION 0.7902   12.319 a -0.1704 a  0.06781 a -10.0567 a  17.8667 a
 (0.625)   (3.600)  (0.0087)   (0.0288)   (0.7357)  (3.3359)
      
Product Dummies Yes   Yes  Yes   No Yes   Yes
Location Dummies Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes Yes   Yes
      
Z-stat for Random 
Effect 1.21 
  
2.36
a
2.26 a
 
1.68 b 2.19 b 
 
2.39 a
      
N 8149   1045  8149  1045 8149  1045
Chi-square  8.32  a    123.24 a    910.64  a   54.25 a    595.36      166.71  a
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There are several points that are worth mentioning about the regression models 
presented in Table 14. First, the control variables regarding the local market condition 
(D_LOC_DM and D_LOC_SP) and the property size (LOG_RM) are significant in 
many models. This shows the validity of adding these factors to the model and the 
robustness of the findings since the results are obtained while controlling for these 
factors.  
Second, SELECTION reveals useful information regarding the nature of 
resource combination between the target and the acquirer. In Panel (B), the target 
group shows consistently positive coefficients for SELECTION while the acquirer 
group shows consistently negative coefficients where they are significant. This means 
that the probability of being a target property is positively associated with the 
dependent variable in the model, while the probability of being an acquirer property is 
negatively associated with the dependent variable. These results imply the 
complementary nature of the growth pattern of the target and the acquirer properties. 
Researchers have recognized that when one of the merging firms has an imbalance 
between its resources and growth opportunities and the other firm has an opposite but 
complementary imbalance, their combination creates value (Myers and Majluf, 1984; 
Sudarsanam, Holl, and Salami, 1996; Morellec and Zhdanova, 2008). Findings in 
SELECTION are consistent with such notion.  
The pattern found in SELECTION is also consistent with the findings in the 
performance improvement analysis. If we focus on the peer-adjusted RevPAR 
performance, which is the main performance variable in the lodging industry, recall 
that Table 7 showed that the acquirer properties displayed consistently negative results 
while the target properties showed consistently positive results. When the existing 
properties, although they have a broad brand recognition, have a weak performance 
compare to the product competitors in the market, it will be difficult to attract 
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developers and franchisors for the additional properties, placing great constraints on 
future growth. In this situation, firms can develop a new brand of their own or 
alternatively, they can merge with a firm with a stronger current competitive position 
with strong growth perspectives. In return, the acquirer may share its broad 
recognition with the target.  
Next, pertaining to Hypotheses 9.1 and 9.2, the relationship between 
performance changes and premium is tested. The results are summarized in Table 15. 
Since the main interest here is whether the premium is related to net synergy creation 
or destruction, the model is estimated only for the peer-adjusted change in RevPAR 
and OCFROA, which are the main sources of cash flow from the properties to the 
lodging corporation. Premiums are known to be related to the deal characteristics, the 
firm characteristics, and the year-specific effect (Betton et al., 2008). Thus, deal- and 
firm-dependent variables are excluded and only property-dependent variables are 
included. As before, Panel (A) reports the results without the selection variable and 
Panel (B) with the selection variable. In Panel (A), PREMIUM is significant only in 
the OCFROA model for the acquirer. When SELECTION is added, the results in Panel 
(B) show that PREMIUM is significant for the acquirer in both ADR and OCFROA 
models.  
These results suggest that a higher premium is associated with higher 
performance change of the acquirer. However, this relationship was not found for the 
target properties. As was found in the earlier estimation, SELECTION shows negative 
and significant coefficients for the acquirer, which means that the probability of being 
an acquirer property is negatively associated with the ex post performance changes. 
Put together, the results for the acquirer suggest that given that SELECTION is 
controlled for, i.e. the acquirer’s performance improvement tends to be lower ex post, 
higher premiums are associated with higher performance improvements. 
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Table 15. Multivariate regression with offer premium 
 
PANEL A. Estimation with the selection variable 
 
Dependent variables are peer-adjusted performance changes defined by the difference between Year +3 
and Year -1 for each property. Superscripts a, b, and c indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels 
in the two-sided test. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
 
 
 
 (1)  (2) 
D_Peer_RevPAR   D_OCFROA 
Acquirer  Target  Acquirer   Target   
      
Intercept 32.4264 a 7.6045  14.7747  -15.147  
 (7.2995) (9.6695)  (16.0939)  (31.2697)  
PREMIUM -0.619 -2.6497  14.8261 a 5.8879  
 (4.4976) (7.0895)  (8.3915)  (8.4259)  
D_LOC MP -0.1271 a -0.2434  -0.07877  -0.1476  
 (0.04742) (0.08506)  (0.0964)  (0.1811)  
D_LOC_DM 67.0927 a 75.2188 a 70.6836 a 76.2734 a 
 (4.1099) (5.4729)  (9.3052)  (12.6387)  
D_LOC_SP 0.4365 1.7826  0.9594  0.8303  
 (0.5072) (0.6732)  (0.7141)  (0.9123)  
LOG_RM -2.6497 -0.9254  -1.7555  1.0546  
 (0.6182) (0.8507)  (1.3179)  (2.807)  
     
     
     
Product Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  No  
Location Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
      
Random Effect Yes  Yes  No  No  
Z-stat for Random Effect 2.00 b 1.65 c n/a n/a  
      
N 1180  761  384 217  
Chi-square  27.84  a  88.87  a n/a    n/a   
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Table 15 (Continued) 
 
 
PANEL B. Estimation with the selection variable 
 
Dependent variables are peer-adjusted performance changes defined by the difference between Year +3 
and Year -1 for each property. Superscripts a, b, and c indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels 
in the two-sided test. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
 
 
 
 (1)  (2)  
D_Peer_RevPAR D_OCFROA 
Acquirer   Target  Acquirer     Target   
        
Intercept 30.9906 a  1.6492  42.0184   -21.4798  
 (6.4892)  (12.076)  (14.5473)   (32.1662)  
PREMIUM 16.0413 a  -1.714  34.5633 a  3.9621  
 (3.0318)  (7.3332)  (5.2903)   (4.3548)  
D_LOC MP -0.1100 b  -0.2275 a -0.0899   -0.1284  
 (0.0450)  (0.0862)  (0.0935)   (0.1824)  
D_LOC_DM 65.8488 a  74.4111 a 71.9000 a  74.3932 a 
 (3.9624)  (5.4969)  (9.2003)   (12.6721)  
D_LOC_SP 1.3435 a  1.7049 b 1.0725   0.5886  
 (0.4766)  (0.6769)  (0.7148)   (0.9109)  
LOG_RM -1.2501 b  -0.7400  -2.2221 c  1.5464  
 (0.5946)  (0.9869)  (1.2367)   (2.8643)  
SELECTION -10.4999 a  0.9765  -17.2496 a  -0.6506  
 (1.2141)  (1.1464)  (3.1334)   (1.2981)  
        
Product Dummies Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  
Location Dummies Yes   Yes  Yes   No  
          
Random Effect No   Yes   No   Yes   
Z-stat for Random Effect n/a   1.65 c n/a   n/a  
          
N 1180   761  384   217  
Chi-square n/a    33.43  n/a    n/a   
F-Statistic 33.72 a  n/a   8.18 a  6.76 a  
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Thus, Hypothesis 9.1, which claims that higher premiums are associated with better 
post-acquisition performance, is supported for the acquirer properties. In contrast, no 
evidence is found for Hypothesis 9.2, which claims that higher premiums are 
associated with poor post- acquisition performance. 
While researchers have persistently found positive combined abnormal returns 
for the target and the acquirer, decomposition of these joint outcomes revealed that 
targets accounted for the majority of those gains, with acquiring firms contributing 
neutral or negative returns (i.e., Bradley et al., 1988; Houston et al., 2001; Leeth and 
Borg, 2000). One explanation for the unequal results between the target and the 
acquirer has been that premiums have to be paid to the target shareholders. Findings in 
this study indicate that the premium, which is paid in the absence of any relationship 
with the target’s ex post performance improvement, is still justified as a payment for 
achieving the acquirer’s performance improvement.   
Finally, as a summary, Table 16 presents the results of the hypotheses 
formulated and tested in this study. The analyses found supporting evidence for local 
market conflict impact on price for both target and acquirer properties (H2.2), positive 
buying power effect from property growth for both target and acquirer properties (H3), 
positive product confidence effect for the target properties only (H6) , 
underperformance of deals announced in high industry cycles for the target in 
RevPAR performance and for the acquirer in OCF measure (H8), and a positive 
association between performance and the premium paid for the acquirer properties in 
RevPAR and OCF measures (H9.1).  
No evidence was found regarding national property growth and price (H1), 
local collusion (H2.1), the effect of local conflict on cost savings (H4.1 and 4.2), 
cross-selling impact across heterogeneous product (H5), disciplinary role of takeover 
(H7), and the destructive implication of the offer premium (H9.2).  
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Table 16. Summary of the results 
 
Hypotheses Related theoretical/analytical framework Result 
A. Market Power  
H1. The price increase of the target and the acquirer 
properties is greater with the higher property 
growth induced by the merger. 
Market power hypothesis Not Supported 
H2.1 The merger-induced market power in the local 
market is positively associated with the increase 
in price of the properties of the target and the 
acquirer. 
Local cooperation Not supported 
H2.2. Merger-induced territorial conflict in the local 
market is positively associated with a decrease in 
price of the properties of the target and the 
acquirer. 
Local erosion Supported 
B. Buying Power  
H3. The cost saving of the target and the acquirer 
properties is greater with the higher property 
growth induced by the merger. 
Buying power hypothesis Supported 
H4.1. The cost saving of the target and the acquirer 
properties is greater with the higher buying 
power at the local market. 
Local cooperation Not supported 
H4.2 The cost saving of the target and the acquirer 
properties is lower with the higher buying power 
at the local market. 
Local erosion Not supported 
C. Relatedness of Target and Acquirer  
H5 The higher the product distance between the 
target and the acquirer, the higher the occupancy 
rate of the target and the acquirer. 
Cross-selling across 
heterogeneous product types Not supported 
H6 The lower product distance between the target 
and the acquirer contributes to the higher price. Product confidence Supported 
D. Tender Offer  
H7. The operating performance of the target 
properties is superior with the tender offer. Market discipline Not supported 
E. Industry/market environment  
H8. The transactions announced in a high industry 
cycle perform poorly in the post-acquisition 
period. 
Performance extrapolation 
Managerial overconfidence Supported 
F. Premium  
H9.1 The offer premium is positively associated with 
the post-acquisition operating performance of 
the target. 
Resource-based theory of firm Supported 
H9.2 The offer premium is negatively associated with 
the post-acquisition operating performance of 
the target. 
Managers self-interest Not supported 
145 
CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION 
  
Synergistic gains are the most frequently stated rationale for mergers and 
acquisitions. Nonetheless, most of the academic literature has found limited evidence 
for value creation. As an attempt to explain this apparent contradiction, this paper 
examined the performance changes, the sources of synergy, and their realization into 
synergistic gains more directly. Rich information from the lodging industry dataset 
served as a good laboratory to isolate the impact of M&A on performance changes of 
the acquirer and target separately while controlling for other factors that can also 
affect performance. In this chapter, the findings of this study are consolidated into 
concluding remarks. The main discussion will focus on the observed performance 
changes as well as the synergy outcome and the sources of synergy which are verified 
by regression analysis.  
This study investigated whether performance actually improves after mergers 
and acquisitions at the property and the aggregate firm level. The results at the 
property level showed that the target properties achieved strong cost savings reflected 
in the improvement in the gross profit margin, which also affected improvement in the 
operating income margin. The price measure (ADR) showed a significant negative 
change, but the impact on revenue was insignificant. On the other hand, the acquirer 
properties showed a significant RevPAR improvement achieved by the occupancy rate 
improvement. No cost-saving effect was detected and the operating income margin 
exhibited significant deterioration for the acquirer in the property-level analysis.  
On the aggregate basis, the firm-level analyses showed significant RevPAR 
gains and cost savings for the aggregate merged firm. The separate firm-level analysis 
by the target and acquirer reveals that most gains were realized on the acquirer side. 
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The ADR and occupancy rate analyses showed that RevPAR gains were attained by 
the improvement in the occupancy rate. Given that lodging operations are 
predominantly franchised, the RevPAR gains found in the combined firm indicate 
positive value creation from the mergers and acquisition. Although a significant cost-
saving effect was detected for the target at the property level, it was not shown for the 
target firms in the firm-level analysis due to size and aggregate effects.   
Next, this study performed regression analysis in order to identify the sources 
of synergy. While the property-level data was used, the regression model was 
carefully designed to control the unobserved deal-level characteristics, possible 
selection bias, and other factors that can also affect the performance. For both target 
and the acquirer, the buying power was verified as a source of cost savings as shown 
in the positive results of property growth (PR_GROWTH) in the gross profit margin 
model. Against the collusion hypothesis, property growth was found to be 
insignificant for both the target and the acquirer.  
For the revenue, the target and the acquirer showed different sources of 
synergy. The target properties, although no significant changes were found in either 
property-level or the firm-level analysis, the regression results show that RevPAR 
change is associated with the nature of product combination. As shown in the negative 
coefficient of the product distance (P_DIST), the closer the brand families of the target 
and the acquirer, the more beneficial for the RevPAR of the target relative to the 
product competitors. The ADR and occupancy model reveals that such a RevPAR 
impact stem from the ADR change, i.e. P_DIST was significant only in the ADR 
model. For the acquirer properties, however, P_DIST was insignificant in the 
corresponding models. These results indicate that the acquirer’s brand recognition 
spills over to the target and increases the brand confidence when the target’s brands 
are merged into the acquirer’s brand family. Thus, the acquirer’s brand equity is 
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identified as a source of the target’s price and revenue gains in this type of brand 
combination. For the acquirer, which already has a brand recognition, there is no 
further gain or loss. 
For the acquirer, the RevPAR gain was found to stem from the cross-selling 
effect. When the selection was controlled, the property growth (P_GROWTH) was 
significantly positive in the RevPAR model for the acquirer. Since P_GROWTH was 
insignificant in the price model while it was significant in the occupancy rate model, 
the RevPAR gain is clearly attributed to the occupancy enhancement. These results 
can be explained by the target customers’ cross-purchase of the acquirer’s properties. 
However, the same effect was not found for the target properties. Thus, an increase in 
geographic availability achieved by the merger is identified as the source of acquirer’s 
revenue and occupancy gains.  
Along the way, this study identified the sources of value erosion from mergers 
and acquisitions. Increasing room capacity within the local market was shown to have 
a detrimental impact on ADR, occupancy rate (significantly for the acquirer), and 
RevPAR for both acquirer and target properties. This is contrary to the view that 
enhanced local cooperation by building capacity within the local market would lead to 
an increase in price and/or occupancy rate. The fact that both ADR and occupancy rate 
show the negative coefficient demonstrates that mergers can cause a particularly 
detrimental impact on the target and the acquirer properties within the same local 
market. Thus, an increase in local contact is identified as the source of value erosion 
for both the target and the acquirer. With respect to the product distance, the flipside 
of the negative coefficient of P_DIST indicates that more heterogeneous brand 
combination has a detrimental effect, presumably from brand dilution. Again, such 
results only affected the target. Given that the acquirer firms were found to be older, 
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they may have solidly established brand equity, which may not be affected by the 
target’s brand characteristics.  
Two moderators of merger performance were also examined in this study: 
deals announced in high industry cycles and tender offers. The deals announced in the 
high industry cycles showed a negative association with the target’s ADR changes and 
the acquirer’s operating cash flow changes relative to their peers, indicating that the 
deal may have been driven by a non-value enhancing motivation or over-optimism. 
Refuting the disciplinary role of the takeover market, the tender offers showed no 
significant association with any of the synergy measures.  
This study also found that even if there is synergy created from underlying 
sources, the gains may not manifest due to the offsetting value erosion or 
size/aggregation effects. For example, the regression analysis combined with the 
findings in the analyses of performance changes both at the property level and the firm 
level showed that property growth is positively associated with the target property’s 
cost savings. Such gain was found in the property analysis where all the properties 
received equal weight. Once properties were aggregated for the target firm, the cost-
saving effect was no longer significant because the gain was mainly realized in the 
small-scale properties.  
In terms of the relationship between the offer premium and post-acquisition 
synergy measures, the offer premium showed a significant positive association with 
the RevPAR and OCFROA gains for the acquirer properties and positive but 
insignificant results for the target properties. While the finding supports the 
supposition that the premium reflects the value of synergy, interestingly, it is 
suggested that the target serves as a crucial resource to improve the acquirer’s 
performance, and the premium is a payment to gain access to such a resource, rather 
than that the premium is the payment for the future improvement of the target per se.  
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Finally, the results also indicated that the lodging mergers demonstrate the 
complementary nature of resource combination between the target and the acquirer. It 
was found that the acquirer’s buying power and brand recognition can have a positive 
spillover effect on the target’s cost saving and price premium; target’s customers may 
cross-purchase the acquirer’s properties. The complementarity is also implied in the 
opposite signs of the selection variable (positive for the target and the negative for the 
acquirer).  
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CHAPTER 9 
DISCUSSION  
 
9.1 Contribution 
Motivated by the theories and literature of mergers and acquisitions, this paper 
examined the realization and the sources of synergy more directly. The detailed 
mechanism of value creation underlying mergers and acquisitions has been largely 
unknown. For example, while post-merger price change has received relatively greater 
attention, the task of identifying the sources of such change has been quite elusive due 
to the general inability of economists to empirically disentangle the market power 
element of performance from that of efficiency (Carter, 1977).  In this regard, the 
primary contribution of this study is to provide a clearer picture of the creation of 
synergy and its sources in an isolated manner by examining each component items 
(e.g. price and quantity measure for revenue) as well as the composite ones. For the 
example above, the results in this study indicated that while property growth has no 
impact on price increase, it leads to a significant cost savings. Moreover, these results 
were obtained while controlling for the supply and demand condition, product types, 
and location. Thus, clearly, this study shows that the collusion hypothesis is not 
supported without ambiguity. More specifically, the multivariate regression results 
indicate that a unit change in the property growth, which corresponds to 28 percent 
annual growth rate in the number of properties, leads to about a 1.7 percent and 1.4 
percent improvement in peer-adjusted gross profit for the acquirer and the target 
group, respectively. 
The second contribution of this study is that it investigated the impact of 
synergy creation by the target and the acquirer separately and thereby shed light on the 
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role played by the target and the acquirer regarding the creation of synergy. For 
example, studies have pointed out that product line extension can enhance revenues 
after the merger if the managers exploit the strong reputation of a merging business 
brand (Capron and Hulland, 1999). However, it has not been very clear about the 
detailed mechanism of how such gain is obtained. The findings in this study show that 
the revenue gains are achieved when the target’s brands are combined with a similar 
brand family of the acquirer. Also, the gain is more likely to be realized on the target 
side. In addition, it was shown that the revenue gain is generated from the price gain. 
For another example, property growth was shown to have a positive impact on the 
acquirer’s revenue through occupancy gain. In this case, this result indicates that there 
is a cross-selling effect from the target customer to the acquirer properties.  
The third contribution of this study is that it incorporated the value erosion as 
well as the value creation of mergers and acquisitions. The possible value erosion is 
obvious from the theory but it has not been discussed much in existing empirical 
research. This study provided evidence that local market conflict and brand dilution 
from the heterogeneous brand combination can be detrimental on the performance. 
Given that many mergers are criticized given that the promised synergy gains fail to 
realize, findings in this study provide valuable insight for both academics as well as 
industry practitioners.  
Finally, this study evaluated the relationship between the premium and the 
post-acquisitions operating performance. The results showed that premiums are 
associated with the ex post performance improvement not of the target but of the 
acquirer. Combined with the value gains to the acquirer shown in the aggregate 
analysis, this result indicate that the premium is required to gain control over the 
target’s assets which can be valuable in improving the acquirer even though the 
target’s synergy on the aggregate basis does not manifest.  
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9.2 Limitations and Future Research 
The lodging industry provides a unique opportunity to test the impact of 
mergers and acquisitions while controlling for other confounding factors of the market. 
In studies of large-scale data and even at industry-level studies looking at other 
industries, estimating and controlling for such conditions can be extremely challenging. 
This was possible in this study because there is no major substitute for hotel rooms; 
the product type and geographic market boundary are relatively well defined; and the 
data is available for a substantial portion of U.S. hotel properties. However, given that 
the results of this study were drawn from the lodging industry, there is no guarantee 
that the results will apply to other industries.  
In order to examine the realization of synergy at the root of the organizational 
structure, this study examined the data at the micro level from hotel properties. 
However, the organizational integration and modifications at the corporate level are 
expected to affect the post-acquisition synergy creation (Canina, Kim, and Ma, 2010). 
In the trend of asset-light strategy in the lodging industry,22 core assets of lodging 
corporations are shifting to intellectual capital, i.e. codified knowledge about an 
organization’s systems and operations (systems capital); knowledge about customers, 
markets, and distribution (customer capital); and knowledge acquired from people 
skills and expertise (human capital) (Walsh, Enz, and Canina, 2008). While Zollo and 
Singh (2004) examined the knowledge codification on the performance of mergers and 
acquisitions and reported a positive impact on the post-acquisition operating 
performance, an investigation of a broader range of intellectual capital in relation to 
mergers and acquisitions will also add value to M&A research.  
                                                 
22 Asset-light or asset-right? The Economist, Nov 11 2010. 
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Regarding the event study framework, econometric caveats and responding 
refinement of the design and methodology are continuing among academics. Despite 
an extensive literature, as Kothari and Warner (2008) put it, there is still no clear 
winner in this horse race. In addition, there are many alternative ways of constructing 
peer performance. One may estimate the counterfactual performance, i.e. the 
performance in the hypothetical state if a property were not involved in the merger and 
acquisition. This dissertation defined the peer by the product competitors in the market 
so that a practical interpretation is possible in terms of the competitive advantage of 
the merger-affected properties over non merger-affected ones. However, it will also be 
meaningful to examine the outcomes by different methodologies. The comparison 
itself may not be of much significance because these two methods can answer 
different questions, i.e. whether the merged firms perform better than the competitors 
versus whether the merged firms perform better than if they were not the subject of a 
merger.  
Another issue related to the event study is the sample selection process. In 
order to analyze the impact of a single deal without any interference of other deals, 
this study identified the sample in a non-overlapping manner, which led to dropping 
hotel firms that make multiple acquisitions over a short span of years. Focusing on the 
relatively infrequent acquirers can overweight a sample with mergers that were poorly 
implemented, because successful acquirers will tend to seek new and bigger deals 
while failed acquirers will tend to abstain from future acquisitions (Houston et al., 
2001). The performance of the hotel properties of frequently acquiring firms remains 
as a future research area. 
In terms of the offer premium, the findings indicated that the premium is 
positively associated with the improvement in the post-acquisition performance of the 
acquirer, refuting the idea of premium as a proxy for value destruction. Nonetheless, it 
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is still possible that the acquirer has paid above the true value of the synergy. 
Additional study involving further cash flow projection and estimation will be 
necessary to fully evaluate such a statement.  
With a limited number of deals between public companies, this study was not 
able to link the announcement returns and realized performance improvements in the 
post-acquisition period. However, some conjecture is possible. In peer-adjusted 
RevPAR and OCFROA improvements, the aggregate firm-level analyses separately 
by target and acquirer showed a positive result for the acquirer in RevPAR and 
insignificant results for the target. Still, it was found that the premium had to be paid 
to the target shareholders to realize such gain on the acquirer. Combined, various 
scenarios are possible. Both target and acquirer can experience a positive 
announcement return as in Canina (2001). For the target, this outcome can be driven 
by the premium, and for the acquirer, it can be driven by the expected synergy gain. If 
the premium is excessive relative to the acquirer’s synergy gain, then, the acquirer will 
experience a negative announcement return while the target will experience a positive 
return (again from the premium). Future research may further verify these points.  
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APPENDIX  
 
Hotel Product Types 
 
Industry Sector and 
Quality Levels Characteristics of Quality levels Brand Exemplar 
Luxury 
Elegant; distinctive; highest-quality décor; 
upscale restaurants; full range of first-class 
amenities and customized services 
Four Seasons 
Upscale 
Well-integrated décor; quality furnishings; 
premium guest-room amenities and facilities; 
high staff to guest ratio. 
Hyatt, Crowne Plaza 
Midscale with food and 
beverage 
Nicely appointed rooms; range of facilities; 
good-quality amenities; some special services 
available; restaurants. 
Holiday Inn 
Midscale without food 
and beverage 
Nicely appointed rooms; range of facilities may 
be limited; good quality amenities. Hampton Inn 
Economy Clean and comfortable; minimum of services and amenities Days Inn 
 
Source: Canina, Enz, and Harrison (2005) 
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